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Militsa Danielova Danova 
Roma as a Unique Cultural Minority: the Impact of Communism and Democratisation on 
Roma in Eastern Europe
This thesis examines the socio-economic situation of Roma in three Eastern European 
countries: Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. It observes that the governments of these three 
countries, to varying degrees, have failed to develop effective policies for improving the 
marginal situation of the Roma minority. My hypothesis is that one of the key factors 
explaining this failure is the fact that ‘the dominant group – ethnic minority’ relations in 
these countries have been based on a liberal as opposed to a multicultural model.
An examination of the academic literature on accommodating ethnic minority rights reveals 
two main models that deal with the rights of minority cultures. The first, the liberal model, 
focuses on human rights and advances the idea that the best way to improve the quality of 
life of ethnic minorities would be to treat their members in the same way as the members of
the dominant ethnic group. The second, the multicultural model, demands special protection 
of the culture of minority groups and views this as an essential precondition for improving 
the minority group’s socio-economic condition. 
The thesis argues that both the policies of the Eastern European governments, as well as the 
monitoring mechanisms adopted by the international community are based on the liberal 
approach which promotes the implementation of human rights standards.  These policies 
have not been successful which in turn casts doubt on the suitability of the liberal model as a 
solution to the problematic situation of the Roma in the three Eastern European countries 
studied here. 
The thesis examines two other factors that explain the poor socio-economic status of Roma in 
Eastern Europe: the unique situation of the Roma minority as one lacking an external 
homeland that could support its minority abroad and the unique geo-political situation of 
these Eastern European countries whose other minorities do have external homelands and are 
seen as posing a security threat to the host countries. Thus the Roma suffer the twofold 
disadvantage of having no external protection and of being the target of the negative attitudes 
aimed at the other ethnic minority groups due to the perceived security threat to the territorial 
integrity of these states.
ii
The analysis demonstrates that the Roma minorities in Hungary fare better than in Bulgaria 
and Romania due to the lack of the above mentioned security issues vis-à-vis other ethnic 
minorities. 
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1Introduction
This thesis explores the situation of the Roma minority in Eastern and Central Europe. 
It delves into the history and social status of Roma in three Eastern and Central European 
countries: Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The governments in Eastern Europe, and more 
specifically those of Bulgaria and Romania, have failed to develop a set of policies, adequate 
for dealing with the marginal and unequal position of the Roma. To help explain why states 
have been ultimately unsuccessful, the thesis examines theories of multiculturalism and 
nationality in light of the Roma’s unique position, the functioning of the international system 
of human rights, and the geopolitical situation of states in Eastern Europe.  
My hypothesis is that one of the key factors explaining the failure of Eastern 
European countries to deal adequately with their Roma minorities is the fact that ‘the 
dominant group – ethnic minority’ relations in these countries have been based on a liberal as 
opposed to a multicultural model.
An examination of the academic literature on accommodating ethnic minority rights 
reveals two key models that deal with the rights of minority cultures. The first, the liberal 
model, focuses on human rights and advances the idea that the best way to improve the 
quality of life of ethnic minorities would be to treat their members in the same way as the 
members of the dominant ethnic group. The second, namely the multicultural model, 
demands special protection of the culture of minority groups and views this as an essential 
precondition for improving the minority group’s socio-economic condition. The thesis 
demonstrates that the international system of human rights, which sets minority rights 
standards for states to adopt, is almost entirely based on the liberal model. The national 
governments in Eastern Europe also show preference for the liberal model over the 
multicultural model, which is based on the protection of minority cultures. Two explanations 
emerge for the preference of states for the liberal model on a global level and in their 
domestic affairs. First, states still prioritise their territorial integrity and believe that stronger 
forms of multicultural rights, such as the right to autonomy, would not help them reach this 
goal. Therefore, the focus of the international monitoring organisations on human rights (in 
line with the liberal model) as opposed to cultural rights (in line with the multicultural 
model) fits well with the territorial and/or security concerns of Eastern European countries.
2Secondly, the governments of Bulgaria and Romania are unwilling to adopt 
multicultural policies due to the overall negative attitude of the dominant groups toward their
ethnic minorities. This problem has its roots in historic developments that are unique in these 
states. Bulgaria, for example, had been under the domination of the Ottoman Empire for 
nearly five centuries of its history1, and its current Turkish minority is a permanent reminder 
of the subjection of the Bulgarians by the Turks in the past. At present, the Turkish state is a 
neighbouring state of Bulgaria and an external national homeland of the Turkish minority. 
Claims for succession and autonomy are an always present threat to territorial integrity. In
Hungary, this problem does not exist as the country has fairly integrated and small-scale
minorities with no external national homelands. This facilitates the introduction of stronger 
forms of minority protection in the country, which are of benefit to Roma people.  
Because of the unique position of the Roma as a transnational, non-territorial minority 
with no external national homeland, the Roma do not fit the nationality model developed by 
Rogers Brubaker, which situates minorities in the triad nationalising state – external national 
homeland – national minority.2 The liberal model of citizenship rights is not suited to 
alleviate the unequal and marginal status of the Roma. Endorsed by theorists such as John
Locke, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Brian Barry, Chandran Kukathas, and 
David Miller, the liberal model opposes either the existence of ethnic minorities or the 
protection of minorities by the state. I point out the relevance of Will Kymlicka’s 
multicultural model of cultural rights, proposing some changes as to accommodate the 
problems consistently experienced by the Roma people. In general, cultural rights can offer 
protection to the Roma by allowing them to keep their unique and separate characteristics. It 
is ‘integration without forced assimilation.’3
The first chapter looks at the key features of nationality in Eastern Europe. An 
exploration of these features helps explain why the dominant groups in the region view their 
ethnic minorities as a threat to the territorial integrity and security of the state. The finding 
                                                
1 Bulgaria had been under Ottoman domination between the 14th and 19th century.
2 Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 4.
3 Henrard, Kristin, “The Interrelationship between Individual Human Rights, Minority Rights and the Right to 
Self-Determination and Its Importance for the Adequate Protection of Linguistic Minorities”, The Global 
Review of Ethnopolitics, 1:1 (2001), 
[http://www.ethnopolitics.org/ethnopolitics/archive/volume_I/issue_1/henrard.pdf] (accessed: 16 November, 
2010).
3that the dominant groups have a hostile attitude toward their minorities helps explain the 
preference of the Eastern European states for the liberal model as opposed to the 
multicultural model. The chapter examines these models in the context of the liberal –
multicultural debate. The aim is to establish which of the two models allows development in 
the right direction – the direction of significant improvement of the socio-economic situation 
of the Roma. 
The second chapter examines human rights standards adopted by the international 
community. These standards are based on the liberal approach and have ultimately failed to 
bring a significant improvement of the socio-economic situation of the Roma. The absence of 
sound minority guarantees is regrettable in view of the vulnerable position of the Roma. The 
chapter establishes that protection of the Roma has been virtually absent until the 20th
century. Within the current human rights framework, most standards focus on human rights 
rather than cultural rights. This chapter establishes that states still prioritise territorial 
integrity and national cohesion over minority protection, especially in Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, Roma-related standards and measures are unpopular with the electorates of most 
nations. 
The third chapter assesses the application of international monitoring instruments that 
monitor states’ compliance with human rights standards. The bodies I investigate are the UN 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Office for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights, and the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. Three major 
problems emerge: partiality of states toward other states’ violation of human rights, 
underlying lack of power to enforce policies, and unwillingness to focus efforts on the 
protection of Roma people. I conclude that such absence of impartiality may create fears 
among Eastern European states that multiculturalism is an instrument of the West against 
their territorial integrity. Secondly, the three monitoring bodies are not actually empowered 
to monitor states’ compliance with human rights standards. They suffer from insufficient 
funding and staffing resources, which hints at the low motivation of states to become 
engaged in full-scale monitoring. The lack of power and resources suggests that decision-
making is still in the hands of the governments. In addition, these bodies are not engaged in 
monitoring the states’ implementation of Roma-related standards, and their work is being 
limited to small-scale projects for Roma integration. 
4To establish the past developments that modeled Roma identity, the fourth chapter 
gives a historic overview of the treatment of Roma by the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and 
Romanian dominant groups. The historic fate of the Roma is important because it has led to 
their unique and unequal position. The focus of this chapter is on historic marginalisation, 
demonstrating that this process is not recent, but has taken many centuries. Discriminated 
minorities are even more vulnerable to suffering because of historic injustices such as 
assimilation, enslavement, or discrimination. By examining past injustices against the Roma, 
the chapter affirms the need of acknowledging Roma identity and adopting group rights, 
targeted at the specific circumstances of the minority.
The fifth chapter examines the extent, to which the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and 
Romanian governments show preference for the liberal model, focused on citizenship, or the 
multicultural model, focused on the protection of minority cultures. I expand on Kymlicka’s 
security argument to explain the preference of Bulgaria and Romania for the liberal over the 
multicultural model. In Bulgaria, the dominant group considers itself to be the victim of 
historic injustice at the hands of its Turkish minority. Thus, ethnic minorities are perceived as 
posing a security threat to the territorial integrity of the state.4 In Romania, historical land 
redistributions have resulted in the annexation of Hungarian-populated territories, and the 
large Hungarian minority living there is seen as a threat to the security of the Romanian state. 
The Hungarian state does not have large and active ethnic minorities living on its territory, as
is the case with Romania and Bulgaria. The ethnic minorities in Hungary are largely 
assimilated and dispersed and do not pose a security threat. 
The chapter also offers an analysis of government policies and measures toward the 
integration of Roma in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania after the fall of Communism. The 
Bulgarian and Romanian authorities have adopted policies based on the liberal approach, 
which have not been successful in dealing with the problematic situation of the Roma.  The 
developed strategies contain multiple measures, but the large scope of the programs has led 
to the inadequate and inconsistent implementation of the planned measures. Hungary has 
been more successful in improving the socio-economic situation of the Roma, due in part to 
better planning, coordination and monitoring, and greater resources. Another reason why the 
                                                
4 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 187-90.
5Roma minority in Hungary fares better than in Bulgaria and Romania is the adoption of 
policies based on the multicultural model, such as non-territorial autonomy. 
The conclusion summarises the results of the different chapters and evaluates the 
existing mechanisms and practices for the protection of ethnic minorities in view of the 
unique position and socio-economic circumstances of the Roma minority. I conclude that the 
Eastern European countries have failed to deal with the problematic situation of the Roma 
due to their choice of policies, based on the liberal model as opposed to the multicultural 
model. At the same time, the geopolitical situation of the Eastern European states and the 
unique situation of the Roma as a transnational, non-territorial minority without an external 
national homeland are important factors when outlining suitable policies to accommodate 
their culture. 
6Chapter 1
Theoretical Debates on Rights for Ethnic Minority Groups 
1.1. Introduction
Chapter one explores the nature of minority rights. It examines various models of 
minority protection and aims to review alternatives for the inclusion of Roma in their 
societies. Firstly, the chapter discusses the relationship between the nation and ethnic 
minorities in Eastern Europe. I explore the key features of nationality in Eastern European 
states and how these features help explain the treatment of ethnic minorities in the region. 
Secondly, the chapter explores the grounds on which ethnic minorities can claim special 
rights as such. I offer a discussion on whether the interests of the members of minority 
groups would be served better if their culture were to be assimilated into the dominant one as 
a result of which they will share fully the privileges of the dominant culture. Alternatively, I 
address the question of whether the interests of members of minority groups would be served 
better if their culture as a whole was granted special protection. The chapter consists of two 
sections. The first section examines nationality in the context of Eastern Europe and the 
relationship between dominant groups and ethnic minorities. The section reviews the positive 
aspects of nationalism in Western democracies and addresses the reasons why the benefits of 
patriotism are not applicable to Eastern European states.
Kenneth Jowitt examines the dynamic of relations between dominant groups and 
ethnic minorities. He notes that the perception of minorities seeking more power is a source 
of conflict.5 Brubaker looks at why the Eastern European dominant groups have a hostile 
attitude toward their minorities. This attitude is a response to the efforts of external national 
homelands to protect the interests of co-nationals living in these states.6 Kymlicka argues that 
dominant groups in Eastern Europe view their minorities as irredentist and loyal to a 
neighbouring state which is their kin-state.7
The second section of the chapter explores the liberal – multicultural debate on the 
fair treatment of ethnic minorities, articulating the arguments of the proponents and 
                                                
5 Jowitt, Kenneth, Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940: A Debate on Development in a European Nation
(Berkley: Institute of International Studies, 1978), p. 13.
6 Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, p. 5.
7 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, p. 186.
7opponents to minority protection. The first part of the section on the liberal – multicultural 
debate examines the views of traditional liberals such as Locke, Rousseau, and Hobbes who 
claim that group rights are incompatible with national cohesion and state integrity. Miller 
reasons that minority protection results in unfair distribution of resources and widens the 
social gap between communities.8 The second part of this section presents the argument of 
another group of liberals, Barry and Kukathas, who recognise the importance of ethnicity for 
minority groups. However, the possible misuse of ethnicity for political purposes and 
profiteering is a cause of concern for these liberals.9 In sum, this group of scholars questions 
the overall utility and desirability of the protection of minority rights. 
The second part of the section on the liberal – multicultural debate moves away from 
the potential threats to the liberal state and examines the negative impact of the dominant 
culture’s social arrangements on the identities and quality of life of minority groups. The 
section discusses different conceptions of minority protection that would benefit ethnic 
communities. In addressing these issues, I first look at culture as a context of choice. 
Kymlicka makes the point that the choices people make are dependent on the cultural values 
they have internalized. If the dominant group treats the cultures of ethnic minorities as 
inferior, these cultures cannot serve as a context of choice.10 Because culture has this 
important function, I look at the difficulties associated with giving up one’s own culture. 
Ayelet Shachar notes that persons who renounce their cultural background must leave behind 
everything that is meaningful to them.11  Jacob Levy complements this argument by pointing 
out that members of ethnic groups are raised to regard the dominant culture as alien, and this 
acts as a barrier to leaving one’s ethnic community.12
Because it is difficult to renounce one’s culture, which is important for its bearers, I 
examine the need to give political recognition and visibility to cultural differences. Anna
Galeotti notes that admitting minorities into the public domain is a way to legitimise their 
                                                
8 Miller, David, Citizenship and National Identity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), pp. 28-32.
9 Barry, Brian, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2000), pp. 314-5; Kukathas, Chandran, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?”, Political Theory 20:1 (1992), p. 113-
4.
10
Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1985), p. 81.
11 Shachar, Ayelet, “On Citizenship and Multicultural Vulnerability. Positioning Rights in Multicultural 
World”, Political Theory, 28:1 (2000), p.79.
12 Levy, Jacob, The Multiculturalism of Fear, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.113.
8presence in society, giving them a sense of entitlement to their ethnic identity.13 I then 
explore the antipode of political recognition and visibility – the non-recognition of ethnic 
identity – and its adverse effects on one’s self-image. Charles Taylor has examined the 
problems of non-recognition and misrecognition and the resulting internalization of distorted 
ideas of oneself by minority members. 14
I also examine redistribution as a necessary supplement to recognition. Nancy Fraser 
notes that dominant cultures need to reconsider the stereotypic representations of cultural 
identities and reform the economic and social structure. In his view, questioning preexisting 
group identities will help eliminate the grounds for discriminatory treatment, cultural biases, 
and Eurocentrism.15 Subsequently, I review arguments in support of group-based rights, 
which build further on the ideas of public visibility and recognition. Bhikhu Parekh and 
Kymlicka, in particular, argue that group-based rights can remedy the unequal position of 
minorities. I employ Parekh’s idea that collective rights guarantee equal respect and 
opportunities for ethnic minorities. They help ethnic minorities participate in the private and 
public spheres of life and give them more power over resources.16 Like Parekh, Kymlicka 
points to the importance of legal and political recognition of cultural differences, arguing that 
minorities require special protection against unfair economic and political decisions of the 
larger society. A number of practices such as state symbols, official languages and holidays, 
and gerrymandering constitute preference for certain identities and needs over others. Given 
the many ways, in which dominant cultures hamper the expression of minority identity, 
special protection is required to remedy the unequal standing of ethnic communities.17 I also 
look at Laurence Thomas’s argument about the importance of dialogue for minority –
dominant culture relations. In his view, empathizing with the suffering of ethnic minorities is 
a step towards establishing a more socially just society.18
                                                
13 Galeotti, Anna, Toleration as Recognition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 101.
14 Taylor, Charles, “The Politics of Recognition”, in Gutmann, Amy, and Charles Taylor, eds., Multiculturalism 
and the “Politics of Recognition” an Essay, (Princeton: Chichester, Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 25.
15 Fraser, Nancy, “A Rejoinder to Iris Young” in Willett, Cynthia, Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the 
Current Debate, (Cambridge: Mass, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 39-40.
16 Parekh, Bhikhu, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press 2000), p. 204; p. 216.
17 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995), pp. 108-9.
18
Thomas, Laurence „Moral Deference” in Willet, Cynthia, Theorizing Multicultural Citizenship: A Guide to 
the Current Debate, (Cambridge: Mass, Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), p. 378.
9Finally, I revisit the arguments in favor of minority protection and their relevance to 
the protection of the Roma. I focus on culture as a context of choice, the difficulty of exit, 
political visibility, recognition of cultural differences, redistribution as a supplement to
recognition, legal and political inclusion of cultural differences, and moral learning as ways 
of accomodating ethnic minorities. 
1.2. Eastern Europe: nationalising states and minority rights
Jowitt examines the tense relationship between dominant groups and their ethnic 
minorities. For him, conflict develops when dominant groups feel threatened by minorities 
seeking more power. Brubaker looks more closely at the relationship between nationalising
states, their ethnic minorities, and the external national homelands of these minorities. The 
Eastern European dominant groups have a hostile attitude toward their minorities because 
they make claims for more rights while their external national homelands seek to defend their 
interests. Brubaker’s triad, nationalising state – external homeland – national minorities, 
helps us understand how ethnicity has become a major source of tension. 
Kymlicka also examines the relationship between the Eastern European states, their 
national minorities, and the kin-states of these minorities, which controlled the currently 
dominant nations in the past. National minorities supported the efforts of the former 
subjugators to establish hegemony in the region and are thus viewed as disloyal and 
irredentist. Because minorities are viewed as a threat to national security, the dominant 
groups in Eastern Europe are firmly opposed to minority group rights. 
Looking as the situation in Romania during the late 19th and early 20th century, Jowitt 
examines the dynamic of ethnic relations in the Eastern European context. In Jowitt’s view, 
ethnic relations are a source of tension due to the dominant group’s perception that minorities 
seek more power. 
Jowitt sees the Romanian society as a status-based one, centred on familial or other 
close ties.19 In contrast to such traditional forms of social organisation, class-divided societies 
base their social organisation and identification on the nuclear family and the individual.20
                                                
19 Jowitt, Kenneth, Social Change in Romania, 1860-1940, p. 8.
20 Ibid, pp. 7-8.
10
While Jowitt makes this distinction, class divisions have not been a typical feature of the 
Eastern European context, as the states in the region used to be Communist states. However, 
Jowitt’s discussion of the ethnic relations in Eastern Europe sheds light on the cases, in 
which ethnic conflict develops. Depending on how powerful the dominant group and 
minorities are, ethnic relations may be organised along three lines: compartmentalization, 
domination, and displacement. Compartmentalization occurs when minorities live in
enclaves and do not threaten the institutions and interests of the dominant group. As a second 
option, the group with more power dominates over the less powerful group. With 
displacement – the third variant – groups that are comparatively equal co-exist and interact 
continuously. Conflict develops by way of imperialism, civil war, fascism, or internal 
displacement. Except for compartmentalization where enclaves are not viewed as threatening 
by the dominant group, the relationship between the dominant group and the minorities is a 
source of conflict.21
While Jowitt discusses the situation of late 19th – early 20th century Romania, the 
scenarios he describes have some relevance to the dynamic of relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Where minorities are small and weak, as in the case of Hungary, and do not 
threaten the institutions of the dominant group, ethnic tensions are unlikely to develop. 
Unlike Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania have large and active ethnic minorities, which have 
made claims to power-sharing, as chapter five will show. The more powerful groups, in this 
case the dominant groups in the two countries, allow no room for minority nationalisms, 
making every effort to dominate over them and limit the possibility of secession. In essence, 
Jowitt offers a diagnosis of the situation rather than a model for the protection of ethnic 
minorities, and of the Roma in particular. His argument helps explain why the dominant 
groups in Eastern Europe are unwilling to adopt special measures toward minority protection, 
which could benefit the Roma. 
Like Jowitt, Brubaker examines the dynamic of the relations between Eastern 
European nationalities and their national minorities. He looks at the key features of 
nationality in Eastern Europe and coins the term ‘nationalizing nationalisms.’22 Nationalizing
nationalisms are those that ‘involve claims made in the name of the “core nation” or 
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nationality, defined in ethnocultural terms, and sharply distinguished as the legitimate 
“owner” of the state, which is conceived as the state of and for the core nation.’23
Brubaker examines the virtues of nationalism in Western Europe and why these 
virtues cannot be transferred in light of the Eastern European context. In Brubaker’s view, in 
longstanding, settled nation-states such as the United States, the category of nation can be the 
driving wheel to mobilizing solidarity among the nation’s members, including all citizens of 
the state. In this sense, invoking nationhood is an attempt to relativise or transcend internal 
divisions and differences. It is an effort to get individuals to formulate their interests and 
identities as members of one particular nation rather than as members of another collective 
entity.24 To that purpose, nationalism and patriotism can be valuable in four different ways. 
First, they are important in motivating and sustaining civic engagement, helping to create 
active and committed citizens. Patriotism facilitates the development of feelings of mutual 
responsibility and solidarity that transcend the boundaries of ethnic identities. The 
identification with one’s country creates a sense of responsibility and provokes powerful 
emotions, concerning the actions of the national government. These can be anger, outrage, 
and shame, and they can motivate opposition to governmental policies. Second, nationalism 
and patriotism facilitate the development and sustenance of redistributive social policies. To 
be perceived as legitimate, these require mutual responsibility and cross-class solidarity 
generated by nationalism. Third, the rhetoric of nationhood contributes to the integration of 
immigrants. The American nation, for example, is imagined as relatively open and 
facilitating integration. Experience shows that second- and third-generation immigrants tend 
to assimilate, adopting an American identity. Fourth, in view of national security and foreign 
policy, patriotism fosters commitment to the security of the common homeland and the 
preservation of liberties, even the liberty to take a dissenting stand. 25
While stable and longstanding democracies in the West enjoy the virtues of 
nationalism, its benefits have not materialised in the states of Eastern Europe. To a large 
extent, this can be attributed to the nature of nationalising states as well as the dynamic in 
play between nationalising states, their ethnic minorities, and the external homelands of these 
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minorities. According to Brubaker, the nationalising states in Eastern Europe share six 
common elements. First, there is the idea of a core nationality, which is defined as an ethno-
cultural entity, differentiated from the totality of citizens. Second, the core nation has legal 
ownership over the state apparatus. Third, the core nation is not at the peak of its 
development, and its specific interests are not adequately served.26 Due to a heritage of 
discrimination against the dominant group, it is considered to be in an unfavorable
demographic, economic, and cultural position. The claim of holding a weak position justifies 
a ‘remedial’ or ‘compensatory’ project, in which the power of the state is used to promote 
certain, inadequately served in the past, interests of the core nation.27 Fourth, it is believed 
that action is needed in multiple directions and fields in order to contribute to the well-being 
and hegemony of the nation. Fifth, a compensatory action is required and sixth, mobilisation
takes place on the basis of ideas and diverse contexts:  legislation, associations, press, etc. as 
to establish politics and practice of the state. Finally, formal and informal policies and 
practices are adopted, based on the above concepts.28
There is a specific dynamic in play between such nationalising states, their ethnic 
minorities, and the external homelands of these minorities. Directly opposed to the 
nationalism of nationalising states are the external homelands, which seek to support the 
activities, rights, and institutions of their ethno-national kin minorities living in the 
nationalising states.29 External national homelands assert their right and obligation to defend 
the interests of their ethnic co-nationals.30 An example of this is the effort of the Hungarian 
state to advocate more rights on behalf of ethnic Hungarians in Romania. External homelands 
base such claims for protection on the view that their kin minorities are being threatened by
the nationalising states. In this way, the nationalism of the external national homeland is in
direct opposition and dynamic interplay with the nationalism of the nationalising state. 
Pressed between the two mutually antagonising nationalisms are the ethnic minorities, which 
have their nationalism as well. Ethnic minorities demand that the states they inhabit 
recognise their ethno-cultural nationality.31 Because the three distinct nationalisms are 
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antagonistic, ‘interlocking and interactive’, a triad of uneasy relations is in play between the 
nationalisms of nationalising states, ethnic minorities, and external homelands.32  
Brubaker believes that there are three possible approaches to institutionalising the 
national status of minorities in a multinational state in the context of these nationalising
processes. First, the state may choose not to recognise or institutionalise the self-perception 
of a sub-state ethnicity as a national community. The claim may be that although the ethnic 
group in question differs in language or religion, it belongs, in essence, to the dominant 
nation. As a second option, the state may recognise the subjective claim of the sub-national 
community, simultaneously aiming to encourage and institutionalise a broader definition of
nationhood. In the third variant, the state accepts the minority’s self-designation as a national 
minority without trying to define it as belonging to the nation. Even in this case, however, the 
state is perceived as a nation-state, which belongs to the dominant group.33 The first approach 
is closer to historic attempts at assimilation in Eastern Europe, while the second variant 
leaves minorities a degree of choice whether to assimilate or preserve elements of their ethnic 
identity. The third variant is more interesting to explore, in that it proposes specific rights to 
ethnic minorities. Examples from the interwar period illustrate attempts to implement this 
model. Ethnic communities such as the Hungarians in Romania were given certain limited 
cultural rights encoded in international treaties and domestic law.34 In fact, as shown in 
chapter five, nationalising states with sizeable minorities such as Bulgaria and Romania have 
presently granted them some limited group-specific rights. At the same time, the tension 
between the three nationalisms – of the nationalising states, national minorities, and external 
national homelands - is a major obstacle to granting rights to ethnic minorities. 
In addition to these three approaches to the national status of minorities, Brubaker 
develops three models of the state that can be differentiated in terms of minority treatment: 
‘the model of the “civic state”’, ‘the model of the binational or multinational states’, and the 
‘hybrid model of minority rights’ state.35 Under the third model, the state belongs to all 
citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin. The model of the binational and multinational states
conceives of the state as belonging to two or more core ethno-cultural nations. These two 
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models are in sharp contrast: ethnic belonging has no relevance in the first case but is of 
major importance in the second. Under the civic model, the composite parts of the state 
apparatus are individual, while under the bi- and multinational, they are the ethno-national 
groups. The hybrid model of minority rights conceives of states as national and not 
nationalising, with ethnic minorities being granted equal rights as citizens as well as minority 
protection, particularly in the fields of education and communication in one’s native
language.36 Unlike the second model, the ethnic minorities in the third model do not have 
equal national status. Brubaker holds the opinion that the civic and bi- and multinational 
models do not have a chance of being adopted in Eastern Europe. The civic model enjoys a 
considerable legitimacy globally, and civic principles have been incorporated in national law
and evoked in different declarations, especially in those directed toward the international 
community. On the other hand, these principles have not been fully adopted. Naturally, it is 
difficult to imagine that civic principles will be embraced in a context where nationality is 
understood in ethno-national rather than political terms.37 The bi- and multinational model 
will not easily prevail because the dominant groups would not share ethnic rights as is 
implied by this model. Brubaker considers that the prospects of the hybrid model of minority 
rights are better as it enjoys greater international legitimacy, with organisations such as the
Organization for Security and Co-operation, the European Union, and the Council of Europe
encouraging new member states to enforce minority rights standards. Consequently, all new 
states are formally committed to safeguarding the rights of minorities.38 However, the same 
trend was seen during the interwar period, with all states being formally bound to observe the 
Minority Treaties of the League of Nations. They clearly required that states procured 
elementary education in the mother’s tongue of minorities in regions with compact minority 
population. These treaties did not contribute much to counteract the dynamic of 
nationalisation. The formal guarantees of minority rights did not succeed in thwarting 
nationalisation. In view of these past developments, Brubaker is of the opinion that the future 
will show whether the regimes for international human rights protection can be more 
successful today. Most new states will be nationalising, as opposed to national, but the 
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degree of nationalisation will vary from one state to another. At the same time, all 
nationalising programs will have to compete with other economic, political, and social 
programs for commitment and support. While the new states will most probably be 
nationalising, the question for Brubaker is in what ways and to what extend they will be 
such.39 So, the hybrid model of minority rights cannot act as a guarantee that minority 
cultures will receive significant protection from the state, but this model permits 
development in the right direction – the direction of significant accommodation of cultural 
rights. 
The third element of the triad nationalising state – external national homeland –
national minorities here refers to large and active ethnic minorities with external homelands. 
Examples are the sizeable and politically active Hungarian minority in Romania and the 
Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The negative attitude of the Bulgarian and Romanian nations 
toward their respective Turkish and Hungarian minorities is the main reason why these 
Eastern European states have adopted the liberal model of human rights. The liberal approach 
is characterized by a focus on citizenship rights and aims to avoid special provisions for 
ethnic groups.
The Roma minority, which is the main subject of this thesis, does not fit in the triad 
nationalising state – external homeland – national minority. First, the Roma can be defined as 
a transnational and non-territorial minority that is not confined to certain regions or territories 
but dispersed across and within the boundaries of continents and states in a world-wide 
Diaspora.40 Second, the Roma people do not have a kin-state or external national homeland 
that can ‘provide haven or extend protection to them.’41 Third, the transnational community 
of Roma comprises of diverse sub-groups with different perceptions of ethnic identity, 
speaking Turkish, Arabic, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, Spanish, and other languages.42
The unique position and characteristics of the Roma minority place it in an uneasy 
position in the triad nationalising state – external national homeland – national minority. The 
nationalist model of Brubaker offers a diagnosis to the situation rather than a model for the 
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protection of Roma rights. The triad helps us understand the attitude of Eastern European 
states toward their ethnic minorities. The dominant Eastern European nations have a hostile 
attitude toward minorities because large ethnic groups on their territories have external 
national homelands active in their protection. This hostile attitude is transferred to other 
minorities like the Roma who suffer to a greater extent than other minorities as they don’t 
have a homeland. 
Multicultural scholars like Kymlicka examine a similar dynamic of ethno-national 
relations in the region, offering a solution to accommodating the Roma culture. Kymlicka 
looks at the tense relationship between Eastern European states, their national minorities, and 
the external homelands of these minorities or what he calls kin-states.43 This uneasy 
relationship is a result of the historic position of the now dominant groups that were 
previously in the composition of neighboring states. With the breakdown of three empires –
the Russian Romanov, Habsburg, and Ottoman Empire – the national groups in Eastern 
Europe acquired independence. However, they still ‘view themselves as the historically weak 
parties … which continue to think and act as if they are weak and victimized minorities, and 
which therefore continue to live in existential fear for their existence.’44 The problem is 
exacerbated by the presence of minorities on their territories, which have the former 
dominant nations as kin-states. These minorities were historically powerful and collaborated 
with the former oppressor as to establish hegemony in the region. With the breakdown of 
empires, the balance of power was reversed, but such minorities are still viewed as irredentist 
and seeking to rejoin their external homelands. Because of the perceived threat of national 
minorities collaborating with the former oppressor, Eastern European dominant groups insist 
on having a strong state with disempowered minorities.45 To illustrate the ethnic tensions 
specific to Eastern Europe, Kymlicka points that the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is 
relatively powerless compared to the dominant group. However, ethnic Hungarians were 
historically the members of the dominant group, which had a privileged status within the 
Habsburg Empire. The Hungarians actively supported the efforts of the Habsburg Empire to 
establish hegemony in the region. In contrast to ethnic Hungarians, Slovaks were treated as a 
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subordinate population which had to be assimilated through ‘Magyarization’.46 This 
hierarchy was reversed after the Slovaks attained independence. They became the dominant 
group while the ethnic Hungarians were a minority threatened by Slovakia’s efforts at nation-
building. However, the memory of historic subjugation remains and for ethnic Slovaks, 
Hungarians are still loyal to their kin-state and hence potentially irredentist. Moreover, 
Hungarians are seen as the historically dominant and privileged group which collaborated 
with the Habsburg Empire as to oppress the culture and language of ethnic Slovaks.47
In the context of this ‘securitization’ of ethnic relations48, claims to minority 
protection are not easily accepted by the dominant groups. As Kymlicka points, ‘anything 
that benefits the minority is seen as a threat to the majority … [and] the treatment of 
minorities is above all a question of national security.’49 Such securitization is harmful to 
democracy itself, threatening the existence of civil society. By overemphasizing the security 
risks involved in meeting minority demands, post-Communist states refuse ‘to make room 
for an open and democratic debate on the merits of Western best practices.’50
The securitization of ethnicity helps explain the treatment of national minority groups
by the Eastern European dominant groups. At the same time, the unique situation of Roma 
poses additional challenges to devising such cultural rights that would accord them effective 
protection. This ethnic minority differs from the historical national minorities that have, to 
varying degrees, institutionalised their cultural practices. Having lost their autonomy due to 
various historic developments, national minorities have strived to preserve their ethnic 
identity and seek some form of autonomy. Kymlicka notes that the Roma people are a 
transnational minority that falls outside the group of national ethnic communities. There are 
two possible approaches to the protection of their rights and identity. First, the Roma can 
look for ways to qualify as a national minority. The second option is setting up targeted 
policies that aim to counterbalance the disadvantages Roma face in the absence of an external 
homeland and their marginalisation and isolation from the dominant culture. The first is a 
feasible objective in Eastern Europe. Some countries, like Romania, have recognised the
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Roma as a national minority. The question is whether recognition will translate into actual 
protection. Eastern European states accept the self-designation of ethnic minorities and at 
least officially, their approach is not nationalising. Examining the policies and approaches of
a diverse array of institutions in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, chapter five points out that 
the governments of these countries have worked toward establishing targeted norms for their 
Roma minorities. At the same time, other factors compete for the attention of national 
governments and render minority protection somehow ineffective. These are the insistence 
on having a strong state with disempowered minorities, the presence of active national 
minorities, and the proactive approach of external homelands (e.g. Hungary) toward the 
protection of such minorities. The high level of mistrust of the loyalty of national minorities 
with external homelands is one factor to be taken into consideration when applying the 
multicultural model of group-based rights. Second, in the absence of an external concerned 
homeland, the unique and unequal position of Roma, along with their marginalisation and 
isolation from the dominant groups, are important factors to reflect upon in the process of 
elaborating targeted policies for Roma protection.
To sum up, Jowitt examines traditional societies and their uneasy relationship with 
class-based ethnic groups. For him, the coexistence of two forms of social organisation 
results in ethnic tensions and subsequent displacement and domination. The discussion of 
ethnic relations in Eastern Europe helps explain the dynamic of ethnic conflict there. 
  Brubaker pays more close attention to nationalism in Eastern Europe. He examines 
the benefits of nationalism in Western Europe and reviews the reasons why these virtues 
cannot be brought home in the context of Eastern Europe. His triad nationalising state –
external homeland – national minority sheds light on the question why states in the region 
oppose accommodating the rights of national minorities. Brubaker examines three 
approaches of states to institutionalizing nationhood and nationality: assimilation of national 
minorities, recognition of national minority status with a degree of assimilation, and 
accepting the self-definition of ethnic minorities as national ones. For Brubaker, the third 
approach is most appropriate as a guiding model for the states of Eastern Europe because it 
involves adopting specific rights for ethnic minorities. While this model serves the interests 
of minorities best, the nationalising projects of Eastern European nations are a major obstacle 
to adopting the third model. Brubaker also examines three models of the state: the model of 
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the civic state, ‘the model of the binational or multinational states, and the hybrid model of 
minority rights state.51. The third model enjoys international legitimacy and represents the 
best practice of Western democracies. This model does not guarantee that ethnic minorities 
will enjoy state protection in Eastern Europe due to the nationalising programs of states. 
However, it allows progress in the right direction – minority protection by accommodating 
cultural rights. 
Kymlicka also examines the dynamic of ethnic relations in Eastern Europe and offers 
a similar explanation about the tense relationship between states, their national minorities, 
and the kin-states of these ethnic minorities. The dominant groups in Eastern Europe were 
included in the makeup of former empires and had subordinate status. They attained formal 
independence from the subjugator but still view themselves as victimised minorities in need 
of a strong state. The presence of national minorities on their territories, which formerly 
collaborated with the oppressor, is considered a threat to national security. Because these 
minorities are believed to be irredentist, the dominant nations in Eastern Europe are opposed 
to granting them rights as a group. In the context of this uneasy relationship, strong forms of 
minority protection, such as autonomy, are not a feasible solution to accommodating any 
minority. Kymlicka notes that there are two possible approaches to accommodating the 
Roma identity. The first is to develop targeted norms that take into account the socio-
economic situation and special concerns of Roma people. The second possibility is that 
Roma qualify for a national minority status and benefit from all the rights that come with this 
status. 
1.3. The liberal – multicultural debate
The liberal – multicultural debate which I review, in part, here took place in the 
second half of the 20th century, in the context of a process, during which Western liberal 
democracies articulated their ways about the fair treatment of ethnic minorities. This debate 
does not take on board the national and cultural specificities of Eastern European states. 
However, the debate is vital in articulating the arguments in favor of protecting minority 
rights. The outcome of these debates should be brought home in Eastern Europe and become 
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part of the political reasoning behind public policy making. Even if not developed in an
Eastern European context, the outcomes of these debates bear significance, due to the fact 
that the problem with the fair treatment of minority cultures is of particular importance here. 
1.3.1. Ethnic groups and the state: defense of the state
In this section, I examine the arguments of traditional liberals such as Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, Mill, and Miller with their focus on state integrity and the dangers that arise from
the existence of intermediaries between the general citizenry and the state. While the ideas of 
traditional liberals are not part of the 20th century  liberal – multicultural debate, these ideas 
mark the birth of political reasoning on the position of minority groups within the state.  
According to traditional liberals, free institutions can work for the good of all persons only in 
states made of one nationality.  
Hobbes and Locke spoke of a social contract among unrelated individuals who agreed 
upon the establishment of the state. For Hobbes, written and unwritten laws derive their force 
and authority from the representative as constituted by a national assembly or personified by 
the monarch.52 No intermediaries should exercise authority, with the parliament being the 
only controller of sovereign law.53 Locke also looks at men ‘as so united in one society as to 
quit everyone his executive power … and resign in to the public.’54 Civil and political society 
is possible only when individuals ‘enter into society to make one people, one body politic 
under one supreme government.’55
These traditional liberals did not imagine any intermediary groups between the 
individuals and the state. Rousseau argued that that ‘if...the general will is to be truly 
expressed, it is essential that there are no subsidiary groups within the State.’56 In Rousseau’s 
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view, when individuals engage in deliberation, the general will results from a large number 
of small differences. If partial associations and speculative groups form to the disadvantage 
of all, the votes do not equal the number of men. The votes are as many as the groups, with 
the result being less general. If one of these entities grows so large as to swamp the others, 
the result is one single difference instead of the sum of small differences. Then, the general 
will does not have a role to play, and the opinion of the majority is no more valid than one of 
a single person.57 Mill further elaborated the argument, claiming that ‘[f]ree institutions are 
next to impossible in a country made of different nationalities.’58 A representative 
government cannot function if public opinion is not united. Persons with no fellow-feeling, 
especially if they speak and read in different languages, are not the proper social base for 
such government.59 From this perspective, state boundaries should necessarily coincide with 
the nation. 
In the first half of the 20th century, the situation of ethnic minorities became a more 
prominent issue. Therefore, David Miller who is very sympathetic to national cohesion gives 
much more consideration to ethnic minorities. He explores the relationship between national 
cohesion and fair distributive practices. While he agrees that ethnic identity is important for 
minority members, he also insists that national identity play a primary role in the provision of 
common goods for all citizens. In Miller’s formulation, national identity is based upon ‘a 
shared belief that its members belong together, and a shared desire to continue their life in 
common.’60 National identity entails historical continuity: individuals identify with and 
appropriate past deeds as their own. The historic national community is also the community,
in the context of which duties can be self-imposed. Ancestors have shed their blood to defend 
the nation, and contemporaries inherit the obligation to continue their work, directed in part 
toward the present and in part toward future generations. Another prominent feature of 
nationality is that it is an active and dynamic identity. Nations make decisions and achieve 
results together. Miller argues that when there are tendencies toward social dissolution, in the 
context of minority claims for special measures, people will look out for their own interests
and the interests of their immediate social networks. Then, it becomes difficult to mobilise
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people in providing collective goods or agreeing on redistribution practices, from which they 
are unlikely to benefit. These problems are avoided only through the existence of large-scale 
solidarity, so that people have a social duty to act for the common good.61
In Miller’s view, ethnic groups are able to become part of the national identity. They 
may want political representation by members who effectively address their interests in 
government. They may also demand public recognition by the national institutions.62  
However, policies directed at particular groups widen the social distance between 
communities, hence weakening the commitment to justice for other groups.63
Miller suggests that disadvantaged groups should channel their concerns through the 
process of deliberation. He explains that members of such groups must find a common 
ground with other members of civic society and try to win the sympathy of and motivate 
people to perceive them as those pivotal to bringing justice. Disadvantaged groups, Miller 
argues, should emphasize the fact that difference also means special needs or disadvantages. 
Such testimony could become an effective form of communication, provided that its case and 
content is not alien to the audience. Testimony that is too unfamiliar risks inducing hostility 
rather than concerns for justice. 
Democracy provides the best opportunity for using political power to overcome social 
disadvantages. However, if the parties are unwilling to make terms with each other, 
democratic forums become ‘talking shops’ of each person’s story. Then, testimony, the 
strongest weapon of disadvantaged minorities, is blunted.64
Miller has three major arguments. First, national attachments are more important than 
cultural belonging; second, national identity brings cohesion; and third, minority members 
have the right to testimony. The right to testimony, in the form he suggests, will serve as an 
effective remedy for the unequal position of minorities if their identity is recognised and 
respected. This line of thinking, as strongly embraced by multiculturalism, will be discussed 
in much detail in the second section of the chapter.
To recap the arguments of traditional liberals, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill 
object to the very existence of ethnic minorities, reasoning that state integrity is possible only 
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through the existence of national identity. Miller argues that special measures would result in 
unfair distribution of resources, while overarching national identity establishes solidarity and 
facilitates fair distributive processes. At the same time, his idea that minorities should 
communicate their concerns with the dominant groups goes some way toward the 
multicultural position of accommodating ethnic minority cultures. 
1.3.2. The critique of cultural minority rights
     A second group of liberal scholars argues that group rights would politicize ethnicity, 
with benefits unfairly accumulated by elites. Barry and Kukathas question the merit of 
minority protection on the ground that ‘belief in essential group differences swerves toward a 
belief in superiority.’65 The devolution of power to ethnic communities ‘can adversely affect 
the peace and stability of the larger society.’66 Group rights are, consequently, a threat to the 
functioning of the state as a cohesive unit.  Moreover, all individuals have the right to leave a 
group that does not fit their needs. There is no place for group rights because collective 
entities are not always culturally defined.  The only outcome of such policies would be the
politicisation of culture for the purposes of the powerful elite. 
      Barry accepts the existence of ethnic groups and points that membership in such 
communities has obvious advantages. Within a group, the costs of behaviour coordination are 
reduced to a minimum. Each individual knows the group’s views of appropriateness and is 
thus aware of behavioural expectations.67 Yet in Barry’s view, the state grants equal rights to 
all people, and a very important one is the freedom of association and dissociation. 
Individuals can be members of any group provided that membership is voluntary.68
Ethnic groups are free to preserve their organised form of existence if they do not 
infringe upon the rights and interests of individuals outside their group.  The state imposes 
only two additional limitations to membership in any group: the members should be ‘adults 
of sound mind’, and the state needs to ensure that individuals are free to leave their ethnic 
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communities.69 As long as people have the freedom to dissociate, they can engage in
relationships of submission and domination.70 In this view, individuals who consider 
themselves derogated by the views and lifestyle of an ethnic community may opt to 
dissociate from it. They can move into another ethnic community or discard their minority
identity. Whenever the exit option exists, Barry believes that individuals will remain within 
the group because they hold it in high esteem. This decision indicates that the benefits from 
membership are greater than the most attractive alternative option.71 In sum, Barry recognises 
the importance of collective entities but assumes that membership is voluntary. Individuals 
can dissociate from groups with abusive terms of membership. The fact that members have 
chosen to stay in a certain group means that they consider it the most attractive form of 
association. 
     Second, Barry objects to group-specific cultural rights on the ground that not all 
disadvantages stem from the misrecognition of one's culture.72 The author points that 
individuals may not suffer because of their cultural distinctiveness. They may be performing 
poorly with regard to socially valuable objectives such as good education or well-paid jobs.73
Even more important, Barry believes that minority protection would increase the 
power of people who would like to impose certain modes of conduct within the group.74 The 
dominant elite will attempt to withdraw from minority members the rights that are normally 
provided by the state.75 Further, Barry believes that in some cases, minority group rights will 
politicise ethnicity. An example of politicisation is to grant economic subsidies for particular 
cultures, which could give people a financial incentive to identify with certain communities. 
Then, entrepreneurs play on the incentive by seeking to stimulate the development of cultural 
consciousness. Their reasoning will be: the bigger the group size, the greater the chance to 
receive increased financial support.76 In fact, such cases are not unknown. My study of Roma 
self-governments in Hungary, described in chapter five, reveals that political leaders have 
made use of the Roma identity for the purpose of profiteering.
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     Kukathas shares the view that group membership has an impact on the individuals’ 
behaviour and identity and determines their loyalty.77 Yet, he claims that groups are not 
culturally defined. They form and dissolve in response to changes in the political and 
institutional climate. Rather than existing prior to the institutions or apart from them, groups 
are the product of institutional influences. Kukathas illustrates this claim with the situation of 
the Malayas in Malaysia. They emerged as a community after the colonialists merged certain 
village clusters and regions. Given that groups undergo such changes in response to the 
institutions, one cannot conclude that communities have fixed interests. Rather, there is a 
plurality of interests which often compete or conflict with each other.78 Such conflicts of 
interest stem from divisions between subgroups within the group or between elites and the 
masses. The second type of conflict is more important because members of the elite have 
‘distinctive interests that relate to the benefits of modernity: good jobs, urban amenities, 
access to school, travel, prestige.’79 In some cases, elites will try to manipulate ethnicity in 
order achieve their ends. The establishment of special rights for groups will reaffirm the 
existing structures of inequality.80 This development will limit the opportunities of members 
of the group to reshape their cultural space. Given this outcome, one should perceive the 
community as a voluntary association that individuals establish and regard as a form of 
authority. They are free to ‘form communities and live by the terms of those associations.’81
Members have the most fundamental and inalienable right: the right to leave their 
group if they dislike its terms of membership. Individuals are free to renounce a disagreeable 
membership and ‘reconstitute the community under modified terms of association.’82
        In summary, Barry and Kukathas acknowledge the importance of group membership 
but consider that inequalities within groups exist, and special rights will increase them. Barry 
reasons that in unequal power relationships, those who possess power will use minority 
protection to impose their own terms of social organisation and oppress the members in 
unequal position. For Kukathas, inequalities also stem from conflicts of interest. The most 
important conflict is between the elites and the masses and relates to the distribution of 
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goods, amenities, and prestige. Both, Barry and Kukathas, then, reason that group rights 
politicise ethnicity and give to elites the power to oppress minority members. In such a 
situation, the freedom to leave one’s community and choose the most suitable option 
represents the most important right of minority members.   
In sum, Barry and Kukathas argue that the liberal order accords to minorities 
individual rights in the same way as it does other citizens of the state. While ethnicity is 
important for its bearers, minority protection will, in their opinion, increase inequalities and 
decrease the power of minorities.
The culture of minorities is to be preserved through the acquiescence of its bearers to 
participate in its particular lifestyle. Minority members are free to stay in their ethnic group if 
they find their community view of the good life agreeable. If members of an ethnic 
community consider it oppressive, they can leave the group and live according to their views 
of the good life. 
 1.3.3. Arguments in favor of minority rights
      Proponents of group rights make an important and persuasive claim about the 
essential role of ethnic identity for the wellbeing of minorities. Recognition of minorities’ 
specific characteristics and needs will help individuals feel like equal members of society. 
The proponents’ perspective, i.e. the perspective of those who defend minority rights, 
examines the issues of culture as a context of choice, the difficulty of leaving one’s ethnic 
community, the need of political visibility for cultural differences, and the negative effect of 
non-recognition of cultural identities. The ideas of recognition as a supplement to economic 
redistribution, legal and political inclusion of cultural differences, and moral learning or 
empathy for ethnic minorities point to ways of accommodating minority cultures. The 
concept of culture as a context of choice, as employed by Kymlicka, refers to the idea that 
individuals make choices depending on the cultural values they have been internalized. If the 
culture of an ethnic minority is ridiculed or discriminated against, it cannot serve as a context 
of choice. Shachar notes that culture plays an essential role in one’s identity, and leaving 
one’s ethnic group is difficult. In Levy’s view, members of minority groups are socialised
into thinking of the dominant culture as alien and strange. Galeotti points out that the culture 
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minority members are socialized into is important for them. Legitimising the presence of 
ethnic minorities in the public domain is a way of giving political visibility to cultural 
differences. For Taylor, not recognizing or misrecognizing cultures is detrimental to the self-
image of minority members. Yet, Fraser notes that recognition alone is not sufficient to 
accommodate minority groups. It is important to question cultural identities and restructure 
the labor relations to put them in more equal standing. Parekh and Kymlicka build on the 
idea of recognition in discussing group rights and protection of minority cultures by the state.
The proponents’ perspective is supplemented by Thomas, who believes that empathy is the 
foundation of socially fairer societies. Social relations will change in a positive direction only 
if the dominant group learns to listen to its oppressed members and develop empathy for their 
suffering. 
1.3.3.1. Context of choice, difficulty of exit, political visibility, and recognition
Multicultural scholars share the understanding that minority culture is important for 
its bearers. Kymlicka reasons that culture gives individuals a context of choice. Shachar, 
Levy, and Galeotti point out that leaving one’s community is difficult because minority 
members have to unlearn the culture they have grown in. Galeotti notes that giving political 
visibility to minority identities will legitimise their presence in the public sphere, assuring 
minority members that they can participate in public life through their identity. For Taylor, 
the denial or non-recognition of minority identity by the dominant culture results in the 
formation of a false self-image. 
The multicultural literature abounds with arguments supporting the view that minority 
members may prefer to stay within their communities and transform practices they find 
disagreeable. Kymlicka argues that cultures are vital in shaping the boundaries of the 
appropriate, the imaginable, and the reachable. Peoples’ cultural background reveals the 
opportunities that are open to them. When dominant groups ridicule or discriminate against 
minority groups, they deny them the right to participate in society through their particular 
culture. If cultural venues are not available, group members lose their pool of available 
choices. If culture cannot serve as a context of choice, individuals lose their autonomy and
cannot fulfill their civic duties. They are not free to examine their conception of the good life, 
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and assess their beliefs with regard to new experiences.83
Given that culture creates a context of choice, leaving one’s community is particularly 
difficult. Shachar points out that the individual is the one to leave ‘the very center of her life, 
family, and community.’84 One might be unable to leave because of obstacles such as 
economic problems, lack of education and skills, and emotional distress.85 Levy 
complements this idea by explaining that all cultures have exit barriers and ‘to have culture 
whose exit is entirely costless … is to have no culture at all.’86 For most individuals, leaving 
one’s community involves more than psychological discomfort; entering another group 
involves reading, writing, and listening in a language different from the one people are used 
to think in. All forms of communication requiring information and its expression are more 
difficult to carry out in a foreign language. In a similar way, adopting a culture with imagery, 
idioms, social understandings, and stories that are different from those one has internalized is 
costly. For members who leave an ethnic group, it is difficult and costly to adopt a different 
culture they do not know well.87 Moreover, community members are brought up to consider 
the dominant culture as strange or alien, and this view creates a barrier to leaving the group. 
Leaving is often problematic as it entails ‘giving up the familiar for the unfamiliar ... the 
comprehensible for the incomprehensible; [l]anguage, religion, history, social meanings, and 
cultural practices, must all be learned anew.’88 And the more different the culture of a 
minority group is, the more difficult it is to adopt another culture. To the extent of which one 
is unable to learn the cultural practices and social meanings of the new culture, one will live 
an alienated life in the new environment.89
Liberals and Barry, in particular, have argued in favour of the right to leave one’s 
community as a way to avoid enforcing illiberal practices on members by their group. Levy 
notes that every group membership is in fact illiberal. In his view, ‘majority or minority, 
traditional or reformist, with or without expectations of active participation by members, 
every cultural or linguistic community necessarily makes exit far more difficult than routine 
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choices are.’90
      In addition, leaving one’s group might be difficult because of the social perception of 
the community members as outsiders. Galeotti reasons that the dominant culture has the 
power to define which characteristics, practices, and beliefs are normal and which are 
deviant.91 Joining the larger society is made difficult by the prejudices it holds against 
members of the minority culture.92 From this point of view, embracing the cultural values of 
the dominant culture is particularly difficult. The legal inclusion of minority members is also 
insufficient. It does not erase the cultural prejudices of the members of the dominant culture
but admits individuals despite their identity.93
     Galeotti points out that no person can feel comfortable or sustain their self-respect 
when they have been accepted despite being black, female, or homosexual. This acceptance 
will ‘amount to denial of significant components or elements of one's (personal) identity.’94
As a result, the person will feel pressured to conceal his true identity and disguise oneself as 
white, macho, or Anglo-Saxon in order to be accepted by society.95 This acceptance will be 
fragile and humiliating for the individual and will prevent him from developing a ‘healthy, 
autonomous, and self-reliant personality.’96  
        In Galeotti’s view, ‘a political principle should be in place which allows for the 
peaceful coexistence of individuals and groups [holding] different views and practic[ing] 
different ways of life within the same society.’97 Moreover, the dominant culture should not 
simply tolerate differences: members of the dominant group need to acknowledge that any 
culture, way of life, or being has value. Differences may not be valuable for society at large, 
but they are important for their bearers. These differences are not ‘intrinsically valuable, 
beautiful, or important for the human good, but ... there are many different codes of dress, 
lifestyles, religious rituals, and so on among the viable options in society at large.’98 Thus, it
is important that society give visibility to different conceptions of the good. Such visibility 
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legitimises the presence of different approaches to life in public and makes minority 
members feel that they are entitled to their identity. Appearance in the public sphere may also 
become a reason to stop being ashamed of their identity.99
         Upon coming to this conclusion, Galeotti notes that the transformation of the 
definition of what normal is will incur costs for the society. The dominant group will need to 
accommodate the newly accepted identities. This change may make the dominant group feel 
that its social standing is worsening. However, the costs are necessary to ensure that society 
is inclusive of its minority members.100
     Before examining the question of special minority protection, I would like to briefly 
discuss the issue of identity recognition, non-recognition, and misrecognition. Society will 
not justify special measures for the Roma if it does not understand that Roma people have 
different lifestyles and needs. It is because of this different identity that Roma people can 
claim special protection.
 Notably, Taylor points out that the non-recogntition of minority identity is harmful to
group members. Taylor illustrates that identity is formed in a dialectical manner, i.e. people 
learn modes of expression by interacting with others, usually family and community 
members. One's values, behaviour, and existential preferences are formed by the interaction
in this environment. On the other hand, identity is also shaped by the recognition of one’s 
identity by members of different cultural groups. If the dominant culture misrecognises or 
denies individuals the sense of unique identity, the members of this group may suffer an 
identity distortion or lose self-respect. Non-recognition or misrecognition can limit one's 
existence to a reduced mode of being because individuals internalize such distorted images.  
Then, ‘[one's] own self-deprecation becomes ... one of the most potent instruments of [one's] 
own oppression.101 Taylor argues that ‘[n]onrecognition or misrecognition ... can be a form 
of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, reduced mode of being. Beyond 
simple lack of respect, it can inflict a grievous wound, saddling people with crippling self-
hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy but a vital human need.’102
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In sum, culture serves as a context of choice for minority members and exit from 
one’s community is not cost-free. Individuals have to give up the values, beliefs, and lifestyle 
of their communities. It has been acknowledged that differences are important to their 
bearers, that participation in public life and political visibility of difference are a necessary 
part of accommodating the presence of a minority culture. Non-recognition or misrecognition 
of cultural identities results in distorted and false perceptions of the self. 
1.3.3.2. Redistribution as a necessary supplement to recognition
      Fraser considers that recognition alone is not enough to correct the social injustices
against minority groups. Recognition has to be combined with redistribution to remedy their 
unequal economic position. Fraser reasons that cultural and economic injustices are 
intertwined: cultural biases are institutionalised in the state economy while economic
hardship prevents members of minority groups from participating in cultural activities.103
Before examining the link between economic hardship and cultural activities, Fraser gives an 
example of situations in which the solution is either redistribution or recognition. In Marxian 
society, the proletariat receives a disproportionate share of the burden for an insufficient 
reward. Culture has no direct role in class exploitation. Therefore, redistribution or 
restructuring of the political economy becomes the solution.104 Fraser considers the 
circumstances of homosexuals who do not constitute an exploited class but suffer from 
prejudices against their sexuality. These are ‘rooted in the cultural-valuational structure of 
society’ and the solution is recognition.105 Although clear-cut examples as these two exist, 
there are many collective entities which fall in the middle of the spectrum or what she calls 
‘bivalent collectivities.’106 For these groups, injustices are ‘co-original’.107 Race is an 
example of such collectivity because people of colour suffer from economic injustices, i.e. 
these individuals tend to be limited to work in low-income and low-status jobs. At the same 
time, race is structured beyond socio-economic lines. Degrading stereotypical depictions, 
                                                
103 Fraser, Nancy, “A Rejoinder to Iris Young” in Willett, Cynthia, Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the 
Current Debate, p. 23.
104 Ibid, p. 25.
105 Ibid, p. 26.
106 Ibid, p. 27; for the exact use of the term, see Ibid, p. 40.
107 Ibid, p. 27.
32
harassment, and violence against people of colour are widespread in everyday life. These 
forms of exclusion from the public represent the ‘injustices of non-recognition.’108
      Here, Fraser examines different solutions to social injustices. Affirmative policies aim 
to correct unjust outcomes without disturbing the framework that underlies them. Affirmative 
cultural remedies revalue unfairly devalued group identities but leave their content and group 
differentiation intact. Analogically, affirmative economic remedies address misdistribution 
without restructuring the system of production. Transformative remedies, on the other hand, 
aim to correct injustice by restructuring the underlying framework. Cultural remedies will 
destabilise depreciated identities, and economic redresses will alter the division of labour and 
improve the conditions for all individuals.109 Further, Fraser looks at affirmative 
redistribution and concludes that transformation of the economy is required to address its
‘racialization.’110 Recognition, on the other hand, will ‘valorize the specificity of despised 
collectivities.’111
The solution which Fraser proposes combines transformative recognition with 
transformative redistribution. The first will reevaluate the existing group identities to 
counteract Eurocentrism which is typically associated with the values of the dominant 
culture. The second will transform the political and economic structure to produce change in 
the division of labour. Though the described situation relates to race, Fraser claims that her 
arguments stand for all bivalent collectivities which suffer socio-economic and cultural 
injustices. Thus, the transformative approach can become a remedy for many disadvantaged 
minority groups.112
To recap, Fraser emphasizes the importance of recognition and redistribution for
bivalent collectivities that suffer from economic hardship and disrespectful treatment. Unless 
group identities are questioned and the political and social structure is transformed, 
oppressed groups will continue to face unequal treatment. 
1.3.3.3. Legal and political inclusion of cultural difference
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Parekh and Kymlicka reason that the unequal position of minorities is linked to their 
limited access to the public realm. Parekh notes that real equality necessitates the 
introduction of group rights that help accommodate diverse identities, together with policies 
aimed at power decentralisation. Kymlicka makes an important observation: group-based 
rights will safeguard minorities from unfair political and economic choices of the dominant 
societies. Special measures for the protection of ethnic identity will help remedy the unequal 
position of minorities. 
Parekh’s arguments bring together Galeotti’s view of public visibility of cultures and 
Fraser’s link between culture and economy by discussing the link between culture, 
economics, and politics altogether.  For Parekh, ‘culture is a source of legitimacy and power, 
all political and economic battles are fought out at the cultural level as well, and all cultural 
struggles have an inescapable political and economic dimension.’113 He goes on to explain 
that in every society, one group dominates over others and enjoys political and economic 
power. All individuals have the opportunity to pursue their vision of the good life. However, 
the dominant group can do so in the public and the private realm, while minorities are 
confined to the private space. Unfortunately, the public realm bears far greater dignity and 
prestige than the private sphere in every society. The institutionalised culture ‘enjoys state 
patronage, power, access to valuable resources, and political respectability, and sets the tone 
of the rest of society.’114 These points mentioned, Parekh concludes that a coherent political 
structure exists when diverse ways of being are acknowledged.115 Such equality can be 
achieved only through collective rights.116    
      Parekh believes that laws have to accommodate cultural differences. The legal 
recognition of cultural differences would amount to successful political recognition of 
minority cultures; recognition is crucial to protecting minority rights. Parekh gives some 
examples of laws that are specifically directed at minority members. In 1972, the British 
Parliament adopted a law which required that all motorcyclists wear a crash helmet. Sikhs 
campaigned against this law because they would be unable to wear their traditional turbans 
while motorcycling. In 1976, the government reviewed the law and came to the conclusion 
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that Sikh turbans met safety standards and could substitute crash helmets. As a further 
development of the law, the Employment Act of 1989 exempted Sikhs from wearing helmets 
at construction sites. Turbans were considered to give adequate, if not the same protection as 
helmets.117
Another compromise was made for a Sikh woman who wished to wear her baggy 
trousers and long shirt on a nursing course. She was refused admission because of her 
traditional clothes. The Industrial Tribunal supported her stance, namely that the dress was a 
cultural requirement, but the Employment Appeal Tribunal took the opposite view. The 
General Nursing Council, the body which determines the rules for nursing uniforms, 
intervened under governmental pressure and eased the rules for uniforms. As a result, the 
woman was offered a place on the condition that she wore grey trousers and a white shirt. 
Such adaptations do not completely transform the organisational culture but respond to 
changing circumstances and facilitate the integration of minority members in society.118
      In addition to legal and political accommodation of cultural differences, Parekh 
considers that a level of decentralisation of power is necessary to ensure justice. From this 
perspective, minorities will benefit substantially if local and regional bodies became more
engaged in accommodating their cultural particularities. Adjustments will be ‘more readily 
identified, limited in scale, not too costly and … free from the glare of publicity.’119 There 
will also be room for more experimentation with different practices, and the correction of 
mistakes will be easier on a limited scale. Regions can exchange experience and learn from 
each other's practices. Parekh concludes that the presence of a decentralised network is a 
crucial precondition for the growth of civic culture.120
Like Parekh, Kymlicka explains the tremendous significance of political recognition 
of cultural differences and argues in favour of special protection for minority groups. In 
accord with Taylor’s view of recognition, he claims that individual self-respect depends on 
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the esteem, in which one’s national group is held. If the group is denigrated, the individual 
sense of worth is threatened.121 Kymlicka points to the many ways in which the dominant 
culture hampers the expression of minority identity: governmental decisions on drawing 
internal boundaries for voting purposes, official languages, public holidays, and state 
symbols. Each practice involves the choice of particular identities and the corresponding 
needs of certain groups over others. In such a situation, only special protection can remedy
the unequal standing of minorities.122 Kymlicka notes that these rights are meant to protect 
the group from unfair external decisions, i.e. political and economic decisions of the larger 
society. He considers that these rights must be established as to prevent suppression of 
dissent of the members of the group.123 Kymlicka’s key argument in support of the 
possibility of internal liberalisation is that people are capable of reassessing their moral 
values and traditional lifestyles. Individuals should not only have the legal right to do so, 
they must be provided with social conditions, enhancing their evaluative capacity (for 
instance, liberal education).124  
       Kymlicka proposes a different type of political accommodation for various groups
like immigrants, indigenous minorities, and national minorities.  Immigrants do not typically 
intend to set up a parallel society but aim to preserve their specific cultural identity.125
Polyethnic policies or exemption rights should be accorded to immigrants so that they can 
express their cultural specifics.126
National minorities or nations represent a category of people that forms historical 
communities and is to some extent institutionally complete. They have lost their autonomous 
status to an expansionist state. At the same time, they preserve their linguistic and cultural 
characteristics and desire to establish some degree of autonomy.127 There are several 
approaches to political accommodation for national minorities. One possibility is to provide 
for the establishment of minority self-government structures. In fact, Hungary has not only 
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accorded a national status to the Roma but has also granted the right to non-territorial self-
governments. Kymlicka notes that when territorial and cultural boundaries fit loosely,
redrawing of the former helps establish political units in which the ethnic minority 
constitutes a dominant group. The government will then devolve decision-making powers to 
the homogeneous units, so that minorities are not outvoted on decisions that affect their 
culture.128 Further, the minority language must become the official language of opportunity 
within these territorial units. Another group-specific measure for national minorities is the 
right to special representation. This right is important because legislatures are increasingly 
seen as ‘dominated by middle class, able-bodied, white men.’129 One approach to this 
problem is to make political parties more inclusive by reducing the barriers which prevent 
minority members from becoming party candidates. 
Another approach to political representation involves granting a number of seats in 
government to minority members.130 Ann Phillips justifies this approach by the fact that 
white men cannot understand the needs of disadvantaged people. In her view, ‘democracies 
are significantly skewed towards the representation of white men, who make up the 
overwhelming majority of our politicians and who determine what gets on the political 
agenda.’131 Kymlicka agrees that no person can entirely put oneself in other people’s shoes. 
Nevertheless, he warns that the total rejection of the capacity to empathise can serve as an 
excuse to under-represent disadvantaged groups. The argument of Phillips undermines the 
general concept of representation because each group contains sub-groups with their distinct 
experiences. Kymlicka suggests that societies should rather fight against ‘the barriers of 
experiences’.132 In this way, they will create political culture that enables people to 
understand one another better. Such transformation would become possible if there were 
changes in the education system, the media depiction of minority groups, and the political 
process. For Kymlicka, the growth of such deliberative democracy is the ‘challenge of 
empathy.’133
Kymlicka also proposes a system of minority representation based on the Maori 
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example. In the Maori model, there is a separate electoral list for the Maori and a number of 
the legislators are elected by Maori only. The candidates are not necessarily Maori 
themselves but once elected, they are accountable to the Maori population.134 Finally 
according to Kymlicka, representation is not solely reducible to the composition of the 
legislature. There should be other mechanisms for the representation of group interests such 
as the right to challenge unfavourable legislation and interest-group advocacy.135
To sum up, Parekh and Kymlicka share the idea that state institutions, representative 
of the dominant culture limit the opportunities of minorities to express their identities and 
live according to their vision of the good life. Parekh reasons that real equality is possible 
only when diverse views and ways of life are acknowledged. In his view, justice requires 
accommodation of diverse cultural identities and a degree of power decentralisation. 
Kymlicka proposes group rights that would guarantee protection against unfair political and 
economic decisions of the dominant group. The development of a culture of tolerance and 
empathy will contribute to the equal inclusion of minorities in their societies.
1.3.3.4. “Moral learning” as a step toward achieving social equality
The multicultural literature offers a variation of the recognition discourse, of 
amending the injustices suffered by minority cultures. Thomas, for example, examines
marginalised and stigmatised minorities and argues that they have experienced what he calls 
‘downward social constitution.’136 The way to amend this would be if the dominant cultures 
developed empathy. The dominant group would help eliminate the feelings of oppression if it
empathised with the moral suffering of stigmatised minority groups. 
      Thomas’ idea of moral deference contributes to the discussion of minority groups. He 
focuses on the importance of a dialogue between the dominant society and the minority 
group. Here, it is essential that the dominant group listens and does its best to understand the 
circumstances of the minority. Thomas considers that this practice is of crucial importance 
because minority groups ‘are constituted so as not to see themselves as full and equal 
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members of society’ and as such, they represent what he calls ‘diminished social 
categories.’137 The process of downward social constitution can come from many different 
sources: advertisements, casting of actors in films, assumptions about the interests of a 
person, and the concepts and ways of life which bring satisfaction. Even individuals who 
deceive themselves into believing that they care, or who actually do care, could be 
participating in the downward constitution of minority members. 
        All these factors create a deep sense of vulnerability in oppressed and stigmatised 
minorities. They feel even more vulnerable because they always need to prove to themselves 
or to others the falseness of the misconstrued ideas about them. Vulnerability also arises from 
the knowledge that hardly anything these people do will change their image in the eyes of
others. Third, there is the vulnerability to exhaustion because minority members feel that 
they should always speak up as no one will do it for them. Their vulnerability stems, in part,
from memories of downward social constitution. These memories can surface for a variety of 
reasons, for example, witnessing another person's experience of downward social 
constitution or having such an experience. 
Marginalised and stigmatised minorities experience the full spectre of painful 
emotions. Since there are many ways in which minority members feel vulnerable, the 
dominant group must grasp the different ways in which stigmatised minorities are harmed.138
Such understanding is possible only if one witnesses the moral suffering of another person. It 
is important that the members of the dominant group win the confidence of oppressed 
minority groups. It does not mean that the members of the dominant group should internalise 
the suffering of minority members, but they should get a sense of the circumstances that
trigger such fears.139 This type of moral learning requires courage. As Thomas observes, in 
Nazi Germany, those who dared to become moral witnesses of the Jews were killed. Today, 
those who become moral witnesses of gays and lesbians are also labelled homosexual.140 As 
difficult a step as it is, the dominant culture needs to engage in moral learning and make an 
effort to demonstrate understanding, thus achieving social inclusion.141
In sum, Thomas reasons that due to past stigmatisation, minority members share a 
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feeling of vulnerability as well as unequal social standing. The dominant culture needs to 
engage in moral learning and get a grasp of the moral suffering of stigmatised and oppressed 
minorities. Social inclusion is attainable when the dominant society empathises with the 
suffering of minorities, thus eliminating the feelings of oppression and stigmatisation. 
1.3.3.5. The Roma and arguments in favour of group rights
The advocates of minority protection offer valuable arguments in support of 
accommodating Roma’s cultural identity and concerns. A number of ideas have been 
identified within the multicultural literature, which is of significance in terms of protection of 
the Roma: culture as a context of choice, difficulty of exit, political visibility, and recognition
of cultural differences. The questions of recognition as a supplement to redistribution, legal 
and political inclusion of cultural differences, and fairer treatment of minorities through 
moral learning are addressed as steps toward better minority protection and shed light on the 
right direction of accomodating the Roma culture. 
Kymlicka examines culture as a context of choice that allows individuals to 
participate in the larger society through their particular culture. From this point of view, it is 
important that dominant groups in Eastern Europe acknowledge the right of Roma to cultural 
membership as a meaningful and intelligible context of choice. Culture is central to one’s 
life, and leaving one’s cultural community, as argued by Shachar, amounts to leaving 
everything that is held dear. What is more, without the support of their group, members of 
economically diadvantaged minorities, such as the Roma minority, may face even greater 
hardship. As noted by Levy, leaving one’s group is more difficult because minority members 
are socialised into viewing the dominant culture as alien. Joining the dominant culture, Roma 
have to learn new cultural practices and social meanings. While leaving one’s ethnic group is 
difficult, cultural prejudice against an ethnic identity can result in loss of self-respect for its 
bearers. Galeotti notes that political recognition of cultural differences is important in 
legitimising the presence of ethnic identities in the public domain. Thus, acknowledging the 
right of Roma to participate in public life though their identities would be a step toward their 
full social integration. The antipode of recognition – the non-recognition of minority identity, 
as argued by Taylor – is harmful to those, whose identity is not recognised or is 
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misrecognised. False perceptions of the self become easier to develop, especially with 
members of strongly discriminated ethnic minorities such as the Roma. In fact, the Roma 
face a double challenge: discrimination by the dominant group and low socio-economic 
status. Fraser argues that for such ethnic groups, recognition alone cannot bring about a 
significant improvement of their socioeconomic status. Ethnic identities should be questioned 
and the socio-political structure transformed as to establish a fairer society. 
Parekh links public visibility to the recognition of cultural differences and a fairer 
distribution of economic resources. He considers that group rights would help acknowledge 
ethnic identities and protect their bearers from unfair economic and political decisions of the 
dominant society. In this view, the legal recognition of cultural differences is a step toward 
giving Roma greater political and economic power. Similar to Parekh, Kymlicka recognises 
the importance of recognising cultural differences and speaks of political accomodation of 
minority identities. Examining the situation of the Roma, Kymlicka notes that this minority 
does not have an external homeland or kin-state and therefore does not raise secessionist
security concerns like the national minorities.142 However, because of the pressing situation
of the Roma, it is important that states develop targeted norms that are specifically designed 
to protect their rights.143 While Roma are a transnational rather than national minority, 
Kymlicka points out that in the absence of targeted norms, the only possibility Roma are left 
with is to find a way of qualifying as a national minority.144
The multicultural literature offers a valuable argument in support of minority 
protection for the Roma: culture is an important context of choice and leaving one’s culture 
is difficult. Because of the tremendous significance of culture for its bearers, dominant 
groups have to give political visibility to minorities and recognise cultural differences. For 
ethnic groups with lower socio-economic standing such as the Roma, it is important to 
combine recognition with the redistribution of economic resources. The legal and political 
inclusion of cultural differences in the public domain can be achieved through advocacy of 
group rights.
As a supplementary approach to political recognition, Thomas explains that if 
dominant groups developed empathy for the injustices suffered by ethnic minorities, this 
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would contribute to greater social equality. Thus, a way toward socially fairer societies is if 
dominant groups acknowledged the painful emotions experienced by stigmatised minorities 
such as the Roma.
      1.4. Conclusion
Jowitt has examined the relationship between dominant groups and ethnic minorities 
in Eastern Europe, shedding light on the cases, in which ethnic conflict develops. Brubaker 
focuses more closely on nationalism and the nationalising states in Eastern Europe. He 
argues that nationalism has a positive role to play in Western Europe. Brubaker examines the 
virtues of patriotism in this part of the world and the reasons why they cannot be brought to 
Eastern Europe. The triad nationalising state – external homeland – national minority helps 
us understand why the dominant nations in Eastern Europe have a hostile attitude toward 
their national minorities and are opposed to minority protection. Brubaker’s analysis of the 
uneasy relationship between states, their minorities, and external national homelands offers a 
diagnosis of the problem. At the same time, Roma are a transnational, non-territorial minority 
without an external homeland that doesn’t easily fit in the triad examined by Brubaker. 
Kymlicka offers a similar explanation to the dynamic of the relationship between 
states, national minorities, and their kin-states. He reasons that the dominant groups in 
Eastern Europe view themselves as victimised minorities because of their historic position of 
subjugated populations in the constitution of empires. Because the former oppressors are kin-
states of their national minorities at present, Eastern European dominant groups view these 
minorities as irredentist. The unique position of Roma as a transnational minority, coupled 
with its low socio-economic status, poses additional challenges to developing a model of 
minority protection that would fit the context of Eastern Europe. Kymlicka examines two 
possible approaches to amending the situation of the Roma minority. Targeted norms should 
be developed to account for the unique position of Roma in the Eastern European states. In 
the absence of targeted norms, the only alternative Roma are left with is to find ways to 
qualify as national minorities. 
The liberal – multicultural debate in the second half of the 20th century articulated 
arguments about the fair treatment of ethnic minorities. While this debate took place in the 
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context of Western Europe and did not take into account the specifics of Eastern Europe, it 
articulated arguments about the fair treatment of minority cultures.
 Traditional liberals have argued that minority protection threatens social cohesion. 
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Mill object to the very existence of minority groups. Their 
arguments hold that the existence of minorities endangers territorial integrity and the 
functioning of democratic institutions. In this view, rather than constituting a separate 
minority, Roma are citizens of their respective states. A second group of liberals, represented 
by Barry, Kukathas, and Miller agrees that ethnic identity is essential to its bearers. However, 
these liberals claim that minority protection leads to power inequalities. From this 
perspective, if the Roma find the terms of membership in their communities disagreeable, 
they can leave their groups or use testimony to communicate their concerns to the dominant 
culture. 
Developments in the multicultural theory offer arguments in support of group rights, 
which could serve the interests of Roma people. In particular, ethnic and national belonging 
is of equal importance for the wellbeing of minorities. Political visibility and recognition of
minority identity and group-based measures will facilitate the full participation of ethnic 
groups in the institutions of their societies. 
Multicultural research shows that identity is important for its bearers. In a world of 
interrelatedness, states and citizens need to acknowledge the right to differ. No person can 
possibly live isolated from society; yet, no two people have the same background, 
upbringing, lifestyle, interests, beliefs, problems, and needs. Background unifies one with 
their family on the closest level. Groups socialise their members and teach them particular 
social meanings and views of the world. Minority ethnic groups represent a miniature model 
of the societal organisation, in which one feels comfortable and secure. 
Kymlicka notes that minority cultures are not only vital in shaping the values and 
beliefs of their members, but also that culture is, in fact, a context of choice. The culture 
individuals are socialised into predetermines the choices they make. When the culture of the 
Roma is discriminated against, as it actually is, it cannot serve as a context of choice. 
Shachar looks into the pivotal role culture plays in one’s identity and notes that leaving one’s 
community is difficult. Levy argues that leaving one’s ethnic group is not easy because to 
members of minority groups, the dominant culture is strange and alien. 
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From Galeotti’s point of view, giving political visibility and recognition to cultural 
differences is a necessary precondition for the inclusion of Roma as equal members of 
society. Not recognising or misrecognising cultures, as Taylor argues, results in the 
development of false images of the self in members of ethnic minorities. Fraser argues that 
the questioning of ethnic identities should be combined with the restructuring of labor 
relations as to ensure equal status of all individuals. Parekh and Kymlicka consider that 
political visibility is the first step toward the protection of minorities, whose culture is under 
pressure. Special measures will serve to protect the Roma’s vision of the good life and enable 
them to act as full members in the private and public domains. Finally, Thomas proposes that 
changes in social attitudes are possible only if the dominant culture learns to listen to its 
oppressed members. Understanding the suffering of minorities and empathy for their 
grievances will open the path to a socially fairer society. 
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Chapter 2
Relevant International Instruments for Minority Protection: Is Roma Destiny Marginal 
to the Global Human Rights Agenda?
(1648–2008)
2.1. Introduction
        This chapter offers an investigation of international standards that are relevant to the 
protection of Roma. The vulnerable position of this transnational minority requires sound 
legislative guarantees that help preserve and develop their identity. Therefore, the chapter 
explores the extent, to which the Roma are adequately covered by the current international 
standards for minority protection. In addition, the chapter examines recent developments 
toward targeted standards and their contribution to the protection of the Roma minority. 
The chapter consists of three sections. The first section of the chapter presents a 
historical discussion, which examines the emergence of protection for minorities between the 
16th and 18th century. This analysis illustrates the historical absence of minority protection in 
view of the enduring marginalisation and debasement of the Roma. The purpose of the first 
section, therefore, is to emphasise that the absence of minority guarantees is detrimental to
the situation of the Roma population.
 The section proceeds with the advent of nationalism and the Vienna Congress of 
1815-1815. The early 19th century produced treaties, designed to promote stable relations 
between participant states. However, the dominant groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania were focused on building their own nations during this period. The Roma 
populations were left without protection due to the lack of enforcement mechanisms.
The subsequent discussion covers the Berlin Congress of 1878 and the imposition of 
external dictates for minority protection. The period of the second half of the 19th century is 
notable because previous religious guarantees for minorities began to be replaced by national 
formulations of minority rights. However, these developments brought no real protection for 
the Roma minorities in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania.  
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The historical section ends with an overview of the League of Nations and its 
minority treaty system. The minority arrangements under the League covered a limited 
number of states, and minority protection was designed only to complement the post-war 
land redistribution. With the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, for example, a sizeable part of 
Hungary, including the region of Transylvania, was annexed to Romania.145 The transfer of 
Hungarian-populated territories to Romania continues to play an essential role today, 
determining the extent, to which minority protection is accepted by the dominant groups in 
the two countries. 
 The second section reviews current international instruments that are relevant to the 
Roma minority as well as Roma-specific standards, paying particular attention to the extent, 
to which these instruments fall within the liberal or multicultural approach to the rights of
ethnic minorities. The section examines documents under the United Nations. Relevant 
instruments included in the section are the Genocide Convention (1948), the UN 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the UNESCO Declaration on 
Race and Racial Prejudice (1978), and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992). All of 
the instruments have texts that are relevant to the protection of Roma from discrimination 
and their right to full development. 
Following the discussion of the UN instruments, the second section reviews 
documents of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Those are the Final 
Act of Helsinki (1975), the Concluding Documents of Madrid (1983) and Vienna (1986), the 
Copenhagen Document (1990), and the Geneva Report (1991). Although some instruments 
have limiting clauses, they put an end to the assimilation of minorities or the melting-pot
theory within the OSCE.146 Moreover, the Copenhagen Document is the first instrument to 
recognise the right of minorities to autonomy. 
The section also reviews instruments for minority protection under the Council of 
Europe. I offer a more detailed review of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) 
and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1994). These 
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instruments are particularly important for the Roma because of their legally binding nature. 
The two conventions safeguard important rights such as the right to non-discrimination, 
freedom of speech and assembly, freedom to manifest one’s religious belief, etc. 
Finally, the third section discusses Roma-specific standards. The resolutions and 
recommendations described in this section call for non-discrimination, the right to cultural 
identity, and special protection for the Roma minority. 
2.2. Historical overview of minority protection
2.2.1. Minority protection: from the Holy Roman Empire to the Congress of Berlin
2.2.1.1. The Holy Roman Empire: Post-Reformation developments
    The history of minority protection begins with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the 
disintegration of the monolithic religious system under the Holy Roman Empire. The signed 
treaties created autonomous states, in which ‘religion and ideology were to be considered 
within the domestic jurisdiction of each territorial state and to be eliminated as aspects of 
international relations.’147 In this new system, jurisdiction over religion and ideology 
required the establishment of more centralised systems of government, which were capable 
of regulating their own affairs and the duties of their citizens. In this context, the question of 
jurisdiction over minorities became relevant. However, as Lerner points out, the emphasis 
was more on religious tolerance than on actual civil rights.148 The Peace of Westphalia 
secured religious tolerance of the Catholic, Calvinist, and Lutheran communities of the Holy 
Roman Empire. Member states were bound to respect the ‘private worship, liberty of 
consciousness, and the right of emigration to all religious minorities and dissidents within 
their domains.’149
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     However, Preece mentions that these concessions were extended only to the 
populations, which inhabited territories that were subject to land redistribution. Princes could 
still determine the religious affiliation of the territories under their rule.150 Religious freedom 
for people in the new territories was hardly granted by virtue of humanity. It was accorded in 
the interest of stability and peace. Moreover, in the case of conflict between the treaty’s 
provisions and the interests of the sovereign, the latter would prevail.151 Overall, this early 
stage saw no real system of minority protection. The guarantees were partial, lacking in 
enforcement mechanisms, and limited to the protection of religious minorities.  
Prior to the Vienna Congress of 1814-1815, minority guarantees were granted only in 
view of religious affiliation. In the absence of minority protection, ethnic groups such as the 
Roma suffered from discrimination and exclusion, arbitrary treatment, forced expulsion, and 
extermination. Chapter four demonstrates that the Roma minorities were historically 
subjected to degrading treatment throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The Romanian 
principalities enslaved their Roma populations for several centuries. Slaves formed the 
lowest level of the social stratum and lacked legal status. The brutal treatment of slaves was 
not sanctioned by the authorities. They were subjected to starvation, solitary confinement, 
and physical punishment and killed.152 Hungary, as a part of the Habsburg Empire, adopted 
two approaches toward the Roma minority – extermination and forceful assimilation. The 
assimilatory approach of monarchs, as represented by the policies of Empress Maria Theresa, 
included prohibition of marriages between Roma, a ban on nomadic lifestyles, outlawing the 
possession of horses, etc.153 In the absence of international standards for minority protection, 
some ethnic minorities were treated as aliens, falling outside the realm of entitlements that 
other subjects enjoyed.  
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2.2.1.2. The Congress of Vienna (1814-1815)
Jennifer Preece notes that a new period of minority protection started with the advent 
of nationalism and the Congress of Vienna.154 The treaties signed in Vienna distinguish, for 
the first time, between national ethnic minorities and ideological religious groups. Article 1 
of the General Treaty arranges the partition of Poland among Prussia, Russia, and Austria. 
The right of Poles to maintain their national institutions are guaranteed by the treaty. Article 
1 stipulates that the Polish subjects of Austria, Prussia, and Russia shall be entitled to 
representation and formal national institutions.155
     This article is among the first texts that recognise the right of minorities to 
representation and national institutions. It is notable that in principle, this stipulation had a 
binding character, and other parties to the Treaty of Vienna had the right to see it carried into 
effect.156 However, Preece explains that the right to representation was not accompanied by
any enforcement mechanisms. As such, it remained a general statement of intent rather than a 
tool that could be employed to preserve national self-expression.157 Another landmark of the 
Final Act was the inclusion of provisions against the slave trade. However it wasn’t until
1890 that the abolition of slavery was backed by enforcement mechanisms as part of the 
Brussels Act.158
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The Vienna Act provides evidence of nascent civil rights. Article LXXVII of the 
General Treaty stated that the inhabitants of Bern and Basil, transferred to the corresponding 
cantons, were entitled to equal political and civil rights.159
As discussed in chapter four, the rights of Roma and other ethnic minorities were not 
on the national agendas of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania during this period. The three 
states were preoccupied with their own nation-building. However, the foundations of 
minority protection were generally laid in Europe, even though no enforcement mechanisms 
accompanied the guarantees. Regarding the abolition of slavery in Romania, chapter four will 
establish that the efforts of Romanian intellectuals, rather than international provisions, led to 
the liberation of the Roma slaves.
2.2.2. The Congress of Berlin (1878): external dictates of minority protection
      Preece stresses the fact that before the Congress of Berlin, states were not required to 
adopt minority provisions. They would accord guarantees as a gesture of goodwill.160  
Disputes were resolved through diplomacy and were regarded as the way to avoid conflict 
and to facilitate cooperation in Europe.161 After the Congress of Berlin, guarantees for 
minority protection were externally dictated to the new states.162 The Treaty of Berlin 
contained comprehensive provisions for the national minorities in Romania. Minorities were
granted religious freedom, the right to non-discrimination, the right to hold public office, and 
the right to membership in the industries.163 Article IV of the Treaty is particularly important 
in providing for the interests of all national groups in Bulgaria. It states that the rights of the
Turkish, Romanian, Geek, and other minorities will be given due consideration when 
drafting the ‘Organic Law of the Principality’ and the electoral regulations.164 As important 
as the stipulations seem, withdrawal of recognition did not follow the failure to adopt 
minority provisions.165 In other words, no enforcement mechanisms were in place to secure 
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compliance with the treaties. Preece concludes that the Treaty of Berlin is important as it 
replaced the religious guarantees with a national formulation of minority rights.166 Yet, this 
period did not produce a real change in the status of Roma. As described in the next section, 
standards and rights were only established with the advent of the 20th century.
2.2.3. The League of Nations (1919-1946): a system of minority treaty guarantees
     Athanasia Akermark notes that the League of Nations marks a new period for 
minority protection. Established at the end of World War I, the League was not aimed at 
humanitarian intervention.167 Measures toward minorities under the League were designed to 
respond to land redistributions and the redrawing of borders.168  President Wilson, who was 
charged with drafting the Covenant of the League, initially envisaged the inclusion of 
minority protection in the document. His second draft of January 10, 1919 contained a 
Supplementary Agreement VI which provided that:
The League of Nations shall require all new States to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their 
recognition as independent autonomous States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their 
several jurisdictions exactly the same treatment and  security, both in law and in fact that is accorded to 
the racial and national majority of the people.169
President Wilson envisioned the establishment of an international organisation, vested 
with the authority to oversee states’ compliance with their commitments to minority 
protection. Wilson conceived of the League of Nations as a monitoring mechanism, 
guaranteeing the adoption of measures for the equal treatment of minorities. This idea is a 
major departure from the agreements reached at the Congress of Berlin and the Congress of 
Vienna. These agreements mandated minority protection but envisaged no enforcement 
mechanisms to secure compliance with the treaties’ provisions.  
Rather than vesting the League of Nations with authority to monitor states’ 
compliance, the Great Powers chose to prepare treaties that dealt with the status of affected 
minorities. These treaties were complemented by bi- and multilateral agreements and
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unilateral declarations. The special minority treaties became a part of the Paris Peace 
Conference. They were concluded between the Associated and Allied Powers and Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Greece, etc. Treaties with special chapters on minorities were also 
signed with Bulgaria, Turkey, Austria, and Hungary.170
     Akermark points out that the implementation of the treaties was controlled by the 
Council and the Permanent Court of International Justice. In addition, the Council member 
states had the right to submit minority petitions to the Committee of Three (consisting of the 
President of the Council and two other representatives). In 1920, this right was extended to 
non-participant minorities and states. However, the Council was not obliged to take up 
petitions. The body could undertake any action it deemed appropriate where treaty violations 
occurred. The Permanent Court could examine disputes arising from treaties’ obligations.171
Therefore, it served to mediate between governments and encourage conciliation.
      Overall, developments in the field of minority protection were the result of land 
redistributions and border transformations during this period. As discussed in chapter four, 
territorial disputes and their post-war settlement continue to shape the current state of 
minority protection in Central and Eastern Europe. The transfer of the Hungarian-populated 
region of Transylvania to Romania remains a major consideration in view of developing 
minority-related policies in Romania. Ethnic Romanians hold deep mistrust of the loyalty of 
the large and politically active Hungarian minority in Transylvania. Concerns about lack of
loyalty discourage the adoption of multicultural policies for minority protection. On the other 
hand, Hungary aims to safeguard the rights of its kin minority in Romania. All these 
developments have their historic roots, with their effects augmented by the post-war land 
redistributions. 
 In general, the post-war period that followed World War I was characterised by 
developments in the direction of minority protection, but they impacted a limited number of 
states. At the same time, a broad range of issues was covered, including non-discrimination, 
equal civil rights, and special measures for the protection of religion, language, and culture. 
States were required to subsidise educational and charity institutions for their ethnic 
minorities. Finally, obligations were imposed not only on the countries defeated in the war. 
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Romania, Greece, and Serbia were on the Entente side but they, too, were required to sign 
minority treaties.172
2.3. Current international instruments for the protection of Roma
2.3.1. Overview
All minority rights instruments described in this section bear upon the rights of the 
Roma minority. Supervisory organs, such as the Advisory Committee to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, have underscored the fact that the 
Roma qualify as a minority. Therefore, all minority rights included in different human rights 
standards are applicable to them. Kristin Henrard notes that according to the Advisory 
Committee, special measures are required to ensure the adequate protection of the Roma.173
This section aims to evaluate the extent, to which the various human rights
declarations and conventions are relevant to the Roma. The analysis turns special attention to 
the nature of these declarations and conventions – whether they include citizenship rights or 
cultural rights, intended to accommodate the culture of ethnic minorities.
The current international instruments grant actual rights to minorities, which are both 
negative (or “freedom from”) and positive (or “freedom to”). Rights such as freedom from 
discrimination or freedom from non-interference in the cultural or religious activities of 
minorities should not be interpreted as mandating that states support minorities’ initiatives. 
On the other hand, the right to education in one’s native language and the right to maintain 
cultural centres imply that states should provide financial assistance to their minorities. These 
rights are embraced by the principles of liberal multiculturalism. 
2.3.2. The United Nations: from group protection to an individualistic approach to the 
protection of minorities
2.3.2.1. Protection of physical integrity: the Genocide Convention
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      According to Nathan Lerner, the ‘machinery’ of minority protection under the League 
of Nations ceased to exist along with the League.174 The treaty obligations, except for the 
Aalands agreement, became null and void at the end of World War II. The establishment of 
the United Nations transformed the character of minority protection. The emphasis was 
shifted from minority protection to individual rights. Whenever the rights of people were 
restricted on the ground of religion, race, ethnic and national origin, or culture, they were 
protected by the principle of non-discrimination.175 Tove Malloy explains that this 
development was due, in part, to the Nazi’s misuse of minority protection. The atrocities 
against the Jews and Roma during WWII made the community of nations wary of the idea of 
group rights. However, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide recognises group protection.176 In the framework of this convention the Roma, 
as an ethnic group, were and are entitled to protection from deeds that aim to damage their 
physical integrity.   
The word ‘genocide’ was first introduced in the Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg. Though not specifically referred to as genocide, the term ‘crime 
against humanity’ encompasses genocide.177 Article 6(c) refers to murder, enslavement, and 
other inhumane acts against civilians, regardless of whether the latter are in compliance with 
domestic legislation.178
      The word ‘genocide’ was used in relation to German criminals in indictment No 8. 
The text referred to genocide as ‘extermination of racial and national groups … particularly 
Jews, Poles, Gypsies, and others.’179 The legal condemnation of genocide culminated in the 
United Nations Genocide Convention. Its article II stipulates that ‘any of the following acts 
committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part particular groups’ constitute 
genocide: 
a) Killing members of the group; b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c) 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
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in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e) forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group. 180
      Finally, the crime of genocide should have been ‘committed with the intent to 
destroy’ a particular group.181 In the absence of intent, acts of atrocity do not constitute 
genocide.182 On the other hand, acts that do not result in genocide but have it as an objective 
constitute genocide. If government officials or individuals commit or intend to commit the 
crime of genocide against the Roma as a group, they shall be subject to international law. 
Further, Patrick Thornberry notes that there is a strict condition of mens rea to define a crime 
as genocide. Acts committed ‘with intent to prevent the preservation’ or ‘with intent to 
prevent the development’ of groups do not constitute genocide.183 The Genocide Convention, 
therefore, does not accord protection in the sense of the right of groups to ‘develop and 
flourish.’184 The Convention, defined in such terms, protects the right of Roma to exist as a 
group. 
2.3.2.2. Protection of minority identity  
2.3.2.2.1. UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
The right to identity is safeguarded by the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
another prominent instrument of the United Nations.. Article 27 reads: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such 
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.185
      The wording of the article, ‘persons belonging to … minorities’ entitles Roma to 
individual rights. However, it can be argued that this right has both collective and individual
components because of the ‘community’ requirement. Patrick Thornberry claims that the 
‘enjoyment of culture, practice of religion, and use of language presuppose a community of 
individuals endowed by similar rights.’186
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      The article explicitly protects the Roma minority from forced assimilation. It points 
to the positive obligation of states to abstain from assimilatory acts. Jacob Robinson 
considers that the negative wording of the article represents a ‘classic example of restrictive 
toleration of minorities.’187 On this reading, the article does not mandate that states provide 
assistance to their minorities.188 The proponents of positive obligations rely on the 
International Covenant on the Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (article 15) for a 
broader reading of Article 27. The second paragraph of this article requires that states ensure 
everyone’s participation in cultural life. Hence, they claim that a similar obligation can be 
read in Article 27.189 Capotorti’s interpretation of Article 27 is also supportive of the positive
obligation of states. He notes that states need to adopt administrative and legislative measures 
as to achieve the objectives set in the article. The language and culture of minority groups
cannot be preserved without special adaptations within the education system. Adequate 
cultural institutions have to be established or the ‘right accorded to members of minorities 
would quite obviously be purely theoretical.’190 The actual enjoyment of rights necessitates 
‘active and sustained intervention by States.’191
     According to Thornberry, Capotorti’s conclusions seem to present the correct 
interpretation of the scope of this article.192 Two conclusions can be drawn from this 
interpretation. Firstly, states should not interfere in the efforts of minorities to preserve their 
culture, language or religion. Secondly, states need to take measures in assisting their 
minorities to preserve their values. The Human Rights Committee General Comment also 
states that ‘positive measures by States may … be necessary to protect the identity of a 
minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to 
practice their religion, in community with the other members of the group.’193 Accordingly, 
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the scope of the article covers the protection of the Roma minority from assimilation and the 
requirement that states take measures to preserve its identity. 
2.3.2.2.2. The UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice
      The right to identity is also protected by the 1978 UNESCO Declaration on Race and 
Racial Prejudice. According to Lerner, the Declaration is the first international instrument,
which proclaims the right of both individuals and groups to differ (Article 1).194 As such, the 
Declaration represents a shift from toleration to the celebration of differences195 as 
envisioned by the multicultural scholarship. According to the Declaration, groups have the 
right to ‘consider themselves different and to be regarded as such.’196 Further, as Lerner 
suggests, the article makes clear that the right to differ cannot be used as a pretext for racial 
prejudice or apartheid. Paragraph 1 of Article 2 condemns theories of superiority and 
inferiority of ethnic and racial groups, noting that such theories have no scientific foundation. 
Paragraph 2 lists the manifestations of racism.197 They are ‘racist ideologies, prejudiced
attitudes, discriminatory behaviour, structural arrangements and institutionalized practices 
resulting in racial inequality as well as the fallacious notion that discriminatory relations 
between groups are morally and scientifically justifiable.’198 This declaration becomes 
particularly relevant in light of the pseudoscientific ideologies that justified Roma’s
marginalisation in the past. During World War II, Romanian scientists claimed that the Roma
minority fell into the category of ‘ballast minorities’ and posed a ‘bioethnic danger’.199
     As to other issues advanced by the UNESCO Declaration, Lerner notes that article 3 
contains a concept that was recently incorporated in the field of human rights protection: the 
right of individuals and groups to full development. This right implies concern for minority 
groups and their cultures. The right to culture is reaffirmed in paragraph 1 of article 5, which 
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states that minority members have the right to determine the extent, to which they desire to
preserve and develop their culture.200
Articles 6, 8, and 9 bear upon the protection and full development of minorities. 
Article 6 reaffirms that states have to ensure, through legislation, that racism is prohibited in 
the spheres of communication, culture, and education.201 In addition, states have the positive 
obligation to ‘encourage the dissemination of knowledge and the findings of appropriate 
research … on the causes and prevention of racial violence and racist attitudes.’202 Article 8 
spells out the obligations of individuals vis-à-vis society and the international community. 
These duties are the promotion of harmony and the fight against racism and racial prejudice. 
     Finally, Lerner observes that Article 9 contains concepts, which have not been 
incorporated in previous human rights instruments.203 The first paragraph proclaims that 
‘racial discrimination practiced by a State constitutes a violation of international law giving 
rise to its international responsibility.’204 The second paragraph deals with affirmative action 
for economically and socially disadvantaged groups in the spheres of health, housing,
employment, and the protection of the culture and values of minority groups. 205
The contributions of the Declaration regarding the right of minorities to culture 
should not be underestimated. In line with the values of multiculturalism, the Declaration
recognises the identity of members of minorities and the right to be different. It promotes the 
full development of minorities and calls for affirmative action in order to achieve this goal.206
In this way, UNESCO has set the standard to facilitate Roma’s inclusion in their societies.
Most articles of the Declaration touch upon the major issues of minority protection. 
Chapter five will suggest that the extent, to which Central and Eastern European dominant 
groups view their minorities as loyal to the nation determines the states’ commitment to 
accommodating ethnic minority rights. In the absence of enforcement mechanisms, states 
that mistrust the loyalty of their minorities (such as Bulgaria and Romania) opt for the 
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minimal reading of minorities’ effective participation in public life: non-discrimination, the 
right to vote, run for office, and engage in advocacy. 
2.3.2.3. The right to culture and minority protection: the UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
     Henrard explains that the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities aimed to clarify the 
provisions of Article 27.207 In this regard, Thornberry observes that the Preamble of the 
Declaration claims that the document is ‘inspired by’, not ‘based on’, Article 27. This implies
that the Declaration should not be interpreted as being limited to the provisions of article 
27.208
      As evident in Article 1.1, the Declaration transcends the scope of Article 27. The 
Roma minority is protected in line with the provision that the existence of ‘national or ethnic, 
religious and linguistic minorities’ shall be safeguarded, and states shall ‘encourage the 
conditions for the promotion of that identity.’209 The protection of identity is mandatory as 
evident in the use of the verb ‘shall’. An important fact is that this requirement is present in 
the very first article of the Declaration.210
      Article 2 has stronger wording than Article 27 because the positive statement ‘have 
the right’ replaces the negative one ‘shall not be denied the right.’211 Under this article,
minorities may exercise their right to culture ‘in private and in public, freely and without 
interference or any form of discrimination’,212 an assurance fully consistent with the 
theoretical discourse of chapter one, which emphasised the right of dominant groups to 
pursue opportunities in the public and private sector. Minorities, on the other hand, are 
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typically confined to the private space. Every society accords greater dignity and prestige to 
the public sector. The culture of the dominant group is institutionalised and ‘enjoys state 
patronage, power, access to valuable resources and political respectability, and sets the tone 
of the rest of society.’213 Accordingly, all individuals have to enjoy equal respect and 
opportunity. Their inclusion necessitates access to the private and the public sphere and equal 
power over resources.214 Having recalled this argument, the right to enjoy one’s culture, as 
contained in the article, is an important contribution to the protection of Roma. 
Further, Article 2.2 entitles the minorities to participation and specifies the relevant 
fields – ‘cultural, religious, social, economic and public life.’215 The article also grants the 
right to ‘participate effectively in local decisions.’216 The specific formula for participation is 
not outlined in the Declaration, suggesting that the form of participation has to be effective 
with respect to the particular circumstances of the group.217    
Article 3 underscores that the scope of protection is not limited to the rights 
incorporated in the Declaration.218 In light of this affirmation, the effective protection of the 
Roma minority includes the enjoyment of all human rights. In addition, Roma are entitled to 
minority protection under this article. Thornberry notes that the members of minorities may 
exercise their rights ‘individually as well as in community with other members of their 
group.’219 Article 4 articulates the need for measures on the part of states to facilitate the 
exercise of these rights. Article 4.2 specifies that states have to promote the development and 
expression of culture, traditions, customs, etc.220 Finally, states should avoid practices, which 
are contrary to international standards and in violation of national legislation.221
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      As suggested in chapter five, national laws and international legislation are not 
alternatives: states should not prohibit practices that do not violate international standards. 222
Articles 5, 6, and 7 ensure that the rights of minorities are taken into consideration in the 
process of national planning. Article 8 reminds that the Declaration is part of the human 
rights standards and cannot serve as an excuse for the failure to act upon existing state 
obligations.223
      Some articles of the Declaration are in line with the multicultural model, which 
demands special protection of the culture of minority groups. Other articles accord only
individual rights. To illustrate this, the Declaration specifies that the beneficiaries of rights 
are members of minority groups. Gundumur Alfredsson notes that the document falls behind 
other international instruments, such as the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial 
Prejudice, which clearly establish group rights. Moreover, the Declaration is full of 
statements such as ‘where appropriate’, ‘where required’, ‘where possible’, and ‘in a manner 
not incompatible with national legislation’, leaving the impression of non-objective and 
selective standards.224 The Declaration also lacks implementation and monitoring procedures.
This fact suggests that minorities are not able to approach specialized bodies such as the UN 
Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Still, the Declaration is the first international 
instrument aimed specifically at minority protection. It calls for additional efforts in the 
protection of minority groups and their rights.225
2.3.2. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and relevant 
documents on minority protection
2.3.2.1. Individual rights for minorities: the Final Act of Helsinki
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      The Final Act of 1975 is only partially relevant in view of special protection of the 
culture of Roma. Akermark notes that Principle VII contains a minority element.226 Member 
states ‘will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities, [affording] them the full 
opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.’227
      The phrases ‘full opportunity’ and ‘actual enjoyment’ entail positive obligation to
safeguard the rights of minority groups. However, there are escape clauses such as ‘[t]he 
Participating states on whose territories national minorities exist’, a phrase that can be 
interpreted as giving states the right to determine whether to recognise or ignore the existence 
of minorities on their territories and leaving open the opportunity for states to claim they 
have no minorities on their territories.228  In fact, chapter four suggests that prior to the
1980s, Central and Eastern European states were unwilling to recognise the Roma as a 
national minority. Escape clauses of this kind leave the impression that states can unilaterally 
exclude and choose not to grant rights to certain groups. 
 The section on ‘Co-operation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture’ calls on
member states to recognise and facilitate the contribution of minorities to their cultures. 
However, this provision contains a similar limiting clause, ‘when such minorities and 
cultures exist within their territory.’229  In addition, the wording of the section is weaker than
that of Principle VII. States merely ‘intend … to facilitate’ rather than ‘protect’ or ‘accord …
full opportunities’ to members of minorities.230 As a whole, the provisions are vaguely 
worded in terms of the rights, which should be guaranteed by participating states.231 This 
places the Final Act within the restrictive reading of rights; special minority rights are 
unnecessary as long as the individual rights of members of minority groups are guaranteed 
and discrimination is prohibited.232
2.3.2.2. Further developments
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The 1983 Concluding Document of Madrid reconfirms the principles, incorporated in
a previous document, the Helsinki Final Act. The paragraph on minorities points out that
‘[states] stress … the importance of constant progress in ensuring the respect for and actual 
enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities … as provided for in the 
Final Act.’233 The wording ‘constant progress’ carries a positive connotation.234 The Madrid 
Document contains plenty of restrictive clauses, but the above reaffirmation should be 
considered a positive development.235
The following 1989 Concluding Document of Vienna represents a serious 
contribution to minority protection. The protection of minorities falls under the section 
‘Questions relating to the security in Europe.’236 This section calls for states to ‘create 
conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity … [and 
respect for] the free exercise of rights by persons belonging to such minorities.’ 237
The affirmation of ethnic identity appears here for the first time in an OSCE standard. 
This statement marks a major shift from the more limited protection under the Final Act,
guaranteeing equality but excluding the protection of identity.  It is important to stress that 
minority protection, thus integrated in the document, puts an end to the efforts to promote the
theory of assimilation of minorities (the ‘melting-pot’ theory) within the OSCE.238
The Vienna Document was followed by a series of meetings and a number of 
proposals sent to the Copenhagen Meeting of 1990. The topics of discussion relevant to
minorities included the collective element of minority protection, positive discrimination, the 
self-definition of minorities, the instruction and use of minority languages by public 
authorities, and autonomous administrations. Of these, self-definition was incorporated in the 
Copenhagen Document, paragraph 32: ‘[t]o belong to a national minority is a matter of a 
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person’s individual choice.’239 This act made clear that states could not, by means of statistics 
or registration, assign ethnic status for the purpose of political decisions,240 a prohibition that 
would have prevented the Communist government in Bulgaria from attempting to transform 
the ethnic identity of Muslim Roma (see chapter four). This and other relevant examples 
demonstrate the importance of the right to self-definition to the Roma. 
Affirmative action was included in paragraph 31. The latter called for special 
measures to guarantee the equal treatment of minorities. Finally, the Document asserted that 
one way to protect the identity of minorities was to create ‘appropriate local or autonomous 
administrations.’241 Though the use of ‘appropriate’ represents an escape clause, the 
Copenhagen Document is the first international instrument stressing the importance of 
autonomy to minorities.242
Akermark considers that the Geneva Report of 1991 merits particular attention. 
Although this document was the result of difficult negotiations, the report is important in 
recognising that minority issues are of ‘legitimate international concern and … do not 
constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective State.’243 In this way, the Report
stresses that states cannot invoke the principle of non-interference in their affairs so as to 
avoid criticism regarding minority protection.244
2.3.3. Minority protection under the Council of Europe
2.3.3.1. Non-discrimination and the right to identity: The European Convention on 
Human Rights
      The provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights protect the Roma in 
two ways. They prohibit discrimination and promote the right to identity. According to
article 14, ‘the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth, or 
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other status.’245 Moreover, Henrard mentions that the wording ‘or other status’ can cover 
almost any personal characteristic. 246
    Christian Hilgruber and Mark Jestaedt note that the identity of minorities is protected
under article 8, proclaiming that, ‘everyone has the right to respect for his private and family 
life, his home, and correspondence.’247 Although this right has an individual character, it is 
an important one. The traditional ways of life of minorities are protected under the article. 
Protection from forced expulsion and relocation fall within the scope of this article. If an 
entire family is forcibly resettled or family members are separated, their ability to lead a 
family life is clearly impaired.248
    Another relevant right is the freedom of expression, safeguarded by Article 10. This 
right is important in giving minorities the freedom to express their political views and make
political demands.249 This right shall be respected, ‘without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers.’250 The theoretical framework in chapter one has underscored the 
importance of greater inclusion of Roma in the political realm. However, Hillgruber and 
Jestaed note that states are not obliged to secure financial assistance for minorities to 
effectively exercise this right under this article.251
     Freedom of assembly, safeguarded by article 11, closely relates to freedom of 
expression. Freedom of assembly is justified on public grounds.252 In addition, it incorporates
the freedom to form associations. The freedom to form associations is not limited to cultural 
purposes. Members of minority groups can form and join political parties and organisations 
representing their specific interests. States are obliged to devise legal forms of existence for 
such associations; otherwise, exercising this right loses purpose.253
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       Henrard notes that the Convention does not contain articles, which grant rights to 
minority groups, as such.254 Articles 10 and 11, described above, give citizenship rights to 
minorities. In addition, article 14 prohibits discriminatory acts on the grounds of ethnicity, 
but the right to non-discrimination is an individual right.255 However, the non-autonomous 
nature of the article renders the prohibition of discrimination rather limited.  Article 14 can 
be enforced only if another provision of the ECHR is violated.256 The article cannot be 
invoked for discriminatory practices, unless they are within the scope of another article. As a 
whole, the convention is designed to accord individual rights rather than group rights.257
Drafting additional protocols to the ECHR is vital for ethnic minorities that need protection. 
This development is especially important given that the Convention distinguishes itself from 
other human rights instruments through its judicial form of legal protection.258
2.3.3.2. Legally binding minority protection: Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities 
   The FCNM is one of the key instruments for the protection of the Roma minority.  
Reiner Hofmann considers the 1998 document to be the most comprehensive human rights
instrument. The Convention is a legally binding standard that addresses the rights of minority 
groups. It contains a Preamble and 32 articles, divided in sections. Section 1 describes the 
general principles that see minority protection as inseparable from other human rights. 
Section 2 contains the principles that states should implement in their policies, domestic 
legislation, and bilateral and multilateral treaties.259
     Discussing the preamble, Malloy notes that the text does not contain rights or 
obligations. Rather, it seeks to explain the reasons for drawing up the convention and the 
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importance of minority protection. The sixth paragraph of the Preamble states that the 
upheavals in the history of Europe showed how crucial minority protection was to the
stability, peace, and democratic security on the continent. Thus, the Preamble clearly states 
why this Convention was crafted. The reason is the concern that minorities are threatened by 
‘territorial ambitions, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, and totalitarian ideologies.’260 This 
affirmation is particularly relevant for the Roma, who have been subjected to prolonged 
discrimination, intolerance, degrading treatment, and even aggression. Pseudoscientific 
theories of racial inferiority have served to marginalise and physically eliminate the Roma 
population. 
The Preamble links democratic and pluralistic societies to the ability of minorities to 
develop and preserve their identity. In essence, it asserts that the identity of minorities would 
be best accommodated in pluralistic societies, which bring together diverse identities and 
ensure that ‘respect and tolerance as well as dialogue help shape the social and political 
agenda.’261 This theme recalls Thomas’s idea of dialogue and empathy for minority 
groups.262 Moreover, according to Malloy, the Preamble requires states to guarantee the 
sustainability of ethnic identities.263 In view of this requirement, states must take positive 
action to ensure that the Roma are visible in the public domain.
Finally, the Preamble stresses the importance of territorial integrity. This approach is 
in line with the state-centrist focus of previous legislation. Even so, the text calls for 
proactive measures on the part of states. They have the positive obligation to protect their 
minorities. The climate of toleration will create conditions for social cohesion.264 The 
theoretical discourse in chapter one has explored and rejected the liberal idea that the
common national identity is the only factor for achieving state cohesion. Here, the text builds 
on the multicultural understanding that respect for difference and toleration are major 
preconditions for social cohesion. Moreover, the state has to play a proactive role in creating 
a socially just society built on the principle of toleration, especially in view of disadvantaged 
minorities, such as the Roma. 
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       Alfredsson notes that the second section of the FCNM contains an article that
underscores the right of equal treatment and equal protection by the law. Further, the section 
prohibits discriminatory acts on the basis of minority status, thus seeking to guarantee equal 
rights. When the prohibition of discrimination is insufficient, ‘special or adequate measures’ 
have to be adopted to ensure equality.265 In effect, this text can serve as the cornerstone of the 
protection of Roma as a group. 
In the view of Geoff Gilbert, Article 5 affirms that states are required to create an 
environment, in which minorities will flourish. They have to ensure that members of 
minority groups have opportunities to develop their culture. Moreover, states have to ensure 
that minorities take part in the process of determining the conditions that foster their growth. 
In line with Article 15, minorities have to participate in the decision-making process, at least 
on a consultative level.266 Thus, ethnic minorities such as the Roma would be entitled to 
institutional representation with offices and government structures, whereby their leaders are 
actively involved in the decision-making process. 
    Article 7 defends the rights to ‘freedom of association’ and ‘freedom of peaceful 
assembly.’267 Zdenka Machnyikova explains that this right allows members to join and 
associate for the purpose of protecting their common characteristics or interests. In this way, 
the right to associate represents a precondition of the existence of minorities. The 
associations of minorities can come in diverse forms – non-profit organizations, associations 
and foundations, political parties, trade unions, and other associations, which can function 
under domestic legislations.268 The right to freedom of assembly allows individuals to 
organise and participate in meetings and demonstrations, given that they can also abstain 
from such.269
The rights to assembly and association are essential in promoting democratic forms of 
political and social organisation. Mass movements are dangerous because they mobilise
persons who are already alienated by the system. They ‘do not believe in the legitimacy of 
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the established order, and … are therefore ready to engage in efforts to destroy it.’270 The 
right to democratic forms of association, guaranteed by the FCNM, is important as it reduces 
the risk of such dangerous mass movements emerging.  
Further, the right to assembly is important in promoting and protecting the identity of 
minority groups. This right is important for the Roma as it aims to ensure greater visibility of 
their contributions. 
      Article 8 protects the right to manifest one’s religious beliefs.271 This right is essential 
for Roma of different religions and would have prevented the Communist authorities in 
Bulgaria from attempting to assimilate the Muslim Roma in the country. The Muslim 
subpopulation of the Roma was highly marginalised throughout the 20th century.272
John Packer and Sally Halt argue that the right to express one’s religious beliefs
would be meaningless without the corresponding right to free expression and information. To 
this end, Article 9(1) stipulates that members of minority groups shall not be subjected to 
discriminatory treatment in the media.273 This right is particularly relevant in view of the 
negative media portrayal of the Roma minorities in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania (see 
chapter five). Packer and Holt note that the article also contains a positive obligation for 
states to ensure that members of minority groups are allowed to create and use media outlets
to the utmost extent. The article acknowledges certain technical limitations, such as the 
number of available broadcasting frequencies. Such limitations can affect the ability of the 
state to exercise its obligation to the fullest.274     
The paucity of knowledge about the Roma culture may be conducive to 
discrimination by the dominant groups.  In this sense, Article 12 (1) is important in affirming 
that ‘[p]arties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields of education and research 
to foster knowledge of the culture, history, language, and religion of their national minorities 
and the majority.’275 Thornberry offers a valuable interpretation of the article in view of 
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ensuring better visibility and knowledge of the Roma culture. In his view, the article contains 
both multicultural and intercultural elements. The multicultural element reflects the 
coexistence of cultures within the same society and the formulation of culturally sensitive
policies. These will take into account cultural differences and allow individuals to learn about 
diverse cultures. The intercultural element, on the other hand, stands for the reciprocity of 
learning among different groups.276 Article 12 (2) contains reference to interculturalism: the 
‘parties shall … facilitate contacts among students and teachers of different communities.’277
Finally, Article 12 (3) points that minorities should have access to education ‘at all 
levels’, illustrating that it is important for groups to increase their capacity for survival
through education.278 This article is essential for the Roma population. In 1969, the 
Parliamentary assembly affirmed that the Roma’s lack of education had ‘far-reaching 
repercussions, over and above the purely material or financial factors.’279 Moreover, it 
impacted the social climate adversely and ‘threaten[ed] their acceptance as citizens with 
equal rights.’280
     Lastly, according to Article 15, states have to establish ‘the conditions necessary for 
the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and 
economic life and in public affairs.’281 This article safeguards the right of the Roma minority 
to participate in policy making. In Weller’s view, the Explanatory Report to the FCNM 
proposes several ways of ensuring equitable representation. One option is to grant national 
minorities direct representation in decision-making structures, such as the Lower Chamber of 
Parliament. Alternatively, mechanisms with delaying or blocking powers might be 
established.282 Another option is to found representative bodies that can be consulted ‘when 
contemplating legislation or administrative measures likely to affect [members of national 
minorities]’.283 These can function at the national or regional level and offer advice regarding 
governmental strategies and measures for dealing with issues of minority concern, drafts of 
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legislative measures, and decrees. Other functions include monitoring the situation of 
national minorities and preparing reports, coordination between public agencies on policies 
that concern minorities, consultations across regions and units of local governance, and so 
on.284 The establishment of such consultative bodies is in itself insufficient because the 
government must ensure their effective functioning through regular contact with
governmental departments and parliamentary committees, early consultation on legislative 
and other measures, and the allocation of adequate resources to these bodies. In addition to 
these measures, special bodies addressing the concerns of specific minorities could be 
established.285
      The Convention clearly defends rights that are important to the Roma, such as the 
freedom of assembly, the freedom to manifest one’s religion, etc. However, while states are 
under a binding obligation, it is their right to determine how to attain these aims. 
Nonetheless, the FCNM is the key legally-binding standard for minority protection. 
2.4. Minority protection for the Roma
I have identified international instruments that are relevant to the protection of the 
Roma minority. Some of them recognise past injustices, aimed at marginalising and even 
annihilating the Roma population. Other instruments protect the Roma’s right to identity and 
development, emphasising the unequal status of the Roma minority and the need for special 
protection. Here, I will review the special attention given by the Advisory Committee to the 
Framework Convention to the situation of the Roma. The Committee stresses that ‘the 
adequate protection of Roma requires special measures in addition to the more general 
minority rights standards.’286 Several Roma-specific standards have been established in the 
last decade. However, all of them belong to the field of soft law as illustrated by their labels –
‘recommendation’, ‘guiding principles’, and so on.287
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The following section will offer an overview of Roma-related standards that were 
established within the framework of international and regional organisations discussed in the 
chapter – the Council of Europe, the United Nations, and the OSCE. 
In 1992, the Human Rights Committee to the United Nations adopted resolution 
1992/65 ‘On the Protection of Roma (Gypsies)’. The Commission recognised the need to 
protect the Roma minority in view of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Resolution
1992/65 invited states to take steps toward eliminating discrimination against the Roma. 
The Copenhagen Document of the OSCE (discussed above) is relevant to the Roma, 
protecting their right to identity. Even more, the document specifically mentions that the 
participating states recognise the problems the Roma face. Istvan Pogany observes that the 
Copenhagen Document does not elaborate on the specific problems of the Roma. However, 
the OSCE states feel that these problems ‘were the result of a form of racial or ethnic hatred 
that was, in some respects at least, comparable to anti-Semitism.’288
Several recommendations by the Council of Europe address specific concerns of the 
Roma population. Resolution 75(13) urges governments to fight against the discrimination of 
nomads and protect their cultural heritage and identity. The Council points out that residence 
issues, education, health, and social welfare represent specific areas of concern.289
Recommendation R 83 (1) of 1983 establishes principles for nomadic populations with
regard to non-discrimination, family reunion, links with states, residence and movement, and 
extended protection.290 Patrick Thornberry and Maria Estebanez note that both documents 
reflect the spirit of the period. The Roma were considered nomads, while the language of the 
recommendations is state-friendly. Nevertheless, the documents are important in recognising 
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problems that have been overlooked for a long time. They also set the first standards for 
guaranteeing the rights of the Roma minority.291
The continuous violations of Roma rights and the emerging Roma activism indicate
that additional efforts are called for. Roma-related issues were among the top priorities of the 
Council of Europe, which included minority protection and the fight against racism, 
intolerance, and social exclusion. The new recommendations use Roma-friendly language 
and set a sterner tone regarding the obligations of states. Recommendation 1203 (1993) uses 
strong wording to stress the commitment of states to the protection of Roma.292 The 
recommendation acknowledges that the general resolutions and recommendations on
minorities are important for the Roma population. However, the recommendation highlights 
that ‘as one of the very few non-territorial minorities in Europe Gypsies need special 
protection.’293 The document makes a special reference to the cultural identity of Roma. The 
recommendation affirms that ‘Gypsies greatly contribute to the cultural diversity of Europe. 
In different parts of Europe they contribute in different ways, be it by language and music or 
by their trades and crafts.’294
Some critics note that the deepening engagement of international institutions 
showcases the inability of home governments to handle the multiplicity of challenges posed 
by the problems of the Roma. Martin Kovats characterizes the national programs for Roma 
inclusion as forms of crisis management. The development of such policies is justified by the 
scarce resources for Roma-related initiatives. In his view, the European institutions should 
play a key role in establishing confidence that the concerns of Roma will be addressed to the 
benefit of society in general. He considers funding to be one of the preconditions to the 
development of effective protection on the international level.295
The issue of funding for international organisations will receive due attention 
throughout the next chapter. At this point, it suffices to note that the Council of Europe and 
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the OSCE have failed to budget the funding, necessary to achieve any particular objective. 
The vague financial planning hints at the fear of national governments of courting politically 
unpopular issues. This could undermine their support base at home. However, it is clear that 
delays in developing targeted intervention increase the social and economic costs paid by 
both national governments and international institutions.296 The European states have to deal 
with the sensitivity of their domestic electorates to the problems of Roma and make joint 
efforts to ensure their protection. 
2.5. Identity and minority protection
      The question of what constitutes ethnic identity and which its constructive elements 
are is a difficult one. Benjamin Ringer and Elinor Lewis give a general definition of the 
ethnic group as a community of individuals who share common sentiments, experiences, and 
history.297 Rather than discussing the constructive elements of ethnic identity, I will focus on 
the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them.’  The reason is that with respect to human rights law, 
it should be established who counts as a member of an ethnic minority and how permeable 
the ethnic boundaries are. Minorities can make claims to a special status only when the
boundaries are very clearly articulated. 
For the purpose of the present discussion, I will use Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer’s 
assumption that identity is a ‘negotiated space between ourselves and others.’298 Spencer 
explains that on a group level individuals acquire self-perception by interacting with others 
and identifying what does not constitute the self. One assumption is that individuals monitor 
their surroundings and establish reference points on what is normal within their common 
environment and what appropriate behaviour is. However, individuals need to interact 
regularly with the out-group so that they can see the differences and validate the social 
boundary of the community.299 If these conditions are in place, ethnic boundaries are 
relatively impermeable. John Borrows considers that another approach to the permeability of 
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boundaries can be deduced from the Aboriginal two-row belt, the so called Gus Wen Tah. 
Some people claim that the two rows of this belt represent the different river paths for the 
British and the Aboriginal people in Canada. Others point out that the belt has more than two 
rows. It contains three rows of white beads, which carry a counterbalancing weight and 
symbolise the salience of sharing and interdependence. These rows are also called the bed of 
agreement, which incorporates peace, friendship, and respect. These views refer to the belt as 
the symbol of the different ships of the British and the Aborigines in the same river. Thus, 
the belt stands for mutuality and interconnectedness between aboriginal and non-aboriginal 
people.300
There are different perspectives of the issue of the permeability of boundaries. Let us 
presume that boundaries are fairly permeable and a non-member can freely join the in-group. 
This person would like to enjoy the same rights as the rest of the community, but it is 
questionable whether the wider society would view him or her as an insider. Another 
problem relates to the criteria for determining whether this person is an insider. Let me 
examine a landmark case, in which the community has accepted the out-member. In addition,
this person views himself as an insider. It is still questionable whether his status would be 
recognised by the larger society. The case is Baker Lake vs. the Minister of Indian Affairs, 
described by Jacob Levy. Justice Mahoney ruled that Aborigines, who were claimants of a 
common-law title, had to pass a test as to receive the title. They had to prove that they and 
their ancestors had been members of an organised society, which had occupied the specific 
territory.301 This example clearly illustrates that a person who has recently joined a group 
might not be able to exercise the same rights as the other members. The question of 
belonging to an ethnic group is, in part, a matter of self-identification and depends on the 
extent, to which the group accepts the newcomer. These two factors are important as the new 
member pledges allegiance to the group and the community grants him support. Laws can 
vary, however, as to whether a person can claim the identity of his or her choice. This chapter
also shows that minority claims, including those to identity, should not violate international 
standards or domestic law. This vague wording illustrates the fear of states that claims to 
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identity may threaten their territorial integrity. Thus, most human rights documents accord
individual rights to minorities at present.
2.6. Conclusion and outlooks
     Minority protection has passed through several distinct periods. Minority guarantees 
were first accorded in the form of religious freedoms. They sought to ensure peace and 
stability throughout the Holy Roman Empire. The treaties were not signed due to a genuine 
concern for humanity. The interest of the sovereign was always privileged. For these reasons, 
minority protection hardly existed at this early stage. Marginalised minorities, such as the 
Roma, did not benefit from the early form of religious guarantees. Between 1814 and 1919, 
minority protection entered a period of redrawing territorial borders and nationalism. The 
states had to weigh the contradicting objectives of self-determination and peace and stability.  
The League of Nations was established to respond to the growing wave of nationalism. The 
League’s minority treaty system made room for some limited minority protection but did not 
grant rights in the modern sense of the word. Protection for the Roma was absent during this 
period. In addition, the post-war redrawing of borders and population shifts continue to 
impact the extent of minority protection in Hungary and Romania. 
The current instruments for minority protection entitle Roma to the right to non-
discrimination, the right to profess one’s religion, the right to political participation, and 
more. Some documents, such as the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948), contain
positive rights. The Copenhagen Document (1990) even goes so far as to propose autonomy 
as a solution. 
Most often, however, the drafters are cautious to include such provisions. Firstly, 
states are not always willing or do not have the means to provide financial assistance to their 
minorities. Secondly, states avoid adopting standards related to the treatment of the Roma 
minority. Governments are worried about supporting a politically sensitive and unpopular 
issue. 
     So far, most international instruments focus on individual human rights as opposed to 
special protection of the culture of ethnic minorities. The major reason appears to be the 
concern for the territorial integrity of states. Chapter five suggests that Eastern European 
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states mistrust the loyalty of their ethnic minorities. The states in the region are more likely 
to claim that individual rights are the best way to improve the socio-economic situation of 
their minorities. Demands for special protection are perceived as the first step to granting 
autonomy to ethnic minorities, resulting in the disruption of territorial integrity. 
However, the Roma people often lack financial resources, sufficient information, and 
other means to take full advantage of their citizenship rights as individuals. Special 
protection can serve to remedy this inequality.302 Lerner suggests granting legal status to
minority groups as one possible solution. The first step in this direction would be giving 
groups the right to representation before human rights monitoring bodies. A second solution 
would be the right to autonomy.303 Group autonomy is understood as the right to choose 
minority governments and to participate in the decision-making process on matters 
concerning members of minorities.304 A third option is to include minorities in decision-
making on the local and national levels. These are just some of the possible solutions, but
they point to ways of ensuring the adequate protection of the Roma minority. 
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Chapter 3
International Bodies That Monitor Standard Implementation: Rhetoric vs. Action
(1947 – 2008)
3.1. Introduction                                                                                                                  
This chapter offers an analysis of international bodies, which monitor states’ 
treatment of ethnic minorities and the impact of their work on the situation of the Roma
minority. As there is a number of monitoring mechanisms, their sheer volume will not allow 
the consideration of all. Therefore, I will focus on three structures: the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, and the EU Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. The reason behind my 
choice is that these bodies represent organisations, which have differing scopes and foci and 
therefore, different capacities and levels of effectiveness in dealing with minorities. Yet, 
possibly due to the fairly recent establishment of the monitoring structures, their work and 
contributions to the protection of Roma have received scant academic attention. The unique 
and unusual situation of the Roma minority – a transnational minority in a poor socio-
economic position – may, in part, explain the absence of a solid body of scholarly literature 
on the impact and contributions of these monitoring structures to the protection of the Roma 
minority. 
 I will examine several issues that are of relevance to this thesis. First, I will discuss 
the capacity of global and regional regimes to deal effectively with minority protection. The 
global approach of the UN is evident in the broad scope of issues covered by the OHCHR. 
The Commissioner monitors the commitment of states to human rights in every part of the 
world. The success of OHCHR’s monitoring efforts depends on its ability to mobilise 
‘global’ resources. This ability, on the other hand, is contingent on the national interests and 
willingness of participating states to contribute to the body’s functioning. It is reasonable to 
argue that a distant problem may hardly represent a domestic concern. The Organization for 
Co-operation and Security in Europe and the European Union are both regional formations, 
and there are some arguments in favour of their potential to monitor minority protection. 
Alex Ballamy considers that regional organisations are more likely to work on joint solutions 
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because of ‘economic interdependence, political alliances, mutual historical ties, and the 
closeness and informality of their relations.’305 The fact that intertwined interests have 
divided OSCE states into Western and Eastern blocks, as discussed in the chapter, is 
illustrative of the formation of political alliances. A close examination of the monitoring
structure of the OSCE, the ODIHR, demonstrates that this body is better positioned to deal 
with minority issues than the Office of the High Commissioner. However, interconnected
interests may also result in the absence of impartiality. This chapter will suggest that at times, 
regional organisations discourage the advance of multiculturalism. 
As a regional formation, the European Union should theoretically have the advantages 
outlined above. Interestingly, analysis will reveal that the EUMC was given a very limited 
role as an information gathering mechanism with no executive and prosecuting functions. 
This fact suggests that monitoring has received limited support among the European 
governments. 
 Secondly, I examine the capacity of the three bodies to attenuate the fears of the 
Eastern European states that minorities endanger their social cohesion. Moreover, if these 
bodies have effectively dealt with the problems of minorities in other states, this would
suppose that they are committed to addressing the problem in Eastern Europe. For instance, 
the High Commissioner José Ayala-Lasso has managed to convince some third-world states 
that his post will take into consideration their understanding of minority protection.306
In chapter five, I further discuss how national fears of threats to territorial integrity 
hinder the advance of multiculturalism in Eastern Europe. Yet, the inertness of international 
organisations in this direction is indicative of the sensitivity and unpopularity of Roma issues 
among participating governments. As Zoltan Barany suggested, ‘the Roma are the region’s 
most unpopular social group widely regarded as a major burden on slender public resources, 
therefore, assisting them is seldom considered “smart politics.”’307 I will further connect this 
issue to the capacity of global and regional regimes to promote the values of 
multiculturalism. In this respect, I will examine which type of regime is best suited to reduce 
the extent, to which Eastern European states prioritise their national cohesion. 
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Thirdly, I will examine the background of the establishment of each monitoring body. 
This analysis will show the extent, to which participating states are committed to minority 
protection. For instance, the establishment of the EUMC required financial resources, but the 
EC had no mechanism to allocate funding for this purpose for a long time.308 This fact 
suggests that until recently, monitoring of minority rights has been low on the list of EU 
priorities. 
I will further analyse the goals and work of the three bodies. An examination of their
focus and scope of activities will help position their current and potential efforts to improve 
the socio-economic situation of the Roma minority. I will subsequently analyse the structure 
and the financial resources of the three monitoring bodies. Clearly, effective coordination, 
motivated and experienced personnel, and adequate funding are some of the prerequisites for 
the successful work of these bodies. Finally, I will discuss particular measures directed at the 
protection of the Roma population. The extent, to which the monitoring structures have 
comprehensive strategies for improving the socio-economic status of the Roma will 
demonstrate how committed they are to ensuring that the Roma receive fair treatment in 
society. 
The three mechanisms are fairly recent developments. This is, on one hand, the 
second reason to examine precisely their work. Presumably, they were built on the 
knowledge and experience of some older establishments and thus represent a refinement in 
the field of monitoring. On the other hand, their short record of functioning leaves some 
information gaps and a level of uncertainty as to their effectiveness. Monitoring, as a whole, 
represents a fairly new development. It has to deal with current problems and become 
flexible enough to respond to concerns that may arise in the future.     
                                                                                                                                      
3.2. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights
3.2.1. Background developments of the establishment of the OHCHR
The idea of establishing the post of the High Commissioner dates from the draft of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1947. What followed was a protracted and 
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tortuous five-decade route before the post was finally established. Mr. Rene Cassin, the 
French representative to the United Nations, was the first to propose the position of an 
Attorney General, who would be responsible for human rights’ protection. Uruguay proposed 
to the General Assembly in 1950 that the post of an Attorney General or High Commissioner 
be established. The post would derive its authority from an International Covenant on Human 
Rights. This proposal was examined but eventually rejected. The idea re-emerged in 1965,
when Costa Rica submitted a draft resolution on the “Election of High Commissioner for 
Human Rights.”309 Notably, the post was proposed and approved within the Charter of the 
United Nations for the first time.310
The success seemed encouraging, but the General Assembly did not examine the 
recommendations to establish the post. In 1973, the Assembly discussed the issue again to 
merely reaffirm that further steps toward the protection of human rights were necessary.311
The long history to the establishment of this position indicates the general unwillingness of
the participating states to establish a global monitoring body, perhaps influenced, at least in 
part, by the historical tendency of Eastern European states to view the loyalty of their ethnic 
minorities with mistrust. Therefore, the prospect of external interference in the states’
territorial integrity would have seemed unappealing. Moreover, the idea of a High 
Commissioner sounded revolutionary within the context of the Cold War division. As John 
Humphrey observes, the Soviet Union objected to the creation of international machinery for 
the enforcement of human rights and viewed it as ‘a sinister plan to undermine the 
sovereignty of states.’312 Indeed, while discussing the Costa Rican proposal in 1966, the 
Ukrainian expert Nedbailo stated that the post would be ‘contrary to the principles of the 
sovereignty of states and of non-intervention in their internal affairs.’313 During the 
discussions, the Soviet expert Nasinovsky stated that ‘[i]t was … utopian to suppose that a 
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single individual could act as an arbitrator, adviser or even judge in the resolution of 
questions relating to human rights which would arise under various legal, philosophical or 
religious systems.’314 This point brings up the first issue of interest in this chapter: regimes’ 
effectiveness. As my original assumption stands, global regimes might experience difficulty 
in unifying states around a common agenda, especially in the context of the East-West 
division. 
Post-Cold War, the World Conference on Human Rights of 1993 reintroduced the 
issue of establishing the position. After an intense several weeks of negotiations the post of 
the High Commissioner was created by Resolution 48/141 of 1993.315 In terms of states’ 
commitments, this resolution was important for the Roma and other disadvantaged minorities 
in three ways. Firstly, it emphasised that states had to respect the Universal Declaration for 
Human Rights and to fully implement the Declaration on the Right to Development, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and other human rights standards. Secondly, the 
resolution reaffirmed the OSCE Vienna Declaration and the Programme of Action. Thirdly, 
the resolution stressed the significance of a continued improvement of the UN human rights 
system and the need to enhance the overall efficiency, coordination, and effectiveness.316 To 
this end, the UN created the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
1993, almost half a century after it was initially proposed. It was set to safeguard the human 
rights of all persons, empowering them to enjoy their rights, and ensuring that human rights
are fully implemented.317  
3.2.2. Goals and achievements of the OHCHR
 The Office has a far-reaching global agenda. The global scope of the focus 
presupposes that the protection of Roma falls within the scope of the OHCHR’s
                                                
314 Ibid, pp. 298-9.
315 Mukherjee, Bhaswati, “United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights” in Alfredson, Gudmundur et 
al, eds.  International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, pp. 392-3.
316 A/RES/48/141 [http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r141.htm] (accessed: August 20, 2006).
317 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mission Statement 
[http://www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/MissionStatement.aspx] (accessed: August 20, 2006). 
82
responsibilities. However the monitoring of Roma protection is not a key priority of the High 
Commissioner. 
In principle, the OHCHR works for the realisation of political, cultural, civil, and 
economic rights for all. The Office concentrates its efforts on the most acute human rights’
violations, especially on those that put human life at risk. In this relation, the OHCHR pays 
particular attention to those individuals and groups which are exposed to risk on multiple 
fronts.318 In view of these goals, a recent EU survey by the Fundamental Rights Agency 
reveals that the Roma minority falls within this category. It is exposed to discrimination and 
racially motivated crimes on multiple fronts. Persons of Roma origin have reported the 
highest level of discrimination in comparison to other minority groups. According to the 
survey, one in four Roma respondents was a victim of personal crimes, such as threats and 
serious harassment. One in five Roma fell victim to a racially motivated crime, such as 
assault. One in three Roma on average were stopped by the police because of their ethnic 
origin. Finally, one in four Roma reported that they were stopped by border control when 
entering their home country because they were Roma.319 Clearly, the Roma, as a group, are 
exposed to the highest levels of risk in Europe. Still, the extent to which the OHCHR has 
evaluated these risks and worked to effectively protect the Roma population is insufficient.
In general, the High Commissioner, under the guidance of the Secretary General, has 
a broad mandate in promoting and protecting all social, economic, civil, and political 
rights.320 In this sense, a major responsibility of the High Commissioner is human rights
advocacy. Advocacy, as such, translates into supporting those who deal with human rights 
issues, including United Nations’ bodies, non-governmental organisations, and other 
partners. Advocacy also entails a commitment to facilitate the communication between 
governments and the UN mechanisms. The dialogue between the United Nations and the 
states takes diverse forms. While visiting a country, the High Commissioner can address 
human rights issues encountered in the given country. These might be structural problems,
such as gender discrimination, existence of unacceptable penalties, limited access to 
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education, and so forth. If the situation requires an urgent response, the High Commissioner 
may appoint a personal envoy to examine it.321
Thomas Weiss et al comment that the activities of the consecutive High 
Commissioners have some merits.322 For instance, the first High Commissioner, Jose Ayala-
Lasso, had extensive experience as a Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United 
Nations in New York and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador.323 His long experience 
within the bureaucracy of the United Nations might explain why Ayala-Lasso preferred, as 
Weiss formulated it, quiet diplomacy to public advocacy in a proactive style. This approach 
had some advantages: diplomacy alleviated the fears of some developing countries that the 
post would serve the Western view of human rights exclusively.324
The inability of organisations to attenuate the fears of states that minority protection 
threatens their territorial integrity and social cohesion remains a lingering challenge. The 
ability to achieve this goal promotes the values of liberal multiculturalism, particularly in 
post-Communist states where the fear of multiculturalism becoming a threat to territorial 
integrity persists. If the High Commissioner focused his efforts on placating the fears of 
weakened social cohesion, his diplomacy could facilitate the introduction of multicultural 
policies in Eastern Europe. However, analysis of the High Commissioner’s diplomacy in this 
part of the world has received scant academic attention. 
The post of the High Commissioner is a recent introduction, due to which one cannot 
draw over-critical conclusions about its merits. The presence of the UN in areas, where 
human rights are violated is a step toward the actual implementation of human rights
standards. However, as articulated in his work agenda, the High Commissioner concentrates 
his efforts in places of acute violations of human rights. The question of what represents
acute violation and the severity of violations are to be assessed. The Roma, as a group, are 
exposed to the highest risk of discrimination and physical assaults across Europe. Yet, a 
subsequent section will show that the efforts of the UN in Central and Eastern Europe are 
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fragmented at best. This selectivity of problem areas might undermine the legitimacy of the 
post. 
In this line of thinking, the High Commissioner engages in areas that are perceived as 
highly problematic, but who, as a global representative of the UN, would focus on all the 
other violations of human rights? There is certainly a limit to what a single person can 
achieve. Finally, the selectivity of problem areas is indicative of a gap between the global 
human rights’ rhetoric and the possible and actual achievements. This gap is illustrative of 
the manner, in which a global organisation functions. As Edward Luck precisely formulates 
the idea: 
[b]ig and small states alike begin to fret that their relative positions in the UN, built through years of 
practice and maneuver, could be affected by unpredictable renovations. As long as their corners of the 
body are well defended, they may continue to mouth rhetoric about sweeping change and historic 
opportunities.325
Global coverage is therefore difficult, when countries differ in motivation or are 
outright unwilling to resolve problems. However, motivation and willingness are contingent 
on whether states perceive a link between global concerns and their own well-being. The 
protection of minority groups is not a universal concern of all member states and more often 
than not, UN actions, unless taking place in their region, will not remain at the top of the 
agendas of the individual states. 
3.2.3. Staffing and employment of the OHCHR
Staffing and employment determine, at least in part, the extent to which organisations 
are committed and able to assign resources for the development of measures. The 
effectiveness of every organisational structure depends on proper management practices, 
coordination, experience and commitment of staff, as well as a sense of common purpose. 
For these reasons, the functioning of the Office is examined in view of its employment 
structure.
According to official information, the Office works through four branches: Treaties 
and Commission, Research and Right to Development, Special Procedures, and Capacity 
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Building and Field Operations Branches. The primary functions of the Treaties and 
Commission Branch are supporting the work of the various treaty bodies, preparing and 
submitting informative documents, and others. The functions of the Research and Right to 
Development Branch include assisting the High Commissioner in enhancing the system and 
providing analysis of the states’ progress reports, among others.326 Basically, both branches 
have purely bureaucratic functions. The Special Procedures Branch and the Capacity 
Building and Field Operations are the operational branches. They have the potential to 
prompt states’ responses to human rights issues. The Special Procedure Branch investigates 
human rights violations via rapporteurs, special representatives, experts, and working groups. 
The Capacity Building and Field Operations Branches assist states to strengthen the capacity 
of their national institutions.327
 These bodies are serviced by 576 officials around the world as of January 1, 2005. 
304 of them work at the OHCHR’s Headquarters in Geneva, 10 are employed in an office in 
New York, and the other 262 are employed in offices around the world.328 It is immediately 
evident that less than 600 individuals could hardly cover concerns on a global scale.      
 Hurst Hannum has questioned the personnel’s effectiveness, pointing out in 
particular that communication between the different branches in Geneva and the field offices 
is inadequate. He suggests that one of the reasons for this “disconnection” is the insufficient 
experience that field officers have in Geneva and vice versa.329 Field officers tend to come 
from outside the system of the United Nations, often from NGOs, and do not have experience 
within the political and institutional framework of the organisation. Geneva-based officials, 
on the other hand, not only have little experience on the ground but are unwilling to 
volunteer for long field missions, especially in regions of conflict.330
While insufficient experience can be a source of concern, Hannum points out that the 
UN hardly had a field component before the 1990s. At the time, neither expertise nor 
experience was considered relevant to the recruitment of Geneva officers. The establishment 
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of the Office of the High Commissioner started reversing the trend, and it appears that the
overall competence of the officials has improved over the past decade.331
3.2.4. Budget of the OHCHR
In addition to adequate human resources, the provision of sufficient material and 
financial resources is vital for the effectiveness of any organisation. A quick glance at the 
overall funding of the United Nations reveals a staggering inadequacy in this area. The 
budget envisages about 50 cents per person with regard to human rights issues. In 
comparison, the annual global military budget of the UN amounts to 100 dollars per 
individual.332
During the 2004-2005 biennium, the regular funding from the budget totalled $67.6 
million. This represents just a 0.07 percent increase over the previous biennium. Similarly, 
voluntary contributions reached $68.2 million, compared to $52.3 million in 2004.333 The 
increase in regular funding seems very negligible. Moreover, the Office receives just two 
percent of the UN budget.334 This situation leaves it dependent on the willingness of states to 
contribute, i.e. on whether they perceive a certain concern as a priority on their agenda.335
The governments approved an increase of the budget for 2006-2007. The funds 
available for activities of the OHCHR have doubled and will be distributed over a five-year 
period.336 Notwithstanding that fact, this increase seems more of a symbolic gesture to 
human rights, especially compared to the resources of some international non-governmental 
organisations. Amnesty International USA, which represents one branch of the Amnesty 
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International, had operating revenue of almost $48 million in 2005.337 Once again, the issue 
of resource availability poses a question in terms of the willingness of states to engage in
human rights monitoring on a global scale. 
3.2.5. The OHCHR’s initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe
The OHCHR does not have a comprehensive monitoring strategy for the Roma 
population in the region. The Office’s activities are limited to country visits of the 
Independent Expert for Minority Issues, together with general support and financial 
assistance for Roma-related projects. 
The High Commissioner has discussed a forthcoming country visit of the Independent 
Expert for Minority Issues, Gay McDougall, with the Bulgarian government. Both parties 
have agreed in principle, but the dates of the visit are still under consideration. In terms of 
grassroot activities, the High Commissioner recently lended support to a community-based 
training initiative in the town of Polski Trambesh. Notably, the project is the first-ever 
minority initiative to receive the support and financial assistance of the High Commissioner. 
The funding of $4,700 comes from the Indigenous and Minority Unit of the Research and 
Right to Development branch, one of the operational structures of the OHCHR, and 
sufficiently covers the activities of the community training project. The initiative will 
culminate in the establishment of a Municipal Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues 
that has a budget covered by the municipality. This pilot project is a model of effective and 
positive implementation of human rights instruments at the local level. However, the 
initiative has been small-scale.338
In view of initiatives in Hungary, the UN High Commissioner respected the 
government’s request for a visit from the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Gay 
McDougall. The expert appreciated the efforts of the government to solve the problems of 
minorities. McDougall paid special attention to Hungary’s efforts to accommodate the Roma 
community. However, the expert expressed concern that the government had moved the 
focus from the problems of the Roma minority to a broad policy that addressed 
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‘disadvantaged groups.’339 McDougall highlighted the need to fully address the educational 
and employment status of Roma and to combat the widespread discrimination against them. 
Mrs. McDougall will present her findings and recommendations on the situation of minority 
groups in Hungary to the Human Rights Council.340 Given that the expert’s tasks include
identifying venues for cooperation between the OHCHR and governments, this report will 
suggest some possible future developments. Finally, the Independent Expert relies on the 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities to determine the scope of her mandate. The Hungarian government has 
to comply with the Declaration and subsequent recommendations of the expert as to ensure 
the equal treatment of all citizens.341
In Romania, the OHCHR launched a project called Assisting Communities Together. 
The program distributes grants among local organisations that promote human rights. The 
OHCHR selected projects targeting the discrimination of Roma in the education system,
women’s participation in public life, human rights awareness, assistance and counselling 
services to juvenile delinquents, investigative journalism, and thematic theatre and 
playwriting for the youth. The funding for the projects varied between 4,700 USD and 5,000 
USD.342 The implementation and monitoring of these projects were to be conducted by an 
OHCHR/UNDP Country Office under the OHCHR. As a general remark, the High 
Commissioner noted that the Offices in many participating countries submitted inadequate
and inaccurate information in their monitoring reports.343 Given that ACT is being 
implemented for the first time in Romania, it is difficult to evaluate the level of the project’s
implementation and monitoring. 
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The measures, including non-discrimination against Roma in the education system, 
support for the participation of women in public life, human rights awareness, and others
represent the first steps of the Office toward human rights advocacy for the Roma population. 
In addition, the recommendations of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues aim to ensure 
states’ compliance with their commitments to human rights. Regrettably, the Roma-related 
activities of the Office are limited to supporting small-scale projects. This fact suggests that 
the global agenda of the United Nations lacks capacity to actively engage states in the 
protection of the Roma minority. On one hand, Eastern European states prioritise national 
cohesion and territorial integrity over the protection of their minorities. They may be 
unwilling to cooperate with the UN in terms of the development of large-scale projects for
minority protection. In addition, the socio-economic situation of the Roma is not a universal 
concern for all member states. It is doubtful that minority protection will receive the active 
support of states unless the efforts of the United Nations are focused on a region in their 
proximity. UN action in distant regions is unlikely to become a priority on the agenda of 
member states. 
3.3. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
3.3.1. Background developments
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights is the main structure 
dealing with human rights within the OSCE. A substantial body of documentation affirms 
that the organisation is committed to human rights protection, serving as a basis for the 
establishment of the Office. At the Copenhagen Meeting of 1990, states affirmed ‘that the
protection and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the basic 
purposes of government.’344 The Document of the Copenhagen Meeting stated that ‘the 
recognition of these rights and freedoms constitutes the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace.’345 These principles were reaffirmed by the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe, 
which proclaimed that ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all 
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human beings.’346 The wording of the Moscow Document of 1991 is even stronger. States 
‘categorically and irrevocably’ declare that commitment to human rights is a matter of ‘direct 
and legitimate concern to all participating States and do[es] not belong exclusively to the 
internal affairs of the State concerned.’347 At first, several institutions were responsible for 
the monitoring of these commitments, the main one being the Office of Free Elections. After 
the 1992 Helsinki Document, the Office for Free Elections evolved into the Office of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. 
In contrast to the prolonged discussions before the establishment of the Office of the 
High Commissioner, debates did not delay the establishment of the ODIHR. Participating 
states were able to agree on establishing this structure with relative ease at the regional level. 
The ODIHR works ‘to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to 
abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy … as well as promote tolerance 
throughout society.’348
3.3.2. Goals and work methods of the ODIHR
A key responsibility of the ODIHR is to assist the monitoring and reporting of states’ 
compliance with their human rights commitments.349 Commitments which relate to the 
protection of Roma include tolerance and non-discrimination, human rights, national 
minorities, and international humanitarian law.350 The compliance of states with their 
commitments is monitored by the OSCE through various mechanisms, the most frequently 
used of which has been the Vienna Mechanism. Any state or a group of states within the 
OSCE can invoke this tool on an ad hoc basis. This section suggests that the excessive use of 
the mechanism against Eastern European states might have a negative impact on the advent
of liberal multiculturalism there. In this sense, the absence of impartiality, characteristic of 
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regional organisations, is less conducive to placating the concerns of Eastern European states 
that minority protection will affect their social cohesion. Then, a subsequent section will 
describe the invocation of the mechanism by Turkey as a response to the treatment of the 
Muslim population of Bulgaria. The application of the Vienna Mechanism had an indirect 
positive impact on the Muslim Roma in the country. 
In general, the Vienna mechanism consists of four phases in which states: 1) 
exchange and respond to other states’ requests for information; 2) hold bilateral meetings 
upon request by other states; (3) bring situations of concern to the OSCE through diplomatic 
channels, and, (4) inform other states about responses to requests, exchanges of information, 
etc. This mechanism is a step forward in the field of supervision. The non-voluntary 
character of the obligations is indeed progressive. Upon requests for information, states are 
obliged to provide a response. They also have to comply with requests for bilateral 
meetings.351
 Arguably, the use of this mechanism illustrates the involvement of member states in
the OSCE. It gives them an opportunity to discuss the implementation of human rights
standards.352 Here, regional involvement proves more effective than the work of global 
bodies such as the United Nations. An illustration of this statement is the frequent use of the 
mechanism. For instance, the first phase was initiated more than one hundred times (e.g., 
against Bulgaria and Romania).353
This mechanism has been used mostly against Eastern States. A look at Arie Blood’s 
listing reveals that proceedings were raised against Western states only 9 times. Moreover, 
the mechanism has been invoked exclusively between the Eastern and Western groups of 
participating states and not within them.354 These facts clearly suggest that interconnected
political and economic interests breed an absence of impartiality. Thus, the global 
organisations may lack the motivational power of the regional, but the regional ones may 
suffer from excessive motivation. One issue of relevance comes up again – the predominant 
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352 Ibid, p. 127.
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use of the mechanism against Eastern states could have a negative impact on their 
willingness to examine the Western ideas of liberal multiculturalism. 
In general, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights fails to serve as a 
central ‘depository’ for all actions since states are not obliged to inform the Office of their 
proceedings.355 In a sense, the mechanism seems detached from the work of the Office. 
Despite the positive developments in the monitoring procedures of the OSCE, decision-
making is still in the hands of the governments.356 Decisions are ultimately made in a
consensual way with states negotiating on the solutions. Negotiation, however, leaves to 
states the difficult task of balancing their national interests and their regional commitments. 
This situation works at the disadvantage of the Roma minorities in Eastern Europe, where 
states prioritise their territorial integrity and national unity. 
3.3.3. Structure of the ODIHR. The Office’s soft diplomacy
As discussed, the effectiveness of organisations depends on their proper management 
and coordination, the experience and commitment of their staff, and the ability of the 
organisation to create a sense of common purpose. This section analyses the extent, to which
the ODIHR manages to function effectively. Rather than monitoring, the major contribution 
of the Office has been the advancement of soft diplomacy – the organisation of workshops 
and initiatives open to the wider public.
The Office has over 120 employees and consists of departments dealing with a 
number of activities.357 The Contact Point on Roma and Sinti Issues is the main department 
that focuses on the integration of Roma and related minorities in their respective societies.358
The activities of the Contact Point include recording and communicating cases of violence to 
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national institutions, responsible for the protection of Roma and Sinti, offering legal 
assistance, identifying national bodies responsible for mediation, advancing cooperation 
between associations of the Roma and Sinti, organising meetings on Roma and Sinti issues, 
and disseminating knowledge about the Roma and Sinti minorities.359
Emmanuel Adler observes that the ODIHR has been successful in organizing regional 
seminars in the framework of the ‘Programme for Newly Admitted States.’360 A number of 
events took place, among which the seminars on tolerance, the building blocks of civil 
society, the protection of Roma, and others. The Workshop on Violence against Roma 
gathered 35 representatives of Roma and Sinti associations as well as representatives of the
UNCHR and the Council of Europe. Most contributors highlighted the fact that 
discrimination against the Roma and Sinti was pervasive. The phenomenon is manifested in 
social life and inter-ethnic relations, the functioning of government, the justice and education
systems, the actions of police officials, and the language of the media. The participants 
recommended improving legal assistance, education, and training.361
The seminars were successful because they were small, managed to attract local 
participants, and focused on the specific circumstances of the region where they took 
place.362 The events also turned into places for seminar diplomacy. This development is
important for the efforts of the OSCE to promote community norms in the new member 
states. The seminar framework can become ‘a clearinghouse for assistance in democracy-
building.’363 The ODIHR has also made its procedures and documents more accessible to 
civil society. NGOs are now given the opportunity to inform the OSCE about human rights’ 
violations.364 The OSCE Implementation Meeting on Human Dimension Issues of 1998 is 
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illustrative of the increased transparency. The initiative attracted 186 representatives of non-
governmental organisations and gave them equal access to the speaker’s list.365
The majority of ODIHR’s activities represent a form of soft diplomacy. The former 
Deputy Secretary-General of NATO has defended this approach by stating that: 
Some may view sceptically the importance of “soft” diplomacy. But I take it wrong to underestimate 
the power of such dialogue and its potential to stimulate and develop constructive and deepening 
cooperation…To understand how powerful dialogue can be as an instrument of change, you only have 
to look at the development of CSCE, which began tentatively as a forum of discussion across a 
geographically and ideologically divided Europe. Now it is a fully fledged organization, building its 
own capacity for conflict prevention.366
On the other hand, analysis indicates that the Office fails to serve as the central 
structure to deal with human rights within the OSCE. A subsequent section will show that its 
initiatives for improving the situation of Roma cannot be defined as monitoring. Rather, they 
can be described as small-scale projects to improve the position of the Roma. 
3.3.4. Budget and funding of the ODIHR
The ODIHR is funded mainly from the regular budget of the OSCE and through small 
voluntary contributions.367 This section will illustrate that funding, which is important for the 
implementation of any project, has been insufficient. However, a recent sizeable increase of 
the Office’s budget indicates a positive tendency in states’ commitment to the human rights 
agenda of the OSCE. 
The OSCE allocated EUR 11,523,000 to the Office in 2004.368 The sum amounts to 
EUR 11,964,000 in 2005.369 This funding represents 6.7 percent of the total budget of the 
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OSCE in 2004.370 The corresponding figure for 2005 is 7.5 percent.371 Compared to the 2 
percent allotted to the United Nations High Commissioner, these figures point to a higher 
involvement of the OSCE states in human rights concerns. The Office is seemingly less 
dependent on states’ voluntary contributions than the United Nations. This might be a 
deliberate arrangement to prevent states from trying to influence the decision-making 
process, focusing on their national interests. These developments sound somewhat more 
optimistic; however, participating states have long acknowledged that the available funding 
is too limited to cover all activities. They have recommended that the ODIHR receive 
increased financing from the regular budget of the OSCE.372
As a positive development, in 2006, the OSCE approved a 2-million Euro increase for 
the activities of the Office.373 Additional resources are welcomed as they strengthen the 
capacity of the ODIHR to cope with its increased responsibilities.374 This will improve its 
effectiveness and ability to react in a timely manner.375
3.3.5. Activities in Central and Eastern Europe
Like the United Nations, the ODIHR does not have a comprehensive program for 
improving the Roma’s socio-economic status. The Office has been involved in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania in three ways. First, the Vienna mechanism has been used by Turkey 
as a response to human rights’ violations. Second, the ODIHR has employed election 
observation missions to follow the transparency of elections and ensure that the election 
process is fair to national minorities. Third, the ODIHR has organised trainings and 
initiatives for the Roma minorities in the three countries. 
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In Bulgaria, the Vienna mechanism of the ODIHR has been applied to the rights of 
national minorities. Between 1989 and 1990, Turkey used the Vienna mechanism in response 
to the Bulgarian treatment of its Muslim minority.376 Zeinep Ibrahimova retells that between 
1984 and 1985, the Communist government commenced the largest initiative to assimilate 
the Bulgarian Turks and the Muslim Roma. The authorities proceeded with forceful name 
changing and sent dissenters to labour camps.377 Turkey applied the first two procedures of 
the mechanism – exchange of information and bilateral meetings. Turkey warned against 
these human rights’ violations and the subsequent exodus of the Muslim community.378
Besides the use of the mechanism, the initiatives of the Office included Roma-related 
projects such as candidate training for party representatives. The ODIHR trained 75 
individuals in campaigning, methods for leading negotiations, and establishing coalitions. 
The initiative resulted in the election of eight participants in the 2003 local elections.379
In Hungary, the ODIHR deployed Election Observation Missions in response to 
invitations by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 2002 mission concluded that 
the current system of representation (requirement for a 5 percent threshold) limited the 
opportunities of parties with regional or minority support. While the Constitutional Court 
ruled that the Parliament must enact a law on minority representation, such legislation has 
not been adopted.380 Regarding the political involvement of the Roma minority, the 2002 
Final Election Observation Report expressed a concern that the Roma was the most 
marginalised minority on the political scene. The Office noted that the formal agreement 
between Fidez, one of the main Hungarian parties, and the Roma Lungo Drom had been a 
major development. Yet, the report pointed to the concern of some NGOs that Lungo Drom 
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had become an extension of Fidez.381 The previous report of the ODIHR of 1998 did not 
mention the participation of minorities in politics.382
The Vienna Mechanism of the ODIHR has been used only occasionally for national 
minority questions. Hungary applied the first two phases of the Vienna mechanism –
exchange of information and bilateral meetings against Romania.383 However, Hungary has 
used the mechanism with regard to Pastor Laszlo Toekes and not with respect to the 
treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Romania.384
Romania has not applied the Vienna Mechanism of the ODIHR to the treatment of 
minorities. In 2004, the Office conducted training sessions within the ‘Use your ballot 
wisely’ initiative. This project entailed a TV spot encouraging Roma to vote in elections,
qualitative monitoring of the minority discourse in six national newspapers, and training and 
instalment of Roma observers. As a result, 34 Roma monitored the election procedures in 8 
counties.385
To summarise, the Vienna mechanism of the ODIHR has been used only by Turkey
and in response to the attempt of the Bulgarian government at large-scale assimilation of the 
Bulgarian Muslims. The forceful assimilation has affected the Muslim Roma population.  In 
addition to the use of the Vienna mechanism, the ODIHR has been engaged in various 
projects in the three states. The activities of the Office covered election observation missions 
and trainings for the Roma population. Unfortunately, comprehensive strategies for 
improving the Roma’s situation have not been formulated.  
3.4. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC)
3.4.1. Background developments of the establishment of the EUMC
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The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia is the final result of a 
lengthy process. The beginning was marked by the Joint Declaration of the Parliament, the 
Commission, and the Council in 1977. The Joint Declaration stressed the ‘prime importance 
that these bodies attach to the protection of human rights’ and their dedication to ‘respect ...
and continue to respect those rights.’386 A Joint Declaration against Racism and Xenophobia
was adopted by the Parliament, the Council, and representatives of the member states in 
1986.387 This document is important for the Roma in focusing on ‘the importance of adequate 
and objective information and of making all citizens aware of the dangers of racism and 
xenophobia and the need to ensure that all acts or forms of discrimination are prevented or 
curbed.’388 However, the establishment of the EUMC was a lengthy process, which indicated
that monitoring was not a priority of the EU Member States. In particular, states have been 
reluctant to commit extensive resources to improve the Roma’s socio-economic status. Most 
dominant groups view the Roma as a drain on their national economies. Unfortunately, this 
cautious attitude is one of the main reasons why Eastern European states are not taking full 
advantage of the benefits of liberal multiculturalism. 
It took nine years before the Commission empowered a Consultative Commission to 
evaluate the prospects of establishing a Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.389
Several challenges to the Centre’s establishment emerged over the years. For example, the 
Founding Treaties of the European Union did not contain any reference to racism and 
xenophobia. The measures required a proper legal basis, and the member states agreed to 
base their action on the former TEU Article K.1 (7) in 1996.390 This article provided that the 
member states would jointly combat racism and xenophobia through ‘police and judicial 
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cooperation in criminal matters.’391 In 1997, the Council passed Resolution 1035/97 to
establish the Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.392
The question of whether regional bodies have the capacity to monitor minority 
protection reappears with regard to the EUMC. The lengthy developments described 
illustrate that human rights monitoring is not among the key priorities of the European 
Union. This statement is confirmed by the fact that the new body is not empowered to 
monitor and penalize states when and if violations of human rights occur. 
 Council Regulation (EC) No 168/2006 replaced the EUMC with the European Union 
Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). The authority is intended to build on the functions 
and monitoring capacity of the EUMC, although there have been few actual changes in the 
powers of the body.393
3.4.2. Structure and work methods of the EUMC
The main responsibility of the EUMC was to ‘provide the Community and the 
member states with objective, reliable, and comparable information on racism, xenophobia, 
and anti-Semitism at the European level.’394 The collected information is used to study the
causes, effects, and consequences of racial violence and discrimination in terms of free 
movement, culture, education, social policy, and employment.395
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The personnel of the body number thirty-five. During 2002, the three units operated 
with twenty four staff members, and the number of employees increased to twenty eight in 
2003.396
The European Racism and Xenophobia Network (RAXEN) was the EUMC’s primary 
instrument for data collection. The RAXEN is comprised of twenty five National Focal 
Points (NFPs), located in the Member States.397 These NFPs cover various research 
organisations, NGOs, and specialised bodies that monitor racism and xenophobia.398 Their 
tasks primarily involve the collection of information on national and regional level and the 
administration of the NFP network.399 The NFPs collect research findings, conduct opinion 
polls, and gather information on conferences and events.400 They submit annual National 
Data Collection Reports on employment, racial violence, legislation, and more. The reports 
represent a basis for the EUMC’s Annual Report on racism and xenophobia.401                                                                                                             
An analysis of the EUMC’s overall functioning is important because most scholars 
and officials are rather sceptical about the purpose and effectiveness of the EUMC. Its
limited role indicates that EU states are unwilling to engage in the monitoring of minority 
protection. 
Discussing the effectiveness of the Centre, Andrew Williams notes that the EUMC 
relies on information that is open to the public. The EUMC uses the following sources of 
information for its reports: personal contributions provided by the Management Board of the 
EUMC, country reports filed by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance,
official documents produced by national public bodies, country reports by the UN Committee 
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for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, documents produced by specialist NGOs, and 
press coverage.402
Furthermore, there is no mechanism, through which the Community’s institutions can 
observe the Centre’s findings or take any action upon its recommendations. The EUMC is 
dependent on the Community’s willingness to take note of its findings or consider its 
recommendations. For this reason, Williams concludes that the Centre is ‘devoid of a 
framework within which its work may have a practical impact.’403
Ann Singleton, a co-founder of Statewatch and the Civil Liberties Network, considers 
that the National Focal Points are the primary strength of the EUMC. They do not constitute 
a part of the Commission and have a degree of autonomy. However, the Centre itself is set up 
and run bureaucratically by the Commission. The staff of the Centre spends a lot of time
monitoring the contracts of external experts and NFPs and following the Commission’s rules 
and regulations.404
An official, who requested confidentiality, commented that the effectiveness of the 
EUMC had been a matter of concern over the past years. In her opinion, some of the reports 
were important, especially those provided by the RAXEN network. However, the 
Community’s institutions do not have proper mechanisms to address the reports and follow-
up is very limited. Another concern of hers is that the EUMC addresses problems selectively. 
For example, in 2001, the EUMC did not participate in a conference on Roma inclusion in 
Bratislava even though the migration of Roma to the then-15 EU states was an issue. In the 
official’s view, a further concern is the lack of clarity on cooperation with NGOs and 
especially on cooperation with the European Network against Racism: a network, which 
unites multiple partners against racism. One aspect that has been noted as somehow 
successful involves the strengthened role of the media and contact with the media with regard 
to human rights advocacy.405
Finally, Roger Helmer, representative in the European Parliament, explained that 
bodies such as the EUMC exist because they are ‘additional bricks to the EU structure’. In 
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his view, the MPs vote in favour of them because ‘they are building Europe’, not because 
they expect effectiveness. MPs also vote for such institutions as a favour to the cities that 
host them – these bodies bring prestige, visitors, and money. The representative concluded 
that he did not expect anything particular or useful from the work of the Centre. The 
Committee of Regions and the Social and Employment Committee are expensive 
organisations. These structures waste a lot of time and money to produce reports that no one 
reads.406
The officials quoted above observed that the Centre had a degree of autonomy while 
the RAXEN reports could be considered informative. However, scholars believe that the
reports of the EUMC lack an inside view. They comment that the Centre does not have real 
monitoring powers, and the follow-up remains limited. Other concerns relate to possible 
selectivity of issues and the absence of sound cooperation with NGOs. Given that the Centre
is run by the bureaucracy of the Commission, the EUMC is overloaded with administrative 
work. The strictly critical position of the MP Helmer holds that structures such as the EUMC 
are ineffective. In sum, the majority of opinions point that the EU has been wary of 
establishing a structure empowered to monitor minority protection. The extent to which
states adopt and follow multicultural policies depends on the decisions of governments. In 
Eastern Europe, the governments have chosen to adopt the liberal model, which focuses on 
human rights as opposed to the multicultural model, which demands special protection of 
ethnic minorities. 
3.4.3. Budget and funding of the EUMC
This section examines the sources and the amount of funding available to the EUMC. 
The Centre receives regular funding and is not dependent on voluntary contributions. 
However, the amount of financing is rather limited, suggesting again that the monitoring of 
minority protection is low on the agenda of the EU.
The main source of funding for the EUMC is the European Community. The Centre 
also receives financial support from the Austrian authorities and PHARE funds to facilitate 
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the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.407 The statements of revenues and costs show that 
the budget is very small, although there is a gradual increase in contributions from the 
European Community. For example, the funding grew from EUR 7,176,000 in 2003 to EUR 
7,969,000 in 2004 and to EUR 8,189,000 in 2005.408 As previously mentioned, non-
governmental organisations such as Amnesty International operate with considerably higher 
funding. 
3.4.4. Activities in Central and Eastern Europe
Information and personal correspondence reveal that the Bulgarian and Hungarian 
NFPs function mostly as centres for data collection and promotion of the identity of 
minorities. The responsibilities of NFPs include publishing books and reports and organizing
workshops. The Romanian NFP has been quite successful in lobbying. Yet, as with the other 
two NFPs, this body has no formal monitoring powers. 
The Center for the Study of Democracy is the organisation chosen to act as the 
Bulgarian National Focal Point for the EUMC. Dimitur Markov, a project coordinator of the 
Center, explained that collecting information on xenophobia and racism is the most important 
task of the NFP. The major deliverable to the EUMC, the National Data Collection Report, 
was due in October, 2006. During the first year of its work, the NFP organised the 
international workshop “Policing Minorities.”409 Contributors highlighted that police officials 
should be trained to work with vulnerable groups such as the Roma.410 However, Markov 
explained that the Center is not responsible for organizing annual workshops.411 The NFP is 
an information-gathering think tank with no project implementation or monitoring functions. 
The Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies is the National Focal Point of
the EUMC in Hungary. The NFP collects and analyses information supplied by non-
governmental organisations, EU Member States, international organisations, and 
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researchers.412 The Institute has produced several thematic reports, among which is a study of 
the possibilities for cultural revitalization and research on the stereotypes in Hungary.413 In 
addition, the Institute published two books covering the Roma minority: Roma of Hungary 
and Roma Migration.414
The EUMC also requested that the Institute develop a report on the education of 
minorities in Hungary. This document gives a positive evaluation of the Act on Education 
and the various decrees that aim to improve the educational level of minorities. However, the 
report also notes that the insufficient number of qualified teachers and the inadequate 
distribution of resources impede the implementation of the legal framework.415 In principle, 
the NFP reports these findings to the government through its representative in the Institute, 
Mr. Andor Urmos, Head of Department at the Ministry for Youth, Family and Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities.416 However, the Institute is not empowered to monitor the 
compliance of government institutions with its recommendations and to make decisions. The 
government decides whether to act upon or ignore the recommendations of the Institute,
which means that the NFP has a consultative character. 
The Center for Legal Resources (CLR) is the National Focal Point of the EUMC for 
Romania. This is a non-governmental organisation, which aims to improve the existing anti-
discrimination framework, ensure the appropriate enforcement of legal mechanisms, and 
raise awareness about discriminatory practices.417 Clearly, such enhanced anti-discrimination 
mechanisms are particularly important to the Roma population. 
The Center has been actively lobbying for amendments to the current anti-
discrimination legislation. In 2003, the organisation drafted, together with other NGOs, a 
letter to the President of the National Council for Combating Discrimination. The document 
highlighted the need to amend the Romanian Constitution and include the National Council 
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for Combating Discrimination (NCCD) in the text. The CLR noted that the anti-
discrimination provisions had to be regulated through the Organic Law of the country instead 
of a simple Government Ordinance. The Center also offered an alternative to the proposal of 
the NCCD to amend the anti-discrimination law. Among the many detailed remarks, the text 
pointed to the need to include the term harassment in the list of prohibited behaviours. 
Furthermore, multiple acts of discrimination should not represent an aggravating 
circumstance of a single act of discrimination; the different instances must be treated as 
separate administrative offences. In its statement of position, the Center pointed to the fact 
that defendants paid a fine to the state, while victims were not compensated. To compensate 
for these shortcomings, a set of clear and applicable regulations in the field of anti-
discrimination are essential.418
It seems that the Center has been quite successful in monitoring the government’s
legislative measures in other areas of human rights. For example, the CLR worked as the 
secretary of an inter-agency group that prepared the Bill on Prevention and Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings. The Center also managed to secure government support for the 
establishment of an inter-ministerial expert group (including representatives of the Ministries 
of Justice, Interior, and Labour, and the CLR) to draft the bill.419
The Center has advised various amendments to the anti-discrimination law, which
would fully transpose the Directives (e.g. shift of the burden of proof and reasonable 
accommodation). However, the amendments to the law are still awaiting Parliamentary 
approval.420
The Romanian NFP has been successful in exerting pressure on the authorities. While 
lobbying has worked in some cases, constructive criticism has not led to transparent 
legislative and social action in every case. It is clear that the CLR and the Bulgarian and 
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Hungarian NFPs remain primarily tools for collecting information. The national structures 
have no formal monitoring powers over their respective governments.
3.5. Conclusion
This chapter has studied the main characteristics of the three monitoring bodies – the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, the Office for 
Democratic Institution and Human Rights, and the European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia – together with their purposes, functions, aims, achievements, strengths, and 
perspectives for development. The chapter provided an overview of where, how, why and to 
what extent human rights monitoring in Central and Eastern Europe fits into the monitoring 
of human rights in general. 
Clearly, the effectiveness of the monitoring bodies depends on the willingness of 
states to grant them a more independent presence in the field of human rights. The motivation
of states determines the extent, to which they provide structural and financial support to deal 
with human rights concerns in an efficient and timely manner. The United Nations’ global 
agenda fails to motivate states for joint action, as evidenced by the insufficient financial and 
human resources allocated to the Office of the High Commissioner. The latest increase of the 
regular budget will serve to create just 91 posts.421 To improve the overall effectiveness of its 
human resource base, the Office envisions an updated staff training policy and policy for the 
field rotation of staff. In addition, the OHCHR will aim to establish a policy, planning, 
monitoring, and evaluation unit to strengthen its management and planning capacity. Yet, the 
Strategic Management plan shows that more resources are required to implement these small 
reforms or they ‘will remain merely aspirational.’422
 The regional approach of the OSCE presents a better alternative, provided that states 
balance their national interests and regional commitments. However, the chapter has 
suggested that regional organisations tend to lack impartiality, a fact that has a negative 
impact on the prospects of liberal multiculturalism in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the
involvement of the Office in the OSCE’s monitoring mechanisms is limited. The ODIHR
                                                
421 High Commissioner’s Strategic Management Plan 2006 – 2007, p. 5.
422 Ibid, p. 8.
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cannot serve as a main ‘depository’ for all activities because states are not required to inform 
the Office of their activities.423 If the ODIHR is to function as the main monitoring body of 
the OSCE, it has to become the primary location for the coordination of activities and 
exchanges of information. 
On the positive side, efforts to enhance the capacity of the ODIHR have brought some 
positive results. The funds steadily increased in 2006, and the number of employees
expanded from just two officials and several administrative positions.424 As noted, the Office
presently employs over 120 people. Their efforts to diffuse human rights norms have 
contributed to improving the cooperation and interaction between the ODIHR and the civil 
sector. Seminars have fostered exchanges of ideas and transfer of knowledge between 
participants. 
 The European Union is another regional formation, which has the potential to offer a 
better-suited approach to monitoring. However, its monitoring body functions mainly as a 
network for collecting information. The absence of any monitoring functions suggests that
monitoring is not a priority for the EU. To enhance the monitoring capacity of the EU, the 
Commission recently transformed the EUMC into the European Union Fundamental Rights 
Agency.425 However, this body has the same powers as its predecessor. 
None of the organisations reviewed above has a comprehensive monitoring strategy 
with regard to the Roma. Yet, monitoring is important for Eastern Europe, where the problem 
with the fair treatment of minorities, and Roma in particular, is especially astute. Monitoring 
can contribute to developments in the right direction, which is the direction of 
accommodating the culture of minority groups.  
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Chapter 4
In Search of the Millennium: Comparative Analysis of Roma Treatment in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania before Transition to Democracy
(1100–1989)
4.1. Introduction
This chapter provides a historical overview of the policies and treatment of Roma
people from Byzantine times to the end of Communism, tracing the historical processes that 
modelled the Roma at the cusp of the region’s transition to democracy in the 1990s. Due to 
historical developments, the Roma people are in a unique and inferior situation than other 
ethnic minorities in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. In all three states, Roma formed a 
marginalised group, but the circumstances and conditions that drive the evolution of policy in 
the 21st century were distinctly different and deserve a more focused inquiry. 
This chapter will examine the historical position of the Roma in the Bulgarian, 
Romanian, and Hungarian societies, examining the differences in the levels of tolerance in 
the three societies, the political regimes that determined or impacted the status of the Roma 
population, and its acceptance or rejection by the dominant groups. Beginning with a brief 
discussion of the Roma living in the Bulgarian and Romanian parts of the Ottoman Empire 
(14th to 19th century), the chapter then proceeds with the situation of the Roma in the 
Hungarian lands of the Habsburg Empire (15th to 19th century). The assimilatory model of the 
Habsburg dynasty will be contrasted with the laissez faire approach of the Ottoman Empire. 
The first part will also examine the enslavement of Roma in Wallachia (as part of the 
Romanian lands) during this period. The section will analyse both, the official policies and 
the extent of discrimination in the three societies in the absence of formal minority 
protection. As underscored in chapter two, human rights standards are fairly recent 
developments. Minority protection has been non-existent for the larger part of human history.  
The second section of the chapter will examine the treatment of Roma after the 
independence of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The awakening of civic consciousness 
among the Roma population during this period is discussed. At the same time, the section 
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will stress the fact that nation building has been the primary goal of the three states. Minority 
protection has been only briefly enacted.
  The final section will examine the different approaches of the Communist regimes 
towards the Roma, the outcomes of their policies, and the extent to which the authorities 
managed to integrate the Roma in the structures of their respective societies. This section is 
essential since the Roma-related measures of the Communist governments represent a legacy 
to be dealt with by the present national authorities. 
4.2. Pre-modern developments in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania
4.2.1. Ottoman Empire
4.2.1.1. Bulgaria
Between the 14th and 15th century, the Bulgarian lands fell under the jurisdiction of 
the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans preserved the civil status of the Roma although they had 
a lower social standing than the general population. The authorities looked favourably on the 
possibility of voluntary assimilation.426 However, they were mostly concerned with the 
regular collection of taxes from their subject populations. Taxation was vital for the Empire’s 
functioning, and the subjugated territories were integrated into an elaborate martial-
administrative complex.427
To some extent, taxes for the Roma depended on their religious affiliation. If they 
were righteous (Muslims), Roma paid 650 akcheta annually. The raia or Christian Roma paid 
720 akcheta. The difference between the taxes is insignificant but indicates a more lenient 
attitude toward the Muslim Roma. Nomadic Muslim Roma who chose to wander with the 
Christians were punished. Elena Marushiakova explains that in this case, religion played a 
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role only because the Christian Roma did not pay their taxes regularly.428 Thus, it seems that 
the main interest was the regular payment of taxes by the Roma. Moreover, the minority was 
allowed to participate in the formal institutions of the Empire. They had the right to practice 
various approved crafts and worked as musicians, goldsmiths, gardeners, servants, doctors 
and surgeons, among others.429 It seems that the Roma were fairly integrated into the socio-
economic life of the Empire. The broad register of occupations allowed as well as the 
comparatively lower taxes for the Muslim Roma suggests that the Ottomans encouraged
voluntary assimilation. Indeed, Roma were open to the prospect of conversion, and the 
majority of Roma converted to Islam.430 The more lenient attitude towards the Muslim Roma 
and their willingness to convert to Islam are by themselves important historical 
developments. Firstly, the Roma who converted to Islam were rejecting a major symbol of 
the Bulgarian nation: the Christian faith. Quite possibly, the Muslim Roma were viewed as 
siding with the Ottomans, who were perceived as the subjugators of the Bulgarian nation. 
Secondly, the fact that the Ottomans favoured the Roma minority, the lifestyle of which was 
disapproved by the dominant group, would have further affected the dominant group’s 
attitude towards the Roma. 
Bulgarian folktales and proverbs of this period might help assess the prevailing 
attitudes of the dominant group toward the Roma. Arguably, folklore encompasses narratives 
that may be judged as fantastic (ascent to a sky world, descent to an underworld, physical 
transformations, etc.) Folktales also stand for something more than photographic images of 
social reality. However, even the most fantastic folktales are constrained by some 
considerations of reality. If a tale is conceived as a pure wish fulfilment, with no 
development or conflict that is meaningful within the context of a particular society, it soon 
goes into oblivion.431 Moreover, a major function of the folktales is to justify the existing 
social structure and to express society’s demands on its members. Certain social demands are 
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made upon the characters, their response is judged against the existing norms, and their fate
follows in the form of punishment or reward. Ultimately, characters who comply with 
society’s demands are restored to their good fortune, and violators are punished for their 
failure to act within the boundaries of the socially approved and encouraged behaviours.432      
In line with this function of folktales, Bulgarian folklore from the Ottoman period 
abounds stories that depict Roma as the violators of social norms. Numerous tales focus on
the Roma’s failure to adopt a lifestyle that is approved by the dominant group. In the context 
of the Bulgarian society, settled life and farming would fall within the scope of approved and 
encouraged lifestyles. Proverbs and folktales support the view that the Roma are incapable of 
farming the land to earn a living. One tale from the Sofia region is indicative of the 
prevailing view, retelling that a Roma man begged the Bulgarian villagers for barley, hoping 
to raise wheat by peeling the husks.433 The story reflects the view that the absence of farming 
skills is equal to laziness. Another story focuses on a Roma man who begs a ploughman for 
some wheat. The Roma explains that his fate is harder: the ploughman ploughs, grinds, 
bakes, and eats. Gypsies have to beg, carry the products, bake, and then finally eat. At the 
end of the story, the ploughman reprimands the Roma for begging434 (a form of punishment 
follows the violation of social norms). 
While not every society disapproves of living on charity -- Hindu and Islamic 
societies consider that giving alms is a religious obligation435 -- for the Bulgarians, begging 
has meant depreciation and even denial of their farming lifestyle. Furthermore, the nomadic 
lifestyle of the Roma minority opposes the settled farming life of the dominant group, and 
therefore, it is unacceptable and rejected by the Bulgarian society. 
 In addition, Roma are depicted as people who lack faith: ‘The Gypsies found sacred 
texts on the road, but they took the texts for pastry and ate them. Gypsies destroyed God’s 
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gift and that is why they have no books or alphabet.’436 In this tale, Roma’s illiteracy is the 
punishment for their perceived lack of faith. 
In general, stereotypical images of the Roma people mark the folktales and literature 
of the Ottoman period. Keta Mircheva notes that some positive portrayals of the Roma 
appear only when Bulgarians describe the romantic nomad whom they met in extraordinary 
circumstances. There was no desire to gain an intimate knowledge or to understand the Roma 
who lived close to the Bulgarians.437
      While many stereotypical depictions are found in the folklore, some positive 
developments came as a result of the Ottoman administration of the Bulgarian lands. The 
Roma were fairly integrated into the socio-economic structure of the Empire and naturally, 
some ideas of nationhood appeared within their communities.438 In 1868, for example, the 
Bulgarian newspaper ‘Macedonia’ published ‘A Letter to the Editor’ signed by an 
‘Egyptian’, i.e. Roma. The author, Illia Naumchev, claimed that the Roma language and 
skills were a sound proof that Roma descended from the ancient Egyptians. The author 
argued that the Roma settled in the Greek lands and educated the Greeks. The Greeks, 
however, feared that the Roma would excel and proclaimed themselves the ‘enlighteners’ of 
Europe.439 To hide the truth, the Greeks banned the Roma from the religious rite and made 
them hateful to all nations.440
In sum, during this period, the Ottoman Empire was interested in tax collection rather 
than the assimilation of the subjected populations. The Muslim Roma were favoured by the 
Ottoman authorities. On the other hand, the Bulgarian dominant group held a contemptuous 
attitude towards the Roma.  
The minority continued to occupy the niches considered undesirable by the dominant 
group, which viewed the Roma as foreign and disgraceful people. The dominant group
distanced itself from the Roma who were the ‘others’, the intruders, the unfamiliar, and 
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unwelcome. In principle, the Roma were granted the right to participate in the institutions of 
the Empire, developing civil consciousness as a result. As illustrated later in the chapter, their 
desire for group rights reappears after the independence. Unfortunately, the dominant group
was preoccupied with its own nationalism and paid no attention to the Roma’s aspirations for 
special protection. 
4.2.1.2. Romania
      The situation of the Roma minority in Romania was quite different from the onset. 
Even the earliest evidence of settlement suggests that they were enslaved by the Romanian 
principalities. The 15th century witnessed the gradual expansion of slavery throughout the 
Romanian provinces. By that time, the Ottomans had occupied the Romanian ports on the 
Danube and the Black Sea. The principalities could no longer act as a transit trade route 
between Europe and the East. The foreign craftsmen who came with the East-West trade 
disappeared and economic prosperity declined. The Roma, who were known as adept 
craftsmen, became a source of skilled labour. The boyars were interested in ensuring a steady 
supply of labour and bonded Roma as to prevent their flight from the principalities.441 In 
1445, Vlad Dracul brought to Walachia ‘11.000-12.000 persons, without luggage and 
animals, who looked like Egyptians’ from his successful campaign against the Turks in 
Bulgaria.442
After the two kingdoms became vassals of the Ottoman Empire in 1503, they enjoyed 
a large degree of self-government in return for their annual payment of tributes and the 
provision of military support. The Ottomans preserved the status of the local aristocracy and 
the Roma’s slavery persisted.443
                                                
441 Achim, Viorel, The Roma in Romanian History, p. 45 quoting: Panaitescu, Petre, “Le Role Economique et 
Social des Tziganes au Moyen Age en Valachie et en Moldavie” in XVII Congres International d`Antropologie 
et d`Archiologie Prehistorique. VII – e Session de l`Institut International d`Antropologie. Bucarest, 1 – 8 
Septembre 1937, (Bucharest, 1939), pp. 933-42.
442
Crowe, David, A History of the Gypsies of Eastern Europe and Russia, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1994), p. 108 quoting:  Beck, Sam “The Origins of Gypsy Slavery”, p. 56; Hancock, Ian, The Pariah Syndrome,
(Ann Harbour, MI: Karoma Publishers, 1987), p. 22; Castellan, Georges, A History of the Romanians, pp. 38-9; 
Seton-Watson, Robert, A History of the Roumanians, p. 44.
443 Fraser, Angus, The Gypsies, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 172.
114
With time, the slaves formed a separate category within the Romanian social 
organisation. They were the lowest social stratum with no legal personality. Slaves were the
property of their master as was their other personal property. The master could treat the 
slaves as he pleased: he could put them to work, sell or exchange them for other goods, use 
them to pay off debts, and even bequeath them. The only obligation of the master was to feed 
and clothe them. The slave master was not sanctioned by the state authorities. For this reason, 
Roma were often subjugated to arbitrary treatment. Masters abused their rights, punished 
them with beatings, or put them in prison.444 The grim picture of the slaves’ treatment is 
presented by one 19th century Romanian reformer, Kogălniceanu who campaigned for the 
emancipation of all slaves:
human beings wearing chains on their arms and legs, others iron clamps round their foreheads, and still 
others with metal collars about their necks. Cruel floggings and other punishments, such as starvation, 
being hung over smoking fires, solitary confinement, and being thrown naked into the snow or a frozen 
river, such was the treatment meted out to the wretched Gypsy.445
The situation of Roma remained unchanged until 1830 when a new generation of   
intellectuals, educated in the West, entered the Romanian public life. The intellectuals 
embraced the liberal Western ideas and advocated the cultural and institutional 
modernisation of the Romanian principalities. Revolutionary exiles from France and other 
states also helped to bring the spirit of the French Revolution to Moldavia and Walachia. A 
Swiss intellectual, Emile Kohly de Guggsberg, condemned slavery as ‘the country’s greatest 
shame, a black stain in front of foreigners.’446
Real changes in the situation of Roma occurred after the 1848 revolution in Romania. 
The revolutionaries in Walachia, intellectuals, boyars, and army commanders, promulgated a 
new constitution that proclaimed: freedom of the press, equal civil rights, the end of special 
privileges for the boyars, administrative and legislative autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, 
a government responsive to a representative assembly, and unification of the two provinces. 
The Ottoman and Russian powers, backed by boyar units, put an end to the revolutionary 
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demands, and the old regime was restored.447 Nevertheless, the new prince of Walachia, 
Barbu Ştirbei, promoted the modernisation of the principality and pressed for the humane 
treatment of the Roma. He ordered that if a slave owner wanted to sell his slaves, he had to 
make a request before the Treasury. The latter stepped in immediately to buy and set them 
free.448 In 1855, the public divan of Moldavia voted ‘for the abolition of slavery, the 
settlement of compensation and the transfer of emancipated slaves to the status of 
taxpayers.’449 Just a year later, ‘The Law for Emancipation of all Gypsies in the Principality 
of Walachia’ was promulgated to put an end to slavery in the privately owned estates.450
The agrarian reform of 1864 is an important development which gave full personal 
liberty and freedom from feudal duties and tithes to all Romanian peasants, removing the
restrictions on movement. Peasants could purchase the land they had farmed while boyars 
were compensated by the state for the lost property. This new freedom was extended to the 
Roma and in principle, their emancipation was complete.451 At the same time, the Romanians 
still viewed the Roma as ‘living outside of society and treated them with the greatest 
disdain.’452 The writings of a 19th century English traveller illustrate this statement: 
Although the Gypsies form such an integral part of the community, they are regarded with the greatest 
disdain by the rest, whose behaviour towards them is scarcely better than towards animals; a man 
could more easily bear being called a ‘thief’ or something similar than Gypsy.453
Discrimination against the Roma in public and the formal denial of their existence 
would gradually find its way to independent Romania. Poor living conditions, lack of support 
for Roma’s initiatives and finally, their forceful extradition to labour camps during World 
War II would come to characterise the next period covered here. This enduring
discrimination and exclusion of the Roma is a major obstacle to their equal inclusion in the 
respective society.
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4.2.2. The Habsburg Empire: Hungary
      The Roma faced a considerably better treatment during the initial years of their 
arrival in Hungary. The Hungarian records of 1417 document that a group of Roma travelled 
through Transylvania and the Slovak parts of Hungary with the special permission of King 
Sigmund (1387-1437). The King granted travel privileges to the Roma because they had
information about the Turks. In 1423, the King granted to the Roma leader Ladisius 
extensive travel privileges. This generous gesture attracted a significant number of Roma to 
the Hungarian lands. The newcomers settled as ‘castle musicians and metal workers’ and 
were highly valued for their skills.454 The Roma ‘were declared royal servants whose 
settlement and employment on private estates the consent of the king was necessary.’455 It is 
also known that many Roma served in the Hungarian army and were highly regarded for 
their ferocity.456 Finally, an important development during this period is the appointment of a 
‘chief of the Gypsies’, who was titled ‘egregius’ (distinguished).457 He had authority over 
Roma leaders who acted as county ‘judges in Gypsy matters.’458 This privilege, in effect, 
translates into what is today the right to self-government. 
The Hungarian attitude toward the Roma changed after the Hungarian forces suffered 
a defeat by the Turks at Mohács in 1526. Previously praised for their knowledge of the 
Turkish military art, the Roma turned into ‘incendiaries, soldiers or spies.’459 The Roma who 
lived in the Ottoman lands ‘became smiths for the Turkish army; others were musicians, 
barbers, messengers or executioners.’460
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When the Hungarians drove the Turks out of Hungary, the authorities developed
increasingly oppressive policies against the Roma. The reign of successive Austro-Hungarian 
rulers was marked by policies that entailed strong patronage and interference in Roma’s
lifestyle. This included purposeful ‘civilising’ attitude with the ultimate goal of complete and 
forceful assimilation,461 processes that have been largely successful. The current ethnic 
landscape of the Hungarian state consists of dispersed and assimilated minorities. This is one 
of the reasons why at present, Hungary implements extensive multicultural policies.  
Charles VI (1711-1740), for example, treated Roma with an utmost brutality. He 
ordered the extermination of all Roma subjects within his domain.462 His daughter, Maria 
Theresa (1740-1780), led a heavy assimilatory policy. In 1774, the Empress forbade 
intermarriages between Roma. Moreover, when a Roma woman married a non-Roma, she 
had to prove she was capable of taking care of the household and was a good Catholic. When 
a male Roma married a non-Roma, he had to prove he was able to support his family. To 
further discourage nomadism, Maria Theresa ruled that the Roma could possess horses only 
for the purpose of farming, although oxen were preferable for ploughing.463
These regulations demonstrate the dominant approach toward the Roma: total and 
forceful assimilation. Having no civil status, the Roma were told how to live and settle, 
whom to marry, and which faith was righteous and mandatory. These policies have left their 
mark on the current ethnic landscape in Hungary. The approach to Roma anticipates the 
Hungarian nationalism to follow. Assimilation rather than inclusion of the Roma was 
pursued after the Habsburg Empire divided into two kingdoms: Austria and Hungary. The
policies of assimilation from the Habsburg period will transform into a drive for a completely 
homogenous Hungarian state whereas the Magyar ethnicity coincides with the nation-state. 
   4.3. The Roma of independent states in the 20th century
4.3.1. The Roma of Bulgaria
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The Ottoman Empire did not attempt to efface the civil consciousness of the 
Bulgarian Roma. Bulgaria, as an independent state, followed suit and granted equality to its 
minorities. The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 made religious freedom a precondition for the 
independent status of Bulgaria. Its article 4 stated that in regions with mixed populations of 
Bulgarian, Turkish, Greek, Romanian, and other nationalities, the interests of all people 
should be considered during the preparation process of the Bulgarian Constitution. Following 
this clause, the new Bulgarian constitution, adopted on 16.04.1878, incriminated 
discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds. It established a law that supported the 
initiatives of minorities as to preserve and develop their culture.464 This positive obligation 
on the part of the state can be interpreted as an early form of multicultural policy. However, 
multiculturalism entered the political scene of Bulgaria only for a short period of time. In 
1901, the National Assembly discussed and approved amendments of the electoral law which 
deprived Roma of the right to vote. Articles 4 and 7 –“Who cannot be a voter” - of the law 
included ‘the non-Christian Gypsies and also all those Gypsies who cannot establish 
residence.’465 This law aimed to combat the historical enemies of the dominant group: the 
nomadic lifestyle and Ottoman influence.
In effect, the law of 1901 suspended the electoral rights of all Muslim Roma who 
represented the majority of the Roma population. The debates around the amendments did 
not provoke any concern about the discriminatory and anti-constitutional suspension of the 
rights of Roma. The Roma, who emerged as a minority with civil consciousness, reacted to 
the legalised discrimination against them. The first Roma conference was organised in 1901 
in the town of Vidin. The conference aimed to formulate a response to the amendments. The 
convenors decided to initiate a campaign to have the measures revoked. They invited Roma 
leaders from all over the country to Sofia where they would draw up and present a petition to 
the National Assembly. This petition was taken to the Assembly on 1 June, 1905, but Roma 
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did not receive a response from any institution. This silence prompted the convocation of the 
first Roma congress in Sofia which sent a petition with the same demand to the National 
Assembly. Eventually, the Assembly voted a new electoral law which omitted the restrictions 
on the voting rights of the Muslim Roma.466
The end of World War I marked a period of quick growth of Roma civic 
organisations. In 1919, the Roma created the organisation Isticbal (Future), which was 
headed by Shakir Mahmudov Pashov. The organisation existed for a couple of years until its 
functioning was made illegal by the 1925 Supplements to the Law for the Protection of the 
State. In 1929, the organisation was restored and two years later, Isticbal began to publish the 
newspaper Terbie (Education). The 1932 Roma Conference in the town of Mezdra decided to 
work for the nationwide influence of the organisation.467 However, the political changes of 
that period prevented the further growth of such initiatives. On 19 May, 1934, the political 
formation Zveno overthrew the elected government and assumed control of the state. The 
new government banned all political parties, restricted the freedom of speech and the press, 
and liquidated the autonomy of the local self-governments. The Cabinet renounced the 1878 
Constitution and disbanded the National Assembly. The Ministers issued decrees to govern 
the country.468 In this oppressive political climate, Isticbal ceased to exist.469
The emergence of Roma organisations and the Roma civic movement, in general, 
manifested a desire for equality and the promotion of the Roma’s cultural heritage. However,
as Marushiakova and Popov mention, such organisations were established independently of 
the government and without its support.470 The dominant group showed a rather limited 
interest in the fate of the Roma minority. In effect, the earlier promise for multicultural 
policies was largely neglected. Moreover, equality before the law had been disregarded with 
the amendments to the electoral law. The historical records are silent about the public 
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response to these restrictions. The Bulgarian Roma of this period continued to be neglected, 
disapproved of, and unsupported by the public and the government alike.
The development of other discriminatory policies against the Roma followed after the 
Bulgarian state joined the Axis during World War II. Roma were not specifically mentioned 
in the 1941 Law for the Protection of the Nation which suspended the civil rights of the
Jews.471 However, in May, 1942, King Boris III issued a decree which ordered the 
compulsory employment of Roma, mainly on public projects. In August, the newspapers 
Dnes and Dnevnik announced that the police had initiated searches for idlers around the 
larger cities and towns. The Roma, who could not provide a proof of useful occupation, were 
deported and put to work on the road and railway projects. The food rations were reduced for 
the whole nation; however, information from the town of Razgrad shows that different 
portions were distributed among the Bulgarians, Jews, and Roma. The Bulgarians were given
200 grams of olives and 500 grams of sugar, the Jews received 100 and 200 respectively, and 
the Roma had only 50 grams of each.472 As for more repressive measures, Ibrahim 
Karahasan-Chanar claims that Roma were interned in several labour camps, one of which 
was in the town of Dupnica.473 However, there is no evidence that Roma were deported to 
extermination camps.474
The fact that Bulgaria was preparing for an early surrender to the Allies might
explain, in part, the authorities’ decision to save the country’s Roma and Jews.475 Before this 
decision was made, Bulgaria did not hesitate to implement discriminatory policies against its 
minorities. The fate of the Roma and Jews, in particular, was a low priority, and their 
treatment was conditional upon the possible benefits from the war (i.e. the acquisition of 
Macedonia and Thrace).476
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This period also witnessed one of the few attempts at civil movement among the 
Roma population. The Roma exercised the right to freedom of assembly and speech, 
lobbying the government to revoke the discriminatory electoral law. However, the authorities 
were quick to suppress the emerging civil consciousness of the Roma. This measure can be 
viewed as just one of the historical developments that led to the enduring marginalisation of 
the Roma population. The long-lasting historical discrimination is a major obstacle to the 
present efforts to improve the socio-economic status of the Roma. 
4.3.2. The Roma of Romania
The ethnic consciousness of the Romanian Roma began to emerge in the 1930s, 
unsupported and undisturbed by the regime. In 1926, Romani intellectuals created the 
General Union or Rumanian Romi which published the journal Neamus Tiganesc (The 
Gypsy Family). Three years later, the Union sponsored a Roma conference in Bucharest 
which drew together delegates from throughout Europe. The conference established that the 
goal of the Roma minority was the ‘rejuvenation of national consciousness and the struggle 
for Gypsy rights.’477 The Romanian Roma also founded the General Association of Roma 
which strove to preserve the traditional culture of Roma, assisting their integration. Some of 
their ideas sounded like demands for group rights. The reason why the Roma made claims for 
special measures may lie in their very insecure social position after the abolition of slavery. 
In particular, the organisation asked the government for ‘a large garden for the Tzigane 
children, a library, a maternity hospital, and office for the settlement of claims, a dispensary, 
and a place for refuge for those who had come to Bucharest temporarily or those who are 
being prosecuted.’478  
The war years put an end to the Roma’s organised movement for multicultural 
policies. The Nazis brought the regime of Antonescu into power. The pro-Nazi racist regime
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strove to clean the country from foreign nationals. They came to be the Romanian Jews and 
Roma. The approach of the regime appeared under the ‘bio-politics’ perspective. The 
Romanian scientists who dealt with the treatment of ethnic minorities coined the concepts of 
‘ethnic purity’, ‘inferior ethnic groups’, and ‘ethnic promiscuity.’479 According to the 
scientists, the Jews and Roma were ‘minorities of extra-European origin’ and ‘ballast 
minorities’ which posed a ‘bioethnic danger.’480 In order to remove this racial threat, the 
researchers proposed to isolate the nomadic and semi-nomadic Roma, in particular, in labour 
camps where:
They will be forced to change their clothes, they will be shaved, receive a haircut and be sterilized. In 
order to cover the costs for their upkeep, they will be required to carry out forced labor. We would get 
rid of them from the first generation. Their place will be taken by national elements capable of ordered 
and creative work. Sedentary Gypsies will be sterilized at home, so that place in which they reside may 
be cleaned of their presence in the course of a generation… In this way, the margins of villages and 
towns will no longer be a source of shame or focus of infection for all the ills of society, but rather an 
ethnic wall buttressing the nation rather than harming it.481
 In line with this proposal, the confiscation of their property was ordered with a royal 
decree of August 1942. It specified which categories of Jews and Roma would be deported 
and resettled in Transnistria.482 Over 25,000 Roma and ‘other racial undesirables’ were 
shipped to the province, many of whom could not survive the harsh conditions.483 Donald 
Kenrick and Karola Fings present an account by one commander who witnessed and 
described the plight of the Romanian Roma. The official retells that the Roma were housed in 
barracks at a distance of 8-10 kilometres away from the city of Oceanov. The Roma 
destroyed all wooden parts of their buildings because the authorities did not supply wood to 
heat their food and houses. The winter conditions were especially harsh because of the 
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damaged buildings and the poor clothing. Some died before arriving at the settlements. Of 
those who survived the long travel to the province, ten to fifteen died daily.484
The misery of Roma lasted till the end of World War II. Some constables told the 
Roma to flee from Transnistria, others left them with no information. The Roma were free to 
leave the province but as Michelle Kelso summarises, many of them were weakened by the 
long exile, the betrayal of the government, and the denial of practical means to secure their 
survival.485 Only 6,000 out of the 25,000 deported Roma returned to Romania.486  
In sum, before the war, the Romanian Roma aimed to secure group rights, which are in 
line with the modern view of minority protection. Yet, during the war period, they were 
treated as inferior and even denied physical existence. They were the separate and unwanted 
minority to be removed from the rest of the population. Inferior ethnic groups such as the 
Roma and Jews posed a ‘bioethnic danger’ to the Romanian nation. The resettlement policy 
further solidified the marginal position of the Roma. The long-lasting marginalisation of the 
Roma and the fact that minorities are perceived as a threat to territorial integrity are major 
obstacles to improving the present situation of the Roma minority in Romania. 
4.3.3. The Roma of Hungary
The academic literature does not offer evidence of the existence of Roma associations 
in the period before World War II. Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov’s list of Roma 
organisations of the 1920s and 1930s provide information about the Roma’s cultural and civil 
revival in Bulgaria, Romania, former Yugoslavia, and Greece.487 However, Hungary is 
omitted from the list, suggesting that tendencies towards organised civil movement were 
hardly present among the Hungarian Roma. This would be consistent with the centuries long 
pattern of assimilation within the Habsburg Empire. The Hungarian minorities are largely 
                                                
484 A. S. B., fond I. G. J., dossier 84/1943, pp. 237 - 238 in Kelso, Michelle “Gypsy Deportations from Romania 
to Transnistria 1942-44” in Kenrick, Donald, and Karola Fings, eds., In the Shadow of the Swastika: The 
Gypsies during the Second World War, p. 114.
485 Author’s interview with survivors in Kelso, Michelle, “Gypsy Deportations from Romania to Transnistria 
1942-44” in Kenrick, Donald, and Karola Fings, eds., In the Shadow of the Swastika: The Gypsies during the 
Second World War, p. 129.
486 ASB, IGJ, 97/1944 in Kenrick, Donald, and Karola Fings, eds., In the Shadow of the Swastika: The Gypsies 
during the Second World War, p. 130.
487 Marushiakova, Elena, and Vesselin Popov, “The Roma – a Nation without s State? Historical Background 
and Contemporary Tendencies”, p. 3.
124
dispersed and assimilated today. For this reason, the dominant group does not perceive ethnic 
minorities as a security threat to the territorial integrity of the state and pursues multicultural 
policies.
World War II marks a radical shift from the politics of assimilation in Hungary. 
While nationalistic policies from earlier periods entailed the elimination or at least muting of 
ethnic characteristics, when the country was forced to choose between the preservation and 
the sacrifice of its citizens (in exchange of the perceived good of the nation), some people 
happened to be less Hungarian than others. In 1940, the government adopted a law that
arranged for the expulsion of all Roma who were non-citizens prior to 1918.488 Mass 
deportations, however, did not begin until the German occupation of Hungary in 1944.489 By 
that year, Regent Horthy and the conservative ruling regime aimed to achieve the Hungarian 
national goals by keeping at least a façade of parliamentary norms and liberties.490
Seizing power in 1944, Szalasi’s fascist Arrow Cross strove to create Carpathian-
Danubian Great Fatherland, composed of Magyar-land, Slovak-land, Ruthene-land, Croat-
land, Slovene-land, and Western March (Austrian Burgenland). The dominant group would 
be the supreme and ruling race, and the Magyar would become the official language of this 
quasi-federal state. Great Fatherland, according to Salazi, would become one of the three 
leaders of Europe, alongside Germany and Italy.491 As a diligent ally of another prospective 
ruling country, the Salazi government deported approximately 31,000 Roma from Hungary, 
and only 3,000 returned.492 However, Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxton argue that there 
are no documents pointing to where the large number of Roma was relocated.493
The grave atrocities against the Roma are illustrative of the Hungarian aggressive 
nationalism during the 20th century: assimilation turned into extermination of the minority 
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when national goals were pursued.  The current multicultural policies of the state are also 
driven by national goals, an issue discussed in chapter five. Hungary aims to set the tone of 
minority protection in order to secure group rights for its large Hungarian minorities in 
Romania and other neighbouring states. 
4.4. Communist policies towards the Roma
At the beginning of the Communist period, the multicultural perspective reappeared 
on the political scene in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian authorities, in unison with the Soviet 
policies, attempted to establish Roma as a separate nationality with equal rights and 
distinctive ethnic identity. The regime organised the Roma intelligentsia to work for the 
problems of the Roma population. March 1945 witnessed the establishment of the All-
Gypsies’ Organisation against Racism and Fascism and for the Promotion of the Cultural 
Development of the Gypsy Minority in Bulgaria. Romano Essi, the first Roma newspaper
was also printed in 1946.494 The Roma theatre ‘Roma’ opened a year later. The authorities
were actively assisting the establishment of local branches of the All-Gypsies’ Organisation. 
Meanwhile, the first National Conference of the Gypsies in Bulgaria took place on 2 May,
1948.495
This spirit of tolerance and cultural sensitivity lasted only briefly. The focus of the 
Communist agenda shifted toward securing national unity in the beginning of the 1950s, and 
the government prioritised state cohesion over the rights of ethnic groups. In line with the 
Lockian view of the state as a social contract among unrelated individuals, the authorities 
focused their efforts on establishing a homogenous nation-state.496 The ethnic Bulgarians 
were led to believe that minorities, and more specifically the Turks and Pomaks, were “the 
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other”. They were dangerous to the state in striving to ‘to cut off a part of the national 
territory and annex it to Turkey.’497
At the same time, the Bulgarian government adopted the Stalinist conservative 
approach to culture. The local branches of the Roma organisation were dissolved, and it 
ceased to exist. The authorities sent its leader, Shakir Pashov to the island of Belene’s
concentration camp. The Roma theatre ‘Roma’ merged with the local cultural organisations
and also disappeared. These developments marked the beginning of a new period for the 
Bulgarian Roma. Their existence as a distinct ethnic community was considered
incompatible with the ‘Bulgarian socialist nation’, and the government focused its efforts on 
a policy of ethnic and cultural effacement with the aim of complete assimilation.498
Initially, the Communist authorities attempted to formulate an ideological basis for 
the already developed assimilatory policies. They requested the Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences to send expeditions of ethnographers, historians, and philologists to regions with
compact minority populations. The expeditions had to explore the ethnic origin and the 
national specifics of the target groups. Their aim was to find out whether forceful 
conversions to Islam had taken place. The scientists welcomed the task but found no 
evidence of forceful conversions and no single trait to prove that Roma were of Bulgarian 
ethnic origin.499
The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist party was disturbed by the 
findings: not only were Roma of non-Bulgarian origin, but their isolation and affiliation with 
the Turks prevented the penetration of a more civilised (Bulgarian) influence among them.500
In 1962, the Central Committee adopted decision A 101, aiming ‘to curb the negative 
tendencies … among Bulgarian Muslims, Gypsies and Tatars to identify with the Turks …
and to enhance patriotic education.’501 In order to assimilate the Roma, the government  
proclaimed that they ‘register themselves and their children as Bulgarians, and change their 
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first, middle and last names without a ruling of the People’s Court but simply by a legal 
request sent to the respective local councils.’502 Marushiakova explains that these policies 
reflected the fear of the dominant group that the Muslim Roma may become a bridge for
Muslim and Turkish influence in the country. Moreover, if Roma joined the Turkish 
community in Bulgaria, they would ‘make it too big and dangerous.’503 This fear and the 
view that ethnic groups are a source of threat to territorial integrity drive the development of 
policies at present. As a result, the post-Communist Bulgarian authorities have shown 
preference for the liberal model of citizenship rights. 
Following these initial policies, in the 1960s, the government implemented a series of 
measures in the education system.504 These measures reflected a concern that those Roma 
who identified with the Turkish minority preferred to send their children to Turkish schools. 
If they were to receive a proper Communist education, the attendance of Bulgarian schools 
was necessary.505 Although the policies described below appear as a form of minority 
protection, their goal was to assimilate the Roma minority. Some initiatives aimed to increase 
the overall competence of the Roma but in reality, they resulted in the lower educational 
level of the minority. 
In general, the measures were intended to stimulate Roma families to send their 
children to Bulgarian educational institutions. The government built new schools in the 
Roma neighbourhoods and provided most textbooks free of charge. Local cooperatives and 
town halls paid the food for the school canteens, and a high proportion of the expenses for 
heating, food, and education in the nursery schools was covered by the state. 
The government also established a special type of school which aimed to increase the 
vocational training of students of Roma origin. Their curricula contained little general 
education in subjects such as Bulgarian, mathematics, foreign languages, or physics and was
focused more closely on vocational training. As a result, graduates had difficulties when 
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applying for university programs.506 Those who wanted to start working were not allowed by 
law. Vocational students completed school at the age of 13-14, but the Bulgarian Code of 
Labour forbade working before the age of 16. In this situation, many graduates were 
compelled to work in breach of the law.507
Further, the percentage of Roma who attended the so called ‘special schools’ was 
disproportionately high. These institutions comprised of schools for mentally retarded 
children, institutions for juvenile delinquents, and establishments for pupils with impaired 
vision, hearing, or speech. As Ilona Tomova illustrates, the Roma comprised only 9.7% of 
students in the mainstream educational institutions but constituted 21.6% in the vocational 
schools, 32.1% in the auxiliary institutions, and 29% in the schools for students with deviant 
behaviour.508 This fact is striking considering that during the last century, the Roma minority
represented between 2 and 5 percent of the total population. Even current census data of 2001 
reveals that the number of Romani is around 370,000 or 4.7 percent of the total Bulgarian 
population.509
The government also initiated a housing program which may be considered a part of a 
package of special measures directed toward the Roma. In reality, the housing plan aimed to
assimilate the Roma rather than improve their socio-economic situation. 
The Roma neighbourhoods, usually located in the outskirts of the populated areas, 
became increasingly segregated. According to the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party, the authorities had to focus on specific measures
to gradually eliminate the segregated sections and quarters in the next ten to twelve years, to 
improve the professional skills of working Gypsies, to construct a vast network of day-care centrers 
and kindergartens to enable children learn the Bulgarian language at an early age, to ban all 
segregated schools and boarding-schools, to make special efforts to attract Gypsies to amateur art 
groups, to reflect and artistically recreate the positive changes in the life and thinking of the 
Bulgarian Gypsies.510
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 The practical results of these measures were negligible and actually worked to the 
contrary of official expectations. Only 36 of the 547 Roma quarters were closed, and some of 
them developed again in several years. A few families received apartments; the others 
remained in their old quarters or moved to live with relatives in other accommodation around 
the country.511
Other culturally insensitive policies included the building of self-contained houses for 
the Roma, which were most often located on the outskirts of the bigger cities. The houses, 
which were initially planned for single families, contained two bedrooms. In time, this space 
became insufficient, and the Roma built additional structures to host the families of each
married son. As a result of the illegal constructions, most buildings remained without sewage 
facilities. The authorities did not feel responsible for the settlements. At present, waste water 
and sewage flows down the streets, and the water mains and the sewage network are rarely 
repaired.512  
The last phase of the government’s assimilatory politics coincided with the 1984-5 
‘Process of Revival.’513 This process represented a forceful re-naming of persons who had 
Arabic names and affected a considerable number of the Muslim Roma. As in previous 
periods, the treatment of Roma was subordinate to the goal of limiting the Muslim influence 
within the country. In a report presented to Politburo, the future Prime Minister, Georgi 
Atanasov, stated that around 250,000 Roma had accepted Bulgarian names. In this way, the 
authorities had stopped the tendency toward ‘Turkicization’ and consolidated the Roma 
minority within the framework of the Bulgarian socialist nation.514
Additional measures were adopted to efface the culture of the minority. The Roma 
were not allowed to communicate with the authorities in their language, display their 
traditional clothing, and practice their customs. Some traditions were proclaimed ‘dangerous 
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heritage from the old times or cultural vulgarity.’515 Practices such as traditional bathing of 
brides, male circumcision, and arranged marriages were banned.516
In sum, the government sought to assimilate the Roma in order to accomplish the 
goals of the nation: a socialist state built on social cohesion and territorial integrity. The 
Roma had to become ethnic Bulgarians and live up to the standards of the dominant group. 
The use of the Roma language and the practice of their customs and beliefs were discouraged 
as to efface their identity. In a nutshell, if Roma had a different identity, they would have a
different kind of needs to be taken care of. A common identity resolves the problem of 
accommodating multiple identities that may be perceived to be competing for individual 
loyalties. And even when the government introduced policies that aimed to raise the standard 
of the minority, the measures were not successful. The special schools gave inferior 
education to the Roma students, failing to prepare them for higher education. The constructed 
neighbourhoods were not properly maintained and turned into ghettos. As a result, the Roma 
remained the least prepared group to face the transitional period that followed after the fall of
Communism. 
In Romania, the situation continued to revolve around the superiority of the 
Romanian nation. It was not until the 1960s that a form of national representation was 
introduced for the Hungarian, German, and other minorities. The Roma, however, were not 
included in the list of ‘co-habituating nationalities’ and not entitled to representation.517 They 
had no voice at the Party level or within the state administration; no institution promoted 
their collective interests and no council of Roma workers was created to represent them.518
These facts seem striking in view of the fact that the Roma was and remains the largest 
minority in Romania. In Ceausescu’s own words, the Roma represented 3 million out of the 
total 23 million population of Romania (approximately 13%).519 In line with the general 
indifference to the problems of the Roma, no policies were developed to improve their 
quality of life. The authorities undertook to settle nomadic Roma, but the policy did not aim 
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to improve their socio-economic situation.520 The absence of other policies directed toward 
the Roma supports this fact. 
In 1983, a report of the Propaganda Section of the Central Committee of the 
Romanian Communist Party stated that some Roma ‘persist[ed] in retrograde traditions and 
mentalities, tend[ed] to lead a parasitic way of life, refused to go to work … live[d] in 
precarious conditions, and refused to take part in activities for the welfare of society.’521
Taking into account these conclusions, the government introduced series of measures 
to eliminate the Roma’s backwardness. They were to be found jobs in the fields of 
construction and agriculture. County officials would work with the Roma to build homes on 
authorized building areas. Health officials had to immunise all Roma and perform monthly 
health and hygiene checks in their quarters. The Ministry of Education had to adopt special 
measures so that Roma students from low-income families received adequate education. The 
Ministries of Health, Labour, and Education had to ensure the placement of ‘abandoned 
Gypsy children, beggars, and vagabonds in special social assistance units.’522
These policies were only partially implemented for a brief period of time. Because of 
the social and economic problems of Romania in the mid-1980s, further progress was not 
made toward implementing the measures. The final years of Communism in Romania were 
especially harsh for the Roma who belonged to the least qualified and least integrated social 
class in Romania.523 The failure of the first and only program to improve the situation of the 
Roma can be explained, in part, with the economic downturn caused by the regime of
Ceausescu. The failure to implement the measures is also explainable by the limited funding 
provided by the state.524 The roots of the problem seem to lie in the general disinterest of the 
government in improving the poor socio-economic status of the Roma. The absence of a 
consistent, long-term strategy to solve their problems confirms this conclusion. During the 
final years of Communism, there were certain accusations that Ceausescu promoted anti-
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Roma policies, but those accusations cannot be supported.525 It is more realistic to assume
that the situation of the Roma minority did not receive a serious attention because the 
authorities did not believe that a serious problem existed.
The Communist policies in Hungary continued the assimilatory approach of the 
previous periods. However, the regime established a double standard for the Roma, treating 
them as inferior citizens. For example, the regime showed no concern for those Roma who 
were sent to the German labour and death camps. No reparations were paid to the victims,
and no memorials were established for several decades.526 As another discriminatory measure 
of 1954, the regime introduced a different kind of identity cards for the Roma. The police 
issued special black books that were reserved for untrustworthy citizens.527 Illustrative of the 
assimilatory approach is the fact that the Communist regime did not acknowledge the
existence of the Roma minority as a distinct group.528
Believing that socialism would automatically solve the problem of nationalities, the 
authorities coined some policies that accounted for ethnic differences. Classes in Hungarian 
as well as minority languages were taught in special schools. The Roma language was not 
included in the school curriculum.529 The authorities expected that in time, the Roma would 
assimilate into the Hungarian society. In order to speed up the process, the regime had to 
implement a combination of campaigns. ‘Discipline of regular labour’ and ‘the civilizing 
effects of decent housing and educational achievement’ were intended to efface the 
differences between the Roma and the other members of the Hungarian society. The regime 
followed this logic in the form of the theory: ‘(Gypsy) x (socialist wage-labour + housing + 
education) = (Hungarian worker) + (Gypsy folklore).’530
Questions about the fair treatment of minorities did not drive the introduction of 
culturally sensitive policies for Hungary’s ethnic minorities. Hungary was increasingly 
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concerned about the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in neighbouring states531 and gradually 
adopted the multicultural approach to accommodating the cultures of minority groups.  The 
main goal was to gain a better position to negotiate special rights for the ethnic Hungarians in 
Romania. 
In this relation, in 1961, a resolution of the Central Committee of the Hungarian 
Socialist Worker’s Party stated that although the Roma did not constitute a nationality, their 
group size entitled them equally to ‘developmental and constitutional privileges.’532 After the 
adoption of this resolution, the authorities confirmed that the Roma constituted an ethnic 
group. In 1988, the Politburo of the Party granted them a nationality status.533
The treatment of minorities under the Hungarian Communist regime had been shaped
by the state’s national interests. During World War II, Hungary sided with Germany in order 
to gain some of the territories lost in World War I.534 During the Communist period that 
followed, the establishment of a socialist state was one of the top priorities. Another priority 
was to negotiate special protection for the ethnic Hungarians in Romania. The situation of the 
Roma minority was ignored at first. Then, the Roma were forced to fit the format of the 
Hungarian socialist worker but were not granted the privileges that other minorities enjoyed. 
The Roma were not granted a nationality status, making it impossible to voice their problems 
as a national minority. Finally, due to concerns about the fair treatment of ethnic Hungarians 
in neighbouring states, the authorities expanded the list of recognised national minorities, as 
a result of which the Roma received a national minority status. The Central Committee 
granted this status to the Roma based on the large size of the minority and not because of its 
distinct ethnic characteristics. As in Bulgaria and Romania, it was not a priority of the 
authorities to accommodate the culture of the Roma. Moreover, the Roma were the least 
prepared minority to face the transition to democracy. 
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4.5. Conclusion
During all historical periods, the Roma were discriminated against by the authorities 
and the general population. This chapter examined historic marginalisation and 
discrimination, demonstrating that these processes have taken many centuries. 
In Bulgaria, the Roma had been treated as foreign, unpredictable, and failing to live 
up to the standard of the dominant group. Because of the Ottoman rule over the Bulgarian 
lands, the dominant group was occupied with its own undesirable circumstances. This pattern 
persisted after the independence. The emergence of aspirations for nationhood has been 
delayed for five centuries, and the dominant group was preoccupied with its own nation 
building. Minority questions were, therefore, left to the capacities of the minorities 
themselves. The Roma were the pariah minority and as such, they faced some discriminatory 
measures, the voting act being an example. They could exercise other citizenship rights, such 
as the right to express their culture, without the interference of the state. Yet, they did not
receive financial assistance to promote their culture, a fact that fits the pattern of limited 
involvement with minorities and their problems. During the war period, national benefits in 
the form of possible territorial expansion took priority over the rights of minorities. The 
government initiated some blatantly discriminatory policies, although they were among the 
most lenient policies in comparison to other European countries. The Communist period 
brought a fairly new policy line aimed to assimilate the Roma, but some of the old patterns 
persisted. The regime tried to fit the Roma within the model of the socialist worker through 
improved standard of living, education, and indoctrination with the socialist values.
However, follow-up did not accompany the policies to evaluate their effectiveness. The 
Roma represented a marginalised group that existed outside the norms of society, and this 
could easily become a justification for the failure to improve their socio-economic situation.
The half-hearted and half-accomplished policies of the Bulgarian government can be 
characterised as an attempted assimilation, combined with a degree of indifference. The 
authorities built schools for the Roma, but they were inferior to those attended by the general
population. With the ‘solution’ of the housing problem, Roma were left to maintain the
newly built neighbourhoods by themselves. The only persistence the government showed 
was in claiming that the Roma were not a separate ethnic minority. By making this claim, the 
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government aimed to curb possible Turkish influences within the country. The Roma had to 
be assimilated into the dominant population so that they did not adopt a Turkish identity. The 
ethnic identity of the minority was a matter of political correctness. Overall, the authorities 
developed ill-thought assimilatory policies and pursued them inconsistently. 
Hungary was included in the makeup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had led 
a deliberate policy of assimilation toward its minorities. The Roma possessed valuable skills 
and knowledge of the Turks, and were highly valued initially. When the Ottomans invaded 
the Habsburg lands, this same knowledge turned Hungarians against the Roma. The former 
valuable workers were viewed with suspicion and mistrust. Successive rulers limited the 
autonomy of the Roma and imposed a number of measures to assimilate them into the 
Hungarian population. These measures aimed to civilise the Roma and efface their foreign 
identity, ruling them more easily as separate subjects than as a group. 
After the independence, Hungary preserved the assimilatory politics of the previous 
periods. The absence of ethnic associations proves that efforts toward assimilation have been 
successful. While assimilation has been a major goal, the physical survival of Roma as a 
group was at stake during World War II. The government in power used the Roma as an 
exchange coin for benefits promised by the Nazi regime, shipping Roma to the concentration 
camps. As with assimilation, extermination was determined by political convenience. The 
post-war Communist regime did not acknowledge the atrocities of the war, and successive 
governments failed to establish a nationality status for the Roma. The situation changed in 
response to the growing concerns about the fair treatment of Hungarian minorities in 
neighbouring states. As a result, the list of recognised minorities was expanded, and the 
Roma were granted a national minority status. 
The Romanian Roma have held the most precarious position within their society. 
They were enslaved during the Middle Ages and subjected to unfair and arbitrary treatment 
by their masters. The authorities did not sanction arbitrary treatment and the Roma suffered 
in the absence of legal protection. With the abolition of slavery, Roma finally gained a 
citizenship status but discrimination against them persisted. They did not have personal 
belongings or land to farm and could not rely on the authorities for support. 
Yet, remembering their precarious position, Roma were quick to organise and press 
for multicultural forms of minority protection.  The outbreak of World War II put an end to 
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the organised movement of Roma, marking a new grim period. According to the views of 
Romanian scientists, Roma were inferior to the ethnic Romanians and presented an obstacle 
to the purification of the Romanian race. The solution was to completely isolate them from 
the ethnic Romanians. Many Roma were deported to settlements in Transnistria and left 
without the basic means for survival. Few Roma survived the deportations of the war period. 
The following decades were marked by inconsistent measures to improve their socio-
economic situation, which were ultimately unsuccessful. 
In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, Roma formed a marginalised minority, but the 
circumstances that inform the evolution of policy today were distinctly different. The 
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe have had their effect on the status of the
Roma people which is an additional reason why the Roma minority faces unique problems 
today. Chapter five will examine the impact of democratisation on the region in the last 20 
years and the effect of government measures for integration on the situation of Roma. 
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Chapter 5
Domestic and International Visions of Minority Protection: Healthy Nexus or Uneasy 
Compromise?
(1990-2008)
5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis of the implementation of international human rights
legislation within the domestic legal standards of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania. The 
chapter explores the impact of democratisation of Eastern and Central Europe on the 
situation of the Roma, paying close attention to the scope and effectiveness of government 
measures for improving the socio-economic status of this minority. The study of government 
approaches helps outline more specific policies to solve the problematic situation of the 
Roma in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania.
The chapter draws upon the historic transformations described in chapter four and 
explores the extent, to which those developments have moulded the modern concepts of 
minority protection. The historical frame will suggest the underlying reasons for the adoption 
of either the liberal model, based on human rights, or the multicultural model of 
accommodating the cultures of minority groups. The present situation of dominant group-
minority relations is also a result of historical processes that have determined the geopolitical 
position of states. Тhe current position of states is informed, at least in part, by the presence 
of ethnic minorities abroad, the homogeneity of states’ populations, and the level of trust in 
the citizenship loyalty of domestic minorities. 
The situation of the Roma in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania, as elsewhere in 
Eastern Europe, also results from historic power redistributions, annexations of territories, 
and the level of states’ encapsulation in nationalistic terms. As a result, the present day Roma 
communities display signs of economic, educational, and social exclusion and corresponding 
isolation at the lower level of the hierarchical structures. 
The first section of this chapter will describe the socio-economic situation of the
Roma in each state and then, the chapter will outline the general historic argument that drives 
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the adoption of a liberal or multicultural model of accommodating the rights of minority 
cultures. Although some historical developments are unrelated to the treatment of the Roma, 
such events have been conducive to the development of different concepts of minority 
protection that affect the Roma. Therefore, the subsequent discussion of approaches to 
minority protection, their benefits, the rationales behind their adoption, and the availability or 
absence of more suitable alternatives aims to explore the argument or the position of the 
three states. 
 The chapter will interlink the reasons why states show preference for the liberal or 
multicultural model with the resulting domestic legislations and structures for 
accommodating ethnic minorities. Conversely, the adopted provisions and the scope of the 
principles of non-discrimination and equality, in terms of individual and collective rights to 
participation, will illustrate the states’ views on accommodating minorities. The specific 
programs targeting the Roma minority, their coherence and level of implementation, will also 
build upon the underlying assumptions of the safe borderline between the territorial integrity 
of states and accommodating the culture of ethnic minorities.
5.2. Minorities vs. states 
5.2.1. Minorities in numbers
5.2.1.1 Bulgaria
The Roma population of Bulgaria is largely sedentary.535 Statistical data from the
2001 census reveals that 370,908 Bulgarian citizens identified themselves as Roma.536 Most 
communities have settled in the countries’ larger towns and cities in search of better
economic opportunities.537 However, the Roma live in impoverished areas, and a quarter of 
their houses are illegal. Their neighbourhoods carry evocative names such as ‘Abyssinia’ and 
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‘Cambodia’ - none-too-subtle indicators of their ghetto status, a status starkly underscored by 
a host of social indicators.538 The majority of households (95.4 percent) do not have 
electricity. Almost 37 percent of the Roma sleep on earthen floors, and only 9.4 percent have 
access to hot water.539 At a threshold of $2.15 per day, the level of poverty is 41.1 percent for 
the Roma and just 4.1 percent for the non-Roma.540 The level of unemployment ranges 
between 60 and 65 percent, especially in areas of compact Romani population.541 The 
educational status of the Roma is significantly lower than the national average. Around 63 
percent of them have basic or no education, 32.2 percent have completed primary school, and 
just 0.2 percent hold university degrees. In comparison, 41.8 percent of ethnic Bulgarians 
complete secondary school, and 16.1 percent graduate from universities.542 About 70 percent 
of school-age Roma study in segregated schools.543 The material conditions in these schools 
are sub-standard – some lack basic facilities such as blackboards and chalk, and more than 
half have no glass windows.544 The quality of education is poor, which prevents the pupils 
from pursuing higher education. When the Roma study in integrated schools, they are 
isolated due to their imperfect command of the Bulgarian language. Moreover, the children 
who live in segregated neighbourhoods cannot possibly have the same social experience as 
other students. If the teachers do not have the time, knowledge, or willingness to integrate 
these children, the latter feel confused by the school environment.545
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Poverty, malnutrition, and limited access to healthcare services account for the 
comparatively poorer health of the Roma. The ethnic Bulgarians live 15 years longer than the 
average Roma, only 1 percent of whom live beyond the age of 70.546 During the last decade, 
child mortality among the Roma has been twice that of the Bulgarians. The Roma are also 
more susceptible to diseases commonly linked to poverty and substance abuse, such as 
tuberculosis, hepatitis B, and HIV.547
           The socio-economic plight of the Roma may be addressed at the policy level by 
including members of the minority in the decision-making process. However, data from the 
2005 elections reveals that only 100 Roma competed with 5,900 other candidates. One 
Roma, Toma Tomov of the Bulgarian Socialist Party, won a seat in Parliament.548 The post-
election distribution of posts resulted in the appointment of two Roma Deputy Ministers for 
the first time. Yavor Dimitrov was appointed at the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, 
and Aleksander Filipov became a Deputy Minister of Emergency Situations.549 While these 
appointments represent a precedent, they are not indicative of an emerging trend of including 
the Roma in the political process. 
Moreover, a survey of social attitudes reveals that the majority of Bulgarians are 
unwilling to empower ethnic communities. 20 percent of Bulgarians object to minority 
(Roma and Turkish) cultural organisations, 25 percent express opposition to political 
representation for the ethnic minorities, and 48 percent oppose the existence of ethnic 
political parties. As explained in the next section, the ethnic Bulgarians fear that minorities 
could monopolize the political life of the country.550
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               To sum up, most Bulgarian Roma have abandoned their traditional occupations and 
nomadic lifestyle. They have moved to the cities in search of subsistence, but their poor
education and lack of marketable skills relegate them to the impoverished periphery. The 
environment of the periphery presents few opportunities because education, healthcare, and
infrastructure fall below the national standard. The dominant group opposes the cultural and 
political mobilization of ethnic minorities, which represents a further obstacle to improving 
the socio-economic situation of the Roma. 
5.2.1.2. Romania
As in Bulgaria and Hungary, the Romanian Roma are poorly educated, largely 
unemployed, and living on the fringes of society. Education statistics show that only half of 
the children aged seven to ten attend primary school, and just 7 percent enrol in 
universities.551 Research among Roma respondents conducted by the Soros Foundation 
reveals that 23 percent have no education, 27 percent have only primary education, and 33 
have graduated from secondary school.552 As in Bulgaria, there are segregated institutions 
with high concentration of Romani pupils. Mihai Surdu’s research indicates that around 12 
percent of all Roma pupils attend schools where more than fifty percent of the student body 
is of Roma origin.553 The facilities and the quality of teaching in the segregated institutions 
are inferior to those of the regular schools.554 Interviews in Ocolna revealed that the Roma 
studying in the local schools could not write their own names and did not know their age, and 
there were graduates of the local school who were unable to read and write.555 Segregation is 
only one reason for the poor educational achievements of the Roma children. School 
attendance is impeded by the poor infrastructure in and around the Roma residential areas. 
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This includes poor or no roads to the communities, absence of public transportation, and the 
distance of schools from the neighbourhoods.556
The poorly developed residential areas fail to provide other basic services, such as 
healthcare. A survey of two regions revealed that 98 percent of poor Romanians were 
registered with a general practitioner in comparison to 48 percent of Roma people.557 The 
Roma who are excluded from the healthcare system cannot enjoy the benefits of regular 
medical checkups and preventive healthcare. Preventive medical care is crucial in diagnosing
medical conditions before they do serious damage to one’s health. Persons who have access 
to preventive healthcare have a longer life expectancy, show better productivity at work, and 
enjoy a higher quality of life.558
Being excluded from the healthcare system, the Roma children suffer from higher 
rates of vitamin deficiency, malnutrition, anaemia, dystrophy, and rickets than the non-Roma 
children.559 According to the Public Health District Office of Mures, the Roma community 
has the highest rate of tuberculosis, AIDS, hepatitis, and neuropsychological disorders of all 
Romanian ethnic groups.560
Poor education, health, and living conditions drive a poverty rate of 75.1 percent and 
a severe poverty rate of 52.1 percent among the Roma in Romania.561 In 1998, roughly 40 
percent had no occupation and only one-half of a percent were employers.562 The Roma 
employed by the state worked mainly in the field of education: teachers and teaching 
assistants, school mediators, and inspectors. At the level of government, just two of the 485 
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deputies of the previous parliament were of Roma origin.563 Currently, the Roma Party Pro 
Europe holds one seat in Parliament.564 At the ministerial level, none of the 24 Ministers is 
Roma, and only one (Mrs. Maria Ionescu) of the 180 state secretaries is of Roma origin.565
The Romanian President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have no Roma employees.566
The President, Traian Basescu has debased the Roma at the highest official level by stating 
that ‘[they] are nomads and nobody can do anything about them ... they will bring their 
horses into the flats and there any attempt to civilize them ends ... we should build special 
camps and keep them outside our cities.’567 The President was also recorded on a cell phone 
while calling the journalist Andrea Pana ‘a stinky Gypsy’. Basescu formally apologized for 
the ‘undeserved moral prejudice’ and added that ‘the used phrasing … [does not] represent in 
any way the President’s attitude … to the Roma community in our country.’568
An optimistic trend is the general decrease of the dominant group’s intolerance of the 
Roma. In 1993, more than 70 percent of ethnic Romanians objected to having Roma 
neighbours. By 2006, this rate had declined to 36 percent. Still, only one third of the 
Romanians approve of mixed marriages, and status indicators such as education and income 
do not enhance the level of tolerance. The Romanians accept the idea of the Germans 
keeping their traditional lifestyle but are less willing to consent that the Roma traditions 
represent an alternative and equally merited lifestyle. Factors such as residence, tolerance of
differences, higher trust in people outside the family, and existing social contacts with Roma 
can act to diminish the preconceived notions and increase the level of tolerance.569 Still,
urgent, comprehensive, and efficient governmental action is necessary to eliminate 
discrimination and increase the social capital in terms of education and employability.
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5.2.1.3. Hungary
Due to the Holocaust legacy, Hungarian law forbids data collection regarding ethnic 
origin and religious affiliation. Even the authorities rely on statistics provided by non-
governmental organisations for its work. Therefore, the compilation of relevant and timely 
demographic information about the Hungarian Roma is difficult.570 Toso Doncsev explains 
that the Roma population is not concentrated in some parts of the country. The Roma inhabit 
some 2,000 of the 3,200 Hungarian settlements, but, as in Bulgaria, more than two-thirds live 
in urban areas, typically in provincial towns.571 Around one third of the Roma live in 
completely segregated settlements.572 In its extreme form, residential segregation is sustained 
through the construction of walls that physically separate the Roma from the rest of society. 
Such a wall, for example, was build around a Roma community in the Hungarian town of 
Keszthely. Similar to Bulgaria, many Roma settlements lack infrastructure and basic 
facilities such as sewage systems, solid roads, access to public transportation, street lighting, 
garbage collection, telephone lines, and emergency services.573 Research on the Roma’s
standard of living has documented that just 45.1 of them have hot water, 41.4 possess a 
telephone, and 50.2 have a shower.574
The Roma’s living conditions relate to a long-term poverty rate of 53 percent.575
Approximately two-thirds of working-age Roma engage in unskilled or semi-skilled labour. 
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A mere 22 percent have skilled ‘blue collar’ jobs, and just 8 percent hold skilled positions.576
Gabor Kertesi explains that in Hungary, those who graduate from primary schools are ten 
times less likely to remain in the labour force. The chances of those who have completed 
vocational school are fourfold, and a university diploma makes one 50 times more likely to 
find a job.577 The marketable skills and employment opportunities of the Roma minority are 
diminished by its low education. Around half of all Hungarian children advance beyond the 
eighth grade, but among the Roma, this figure is only 3 percent. Just 0.1 percent of them are 
admitted to the universities.578
There are no segregated educational facilities as in Bulgaria. However, administrators 
often form classes with a high percentage of Romani children. The concentration of Roma 
pupils is also noticeable in remedial classes that are intended to provide supplemental 
academic help. Parents claim that their children are often ignored, and even bright and 
prepared pupils are kept in these classes.579 Research indicates that more than 50 percent of 
the students in these schools are Romani.580 The low quality of segregated education is only 
one reason behind the Roma’s failure in the Hungarian education system. Teachers often 
assume that the Roma are less intelligent, and almost every Romani student can tell a story of 
prejudice and discrimination by teachers and classmates. Parents lack faith in traditional 
education because they have had negative school experiences as well.581 Discrimination in 
the education system is symptomatic of a general negative attitude that is noticeable even at 
the highest levels of government. Péter Szegvári of the Prime Minister’s Office stated that ‘it 
should be proposed to supply the Roma population with free contraceptives ... The increase 
of the Gypsy population is too high compared to their living conditions. Having six to eight 
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children, they are reproducing their own misery and have no chance to get out of it.’582 Non-
governmental organisations objected to Szegvári’s purported ideas of Roma sterilization. The 
official was eventually dismissed, but for reasons unrelated to his comments.583
Officially manifested expressions of discrimination suggest that the Roma do not 
have a strong political lobby that could act as a deterrent. In fact, the political representation 
of the Roma has been quite modest in all democratic parliaments.584 Roma have entered the 
higher levels of government only through the lists of the major political parties. Roma 
political parties stood for election twice (1990 and 1994) but were unable to attract a
sufficient number of votes.585 A positive development is the fact that the Roma, as other 
officially recognised Hungarian minorities, have been granted the right to self-government. 
The isolation of the Roma people is comparable to, though not a mirror image of the 
problems of the Bulgarian Roma. However, an analysis of the legal and practical measures
for improving the Roma’s socio-economic situation will illustrate that both states differ 
significantly in their preference for the liberal or multicultural model. 
5.2.1.4. Concluding Remarks
Historically, the Roma had been marginalised at the peripheral socio-economic 
niches, living separately from the dominant groups, which looked upon them with suspicion 
and mistrust. The policies of slavery, assimilation, or indifference resulted in the further 
marginalisation of the Roma and left little room for the development of civic consciousness. 
The governments of the transitional period faced a large number of destitute Roma 
with poor skills who could hardly sustain the pressures of the market economies. This 
situation poses a difficult dilemma for governments. They could either attempt to integrate 
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the Roma under the terms of the liberal approach to universal human rights or they could
develop special policies to accommodate the culture of Roma, as to improve the group’s 
socio-economic status. 
5.2.2. The argument of the state
          All three states participated in the constitution of imperial formations, but the terms of 
participation differed in the three contexts. The Bulgarians, as other nationalities in Eastern 
Europe, have a distinct history of imperial domination. Being subjugated earlier, the 
dominant group focuses on the historical injustices that were inflicted upon it and need to be 
acknowledged or remedied. Kymlicka notes that in the Western societies, minorities seek an 
apology and compensation from the state for their mistreatment, and the argument of historic 
injustice strengthens their claims for equality. For instance, indigenous people in Australia, 
Canada, and New Zealand make claims for the rectification of historic injustices. The 
argument of past wrongdoings serves to strengthen the demands of minorities for special 
protection and a more just distribution of available resources. 
           In Eastern Europe, it is the dominant groups who claim to be the victims of historical 
oppression, usually at the hands of minorities collaborating with the nations’ enemies. 
Consequently, the dominant group expects the guilt and apology of the minorities as a 
confirmation of their loyalty to the state.586 Bulgaria was under the rule of the Ottoman 
Empire for almost five centuries. The Turkish minority in the country has the former 
subjugator as a kin-state. Consequently, the members of the dominant group view this 
minority as attempting to resume its previous dominant status. The Roma, half of whom 
converted to Islam, are also conceived as bearers of non-Orthodox and therefore non-
Bulgarian moral values. For the dominant group, the moral code of the Roma does not entail 
the values of a strong loyalty to the state and a desire for social advancement through
knowledge and hard work. Yet, the turbulent historic relationship between the Bulgarians and 
the Turkish minority is the main reason why the dominant group shows preference for a
strong state with weak and disempowered minorities. 
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            The framework of the historic injustice argument may apply differently in the 
Hungarian and Romanian contexts. Hungary had led a robust assimilation policy during its 
imperial, independent, and early Communist periods. The suppressed mobilization of ethnic 
minorities later opened room for experiments with multicultural ideas of non-territorial 
autonomy. However, developments following World War I also entailed restructuring
borders and transferring Hungarian-populated territories to neighbouring countries. The 
perception of historic injustice against the dominant group in Hungary marks the 
development of subsequent policies which, although targeting Hungary’s home minorities, 
aim to become a model for the treatment of Hungarian minorities abroad. 
             A large Hungarian minority inhabits the region of Transylvania in Romania. The 
territory, which was annexed by Romania during World War II, encompassed 2 million 
ethnic Hungarians.587 Romania has claimed ownership of the territory in the past 1000 years 
and considers the Hungarian rule a historic injustice. The annexation resolved the dispute in 
favour of Romania. However, mistrust and suspicion among Transylvania’s Romanians and 
Hungarians prompted the development of assimilatory policies by the Communist regime.588
National security submerged the issue of justice yet again.589
          Proponents of the liberal model explain that perceptions of injustice disappear when 
the members of ethnic minorities are treated in the same way as members of the dominant 
group.590 Universal human rights close the gap between alternative universes, advance 
‘mutual understanding [and] encourage the cultivation of habits of cooperation and 
sentiments of trust.’591 Group-based measures might also be admissible if suffering arises 
from conditions beyond the community’s responsibility. However, the measures are
justifiable as long as the inequality persists.592 The principles of justice require the provision 
of opportunities and equal rights, which may not translate into equal outcomes for all 
individuals. Some cultures encourage educational achievements, while others place less value 
                                                
587 Lorant, Czigani “A History of Hungarian Literature: From the Earliest Times to the Mid-1970’s” 
[http://mek.niif.hu/02000/02042/html/63.html] (accessed: November 2, 2007). 
588
Roe, Paul, “Misperception and Ethnic Conflict: Transylvania’s Societal Security Dilemma”, Review of 
International Studies, 28:1 (2002), p. 58. 
[http://journals.cambridge.org/download.php?file=%2FRIS%2FRIS28_01%2FS0260210502000578a.pdf&code
=3b431b59e2fe2fa600062d1042e9273c] (accessed: November 2, 2007).
589 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Odysseys: Navigating the New International Politics of Diversity, pp. 187-91.
590 Barry, Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism, p. 23.
591 Ibid, p. 88.
592 Ibid, p. 13.
149
on or neglect education. Positions requiring higher academic qualifications will 
disproportionately be filled by members of the educationally-oriented groups. Individuals of 
other cultural backgrounds may be better suited for positions requiring different skills, for 
example, interaction and teamwork. Those who do not have the qualities underlying success 
will change their view of life or cluster at the lower end of the occupational hierarchy.593  In
sum, improving the quality of life of ethnic minorities means they have to be treated in the 
same way as the members of the dominant groups. In Bulgaria and Romania, where tensions 
exist, the equal treatment of all citizens would reduce the mistrust of minorities. The 
communities with competitive labour values and skills would flourish at the expense of some
less acculturated minorities. For example, if the values of capitalism are not as valuable to
the Roma, their culture would be doomed to extinction under the pressures of the market 
economy. The minority will either accept the values of the dominant group or remain at the 
bottom of the hierarchy. 
              The multicultural scholarship advances the counterclaim that the liberal approach of 
minorities’ acculturation deprives ethnic groups of their sense of unique identity. Group 
members will suffer identity distortion, and their misrecognised or denied identities will 
become an instrument for internalized oppression.594
            The remedy for the unequal position of ethnic minorities is to accord them group or 
collective rights.595 Kymlicka notes that Western liberal states such as Canada increasingly 
adopt such multicultural approaches to ethno-cultural diversity. Their geopolitical stability, 
the ‘de-securitization’ of ethnic relations, and the consensus on human rights have reduced 
the risk of accepting claims for special protection.596 In contrast, the dominant groups in post-
Communist Central and Eastern Europe fear the potential disloyalty of minorities and
endorse the idea of a strong state that is capable of minimising diversity.597
The recognition that differences are important for their bearers might be a first step, 
giving visibility to different identities and conceptions of the good life. Visibility will 
legitimize the presence of different cultures in the public realm, making minorities feel 
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entitled to their identities.598 On the other hand, if the dominant groups learn to empathise 
with their stigmatised minorities, they will help eliminate the feeling of oppression. Empathy 
with the suffering of minorities will open the path to a more equal inclusion of devalued 
minorities.599
International norms stipulate that ethnic minorities have the right to participate in 
public life, especially in matters of their concern. The idea of effective participation sounds 
attractive to states because it is vague, subject to multiple and diverse interpretations, and can 
accommodate different conceptions of state – minority relations. The minimal reading of 
effective participation requires only non-discrimination, the standard right to vote, engage in 
advocacy, and run for office. A more robust interpretation of participation requires that states 
grant their minorities some form of autonomy or representation in the legislature.600 A degree
of power decentralisation, together with cultural accommodation, is necessary to ensure 
justice.601 However, post-Communist states might opt for the minimum reading of
international norms ‘as the outside limit of legitimate minority mobilization.’602 The 
acceptance of international standards would be seen as eliminating the need to establish or 
even debate on different forms of sharing power. The multiculturalism proponents express 
hope that in time, post-Communist states will find their own trends toward liberal 
multiculturalism. Toward this goal, norms must be the ‘floor from which minority rights 
should be domestically negotiated and not the ceiling beyond which minorities must not seek 
to go.’603
5.3. Legal guarantees of minority rights and state programs for Roma integration
5.3.1. Bulgaria
5.3.1.1. Legal framework within the human rights system
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Bulgaria has adopted all relevant human rights international instruments, discussed in 
chapter two, which fall within the framework of the liberal approach.604 The Bulgarian state 
has confirmed that the conventions incorporated in the Constitution are an inseparable part of
domestic legislation and have priority over the domestic norms that contradict them (Art. 5 of 
the Constitution). In line with the liberal approach, adopted in the context of most 
international instruments, Bulgaria recognises the existence of persons belonging to national 
and ethnic minorities rather than collectives or groups. However, the collective term ‘national 
minority’ is not unknown to the Bulgarian legal tradition.605 The Constitution of 1947 
incorporates the terminology in Article 79:606
All citizens have the right to education … National minorities have the right to study 
in their mother tongue and to develop their national culture, as the study of Bulgarian 
language is obligatory.607
The present Constitution does not contain a ‘national minority’ clause, although the 
Constitutional Court has ruled that the term is conventional and needs no formal mention in 
the constitutional text.608 On the other hand, the individual approach to ethnic minorities of 
the FCNM, ICCPR, and other international instruments represents the dominant model of 
accommodating the rights of ethnic minorities within the Constitutional framework. 
Bulgarian scholars rationalise that the principle of individual protection stems from 
the assumption that generic rights cannot be exchanged for other public goods without a 
person’s explicit consent. The Constitution envisages that war or a state of emergency may 
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necessitate the temporary limitation of some basic rights, except for the prohibition of 
torture, the right to life, the presumption of innocence, the inviolability of one’s personal life, 
and the freedom of conscience, thought, and religion. In this way, the Constitution ensures 
that the rights guaranteeing the safety of each individual, member of a dominant group or an 
ethnic minority, are inviolable, even when the circumstances require that emergency 
measures be imposed. 
The negative framing of this right corresponds to a limitation of the state’s
interference with the autonomy of the individual. Social, cultural, and economic rights are, 
on the other hand, positive guarantees for the realisation of the individual interests in view of 
the pursued goods. These generic rights are in line with the liberal model and interlink with 
the principle of social equality.609 Norms of this type are well developed within the 
constitutional regulations as constituted through the right to labour and private property, the 
right to participation in strikes, and the right to social welfare and healthcare. A third layer of 
the Constitution entails the right to common cultural heritage and full development. This 
norm is specified in Article 54 of the Constitution.610 The article postulates that each
individual has the right ‘to develop one’s culture in accordance with his or her ethnicity 
which is recognised and guaranteed by the law.’611
The right to full development translates the language of the international norms that 
grant protection to individuals rather than collectives.612 This right is neither positive nor 
negative, but reflects the principle of solidarity.613
The Constitution stipulates that all citizens are entitled to the three layers of rights and 
consequently, everyone is obliged to respect the rights of their fellow citizens (Art. 58).614
This provision extends the equality requirement from state institutions to the citizens through 
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Article 6 (par. 2), stating that ‘limitations of a person’s rights and privileges, based on his 
race, nationality, ethnic belonging … are prohibited’.615
The clause contains the negative requirement to abstain from discrimination that is 
valid for both state institutions and private citizens as incorporated in various statutory laws. 
The Law on Social Welfare (Art. 3), the Law on Education (art. 4, par. 2), and the Penal 
Code (art. 10, par. 1) prohibit limitations or privileges and proclaim the principle of 
equality.616 However, their provisions do not account for all forms of discrimination and 
contain some contradictory or obscure texts.617
The new Law for the Protection from Discrimination unifies the existing anti-
discrimination legislation and harmonises the Bulgarian legal code with the standards of the 
European Union. The law is in line with the Employment Equality Directive 2000/78/EC and 
the Racial Equality Directive 2000/43/EC.618 The text of the law covers all equality 
provisions enshrined in them. The new legislation is also an integral part of the planned
measures under the Framework Program for the Equal Integration of Roma in the Bulgarian 
society. The Program promotes Roma’s empowerment, but a substantial portion of the 
provisions involve the recognition and prevention of discrimination and the establishment of 
instruments that combat discriminatory acts.619
In view of this goal, the law aims to protect all natural persons on the territory of the 
Republic where they are discriminated on grounds covered by the Directives and by 
international conventions, to which the state is a party. Three main areas are covered by the 
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provisions for the protection from discrimination – employment, education, and participation 
in civic and professional organisations. Additional orders stipulate that state and local 
authorities encourage the balanced participation of ethnic groups and religious and linguistic 
communities in the decision-making process. A final section arranges the statute and 
competencies of the Commission for the Protection against Discrimination. 
At first, the Legislative Council of the Ministry of Justice expressed the opinion that 
the establishment of a state anti-discrimination body was unconstitutional.620 This 
interpretation was in line with the minimalist reading of international norms, according to 
which the principle of equality represents an effective guarantee for the protection of all 
individuals. The Parliament decided to opt for a more robust approach to the principle of 
effective participation, as constituted in the positive interpretation of Article 14 of the 
FCNM, and established the Commission for the Protection against Discrimination – a 
structure with the capacity to monitor the implementation of the non-discrimination principle. 
This structure of the state administration became a specialised body that determines the facts 
of discrimination, imposes appropriate sanctions, renders independent assistance to victims 
of discrimination, and publishes independent reports and recommendations on all questions 
related to discrimination.621
Several aspects of the Commission’s functions, specifically those related to its 
objectivity, workload, and resources, necessitate a brief discussion. First, the members of 
staff are jointly appointed by the Parliament and the President.622 Under this arrangement, the 
impartiality of the Commission would be questionable in cases of anti-discrimination 
procedures against them. Another obstacle is the fact that the Commission has an 
overwhelming number of different functions and duties, including the possibility to act upon 
its own discretion and to investigate cases ex officio (by virtue of their position).623  
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Secondly, Members of Parliament such as Plamen Savov, Trifon Mitev, and Rupen 
Krikorian noted that the Commission’s work necessitated frequent travelling around the 
country. The employees are often forced to work overtime, and the workload seems 
disproportionate to their remuneration.624 In 2006, the Commission had just six regional 
representatives, and the administrative personnel were reduced from 42 (as per statutory 
regulations) to 35.625 The Council of Ministers also adopted the reduced budget of BGN 
1,644,000 (around EUR 545,000) instead of BGN 1,800,000 as requested.626
While keeping in mind these administrative constraints, the Commission is the only 
specialised organ to investigate cases free of charge and over a short period of 30 days.627
The Roma, who often lack financial means for litigation, can turn to the body and ask for
prompt corrective measures. Commission chairman Kemal Etup explained that the Roma 
initiated most of the cases involving ethnic discrimination. They complain of limited access 
to public places and services, denial of medical care, and discrimination in job interviews. 
However, the official also added that ‘it [was] in the mentality of Roma to complain and 
think that the state owe[d] them everything.’628 This statement is in breach of the FCNM’s
prohibition against discrimination in the media.629 It is also in violation of the Law for the 
Protection from Discrimination. The establishment of an anti-discrimination body with real 
executive powers has proven the efficacy of the government’s robust approach toward the 
protection of minorities. However, discrimination on the top tier of the very structure 
empowered to fight discrimination casts suspicion on the consistent enforcement of the law.  
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Besides the Commission and the courts, the Roma can turn to the institution of the 
Ombudsman. Procedures established by the Ombudsman include accepting and evaluating
complaints, mediation, making recommendations for legislative amendments and 
improvements of the administrative efficiency, and acting upon the Ombudsman’s own 
initiative.630 According to Article 152a of the 2005 Law on the Ombudsman, the institution 
works toward the ‘discontinuation of human rights violations, restoration of the damages, and 
creation of conditions for the unobstructed and efficient exercise of those rights.’631
This broad provision of the law has been restricted by regulations within the Rules on 
the Organisation and Activities of the authority. Under these rules, the Ombudsman has no 
authority over the judiciary, investigative services, and prosecution offices. Outside the scope 
of the Ombudsman are the President, the National Assembly, the Supreme Judicial Council, 
and the Constitutional Court.632 In other words, the Ombudsman does not have executive 
powers and cannot impose fines. The sanctions of the institution are only moral, suggesting
that the Ombudsman’s establishment is formulated as a broad forum for civic dialogue rather 
than with the aim to enforce the anti-discrimination legislation. The voice of the Ombudsman 
has the potential to enhance the general knowledge of discriminatory practices, but the 
institution does not have judicial authority to prosecute discrimination. 
An important fact is that the Bulgarian legal framework was conceived according to 
the principle of democratic constitutional rule that prioritises the rights of all citizens.633 The 
Constitutional text protects the autonomy of the individual by minimising the state’s 
interference with generic human rights. Bulgarian legislation excludes special protection of 
minority cultures on the grounds that personal autonomy provides freedom of choice between 
alternatives and the power to remove barriers to a preferred alternative. Personal autonomy 
allows individuals to refine and develop their abilities and moral virtues.634 It can be argued 
that generic minority standards do not respond to the circumstances of each group and that
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the prohibition against discrimination might simply deter or penalize its manifestations. 
Excluded groups remain on the fringes because of the limited opportunities to advance 
alternative views of identity and the common good. However, the dominant group’s view 
that ethnic minorities are a security threat to the state’s territorial integrity may be confirmed 
by the imposition of group rights. In this sense, the democratic processes that build up mutual 
trust and tolerance would ideally coincide with the development of mutually agreeable forms 
of collective empowerment. The liberal notion of effective participation and peaceful 
democratic deliberations can be conducive to the gradual development of a country-specific 
approach to multiculturalism.635
5.3.1.2. Government measures for Roma integration
The Constitutional cultural, social, and economic rights of the Roma pertain to their 
decent employment, housing, education, access to healthcare, and cultural preservation and 
development. The Framework Program for the Equal Integration of Roma acknowledges the 
disadvantaged and isolated position of the minority. The program envisages the formulation 
of specific measures that aim to optimise the Roma’s chances for integration. The 
occupational measures include training, re-qualification, and employment combined with 
improved quality of education and free access to integrated schools. The Roma’s housing 
situation is considered in light of the illegal status of many settlements and the inadequate 
infrastructure of their neighbourhoods. Finally, the state should encourage the minority to 
preserve and develop its culture, which the members of the dominant group are unfamiliar 
with. This is the reason why the Roma are isolated by the dominant group.636
The program of the Bulgarian government may be studied in light of the social 
equality principle rather than in terms of affirmative action. Affirmative action builds on 
compensatory and distributive justice rationales, while the social equality principle focuses 
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on disadvantage and exclusion.637 The Bulgarian approach to integration does not entail 
affirmative mechanisms such as quotas and targets, thus moving away from the individual 
compensatory mechanisms. The measures of the Bulgarian program have a group-specific
component and represent a departure from the liberal model of human rights. However, every 
model of differential treatment runs the risk of being proclaimed as ‘preferential 
treatment.’638 The following overview reveals that the government has shown preference for 
the liberal model of human rights while formulating strategies and structures to implement 
the adopted measures. 
From 1997 to 2006, the government implemented the provisions of the program with
the assistance of the National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues (NCEDI). The 
establishment of this structure was in line with the requirement of the FCNM to ensure the
effective participation of minorities in public life. According to this interpretation of Article 
15, the government had to establish a consultative organ that formulated strategies and 
drafted legislative acts, monitored the situation of minorities, prepared reports, and 
coordinated activities across agencies.639 A stronger reading of Article 15 would vest the 
organ with delaying and blocking powers.640 However, the government chose to establish an 
inter-departmental, coordinating, and consultative body within the Council of Ministers. 
The choice of a liberally-oriented approach to the functions of the National Council
can be attributed mainly to the tensions ensuing from the Bulgarian ethnic model. The 
establishment of an executive organ with delaying and blocking powers might substantiate
the impression that minorities are granted special protection at the expense of the dominant 
group’s prosperity. Thus, the liberal paradigm establishes minority instruments that suppose 
less direct involvement and therefore more limited expenditure of resources.641 Another 
explanation is that the initial preference for liberal measures relates to the economic 
recession during the transitional period. The country’s GDP declined, the capital stock 
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shrank, and the state’s industries hardly functioned.642 These facts suggest that consecutive 
governments have been under pressure to develop a functioning and competitive market 
economy at a time when special protection of the culture of minority groups necessitated a 
substantial investment of resources.
The negligible budget of the National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues is 
indicative of the latter assumption. In 2001, the structure appropriated BGN 104,317 
(approximately EUR 58,000).  It is doubtful that the sum was sufficient to cover the various 
fields listed in the government’s report, including development of minority media, cultural 
events and celebrations, and the establishment of information and cultural centres.643 The 
focus on cultural activities and the exclusion of socio-economic measures illustrate the 
government’s preference for the liberal view of a more limited involvement of the state in 
minority protection.644
While the Council focused on cultural initiatives, the implementation of the 
Framework Program followed confused patterns. Its two-year Plan of Action secured housing 
funding of BGN 300,000 in 2006 and BGN 13.36 million in 2007. Given that the deadline of 
the program is 2015, future governments will have to appropriate BGN 1.246 billion.  In 
addition, the Action Plan does not envisage the legalisation of existing housing, which is in 
breach of the commitments within the Framework Program.645
Efforts in the field of healthcare resulted in the formulation of strategies that had no 
follow-up implementation. In September 2006, the government adopted a Health Strategy for 
Disadvantaged Persons Belonging to Ethnic Minorities and a corresponding Plan of 
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Action.646 The package envisaged measures to reduce infant mortality and to optimise early 
prevention programs. It aimed to strengthen the role of the health mediator and to train 
medical personnel to work with minorities, among others.647 The government planned to 
secure BGN 500,000 for the Strategy but in reality provided the negligible sum of BGN 
30,000.648
Educational measures have been advanced in two major documents. The Strategy for 
the Educational Integration of Children and Students from the Ethnic Minorities was adopted 
by the Ministry of Education in 2004. The document aimed to ensure access to integrated
intercultural education, including steps toward desegregation. The Action Plan of the 
Strategy envisaged the establishment of a Center for Intercultural Integration for Children 
and Students of Ethnic Minority Origin that would raise funds from foreign donors. The aim 
was to provide the financial means to implement the strategy.649 At present, the Center 
disposes of BGN 500,000 and finances projects related to school network optimisation, 
renovation of school premises, organisation of re-qualification courses for teachers, 
intercultural activities, and others.650 The distribution of funding can only encourage but not 
mandate the process of desegregation. 
The government has devolved authority over the school system to the local 
governments instead of to minority bodies, and desegregation depends on the willingness of 
municipalities to apply for grants. Realistically, the strategy does not have much weight 
because it was adopted by the Bulgarian Ministry of Education, not the Parliament. Another 
strategy, the National Program for Development of School Education and Pre-school 
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650 “Център за образователна интеграция на децата и учениците от етническите малцинства” (“Center for 
Intercultural Integration for Children and Students of Ethnic Minority Origin”) [http://coiduem.mon.bg/?m=3] 
(accessed: September 27, 2007).
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Upbringing and Instruction, was adopted by the Bulgarian Parliament and has greater bearing 
on the issue. However, the Program does not focus on desegregation and merely places 
minority pupils under the concept of ‘socialization of children whose mother tongue is not 
Bulgarian.’651 So far, the government has abstained from restructuring the education system 
despite the requirement of the ECHR for equal access to education on all levels.652
To summarise, the politics of integration includes a series of active measures to 
improve the Roma’s socio-economic status through enhanced opportunities for education, 
work, healthcare, housing, and cultural preservation. The simultaneous completion of all 
tasks is possible if the authorities are able and willing to invest sufficient financial resources 
in the initiatives.653 The liberal paradigm counteracts the ideas of social equality and limits 
the amount of funding available for the implementation of measures. The healthcare strategy, 
for example, contains a multitude of ambitious measures but attracted little financial support. 
The housing program secured financing, but its short-term absorption has been limited. The 
inadequate long-term distribution of resources is the result of an oversized project that lacks 
appropriate implementation schedules.654
The government prioritises every area in theory but allocates available resources, the 
amount of which is limited. The allocation of considerable funding risks provoking 
discontent among the members of the dominant group. Moreover, this large-scale
multidimensional planning cannot account for the specifics of each problem. A focused effort 
to identify and resolve the most pressing concern, for example the need for marketable skills, 
could bring more visible results. Another issue is the involvement of different decision-
makers in the same policy field. The Ministry of Education and the Bulgarian Parliament 
both participate in the formulation of the educational policy. Such overlap of policymaking 
might lead to an inefficient expenditure of human resources and financing. The decision-
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652 “Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and Explanatory Report” 
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making structures compete with one another as to which one can develop a more effective 
strategy.  This results in the formulation of over-ambitious goals.655 Alternatively, it leads to 
the overall underestimation of a project that has strong points. 
In line with the liberal model, the National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and 
Demographic Issues participates marginally in the implementation of policies for improving 
the Roma’s socio-economic position. The municipalities are also peripheral actors in 
policymaking. The government has devolved various responsibilities to the local authorities, 
such as school desegregation, without securing budgets for the implementation of projects. 
The result of this discrepancy is that municipalities cannot participate effectively in the 
development of policies. The position of the Expert on Ethnic and Demographic Issues was 
also introduced at the local level, but this position is only to assist the municipalities. There is 
no adequate mechanism to oblige or stimulate the introduction of local projects that take into 
account the specifics of the respective Roma communities. The lack of focus on a grassroots’
level is regrettable because the development of local projects could provide a more accurate 
estimate of the necessary human and financial resources and the reasonable time limits for 
implementation. The current large-scale program of the government contains very ambitious
goals, but each area necessitates substantial planning, coordination, and resources. Finally, 
large-scale programs that target ethnic minorities run the risk of losing the dominant group’s
support. They also raise the expectations of the targeted minority, and the failure of the 
national project could result in the discontent of the minority. 
5.3.2. Romania  
5.3.2.1. Legal framework within the human rights system
 Romania has adopted the relevant body of human rights treaties.656 The Romanian 
Constitution stipulates that international treaties override domestic legislation unless the 
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latter ensure greater protection.657 However, in a report to the Council of Europe, Romania 
explained that 
the correlation between international regulations and domestic law does not alter or reduce the major 
role which national legislation plays in proclaiming and guaranteeing human rights. That is so because 
the State is and remains the framework within which human rights and fundamental freedoms are 
realized.658
This statement illustrates the conviction that adherence to international legal norms is 
secondary to domestic priorities which, on the other hand, pertain to the existence of a 
‘sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State.’659 The use of the term 
‘national’ masks the fact that 14 ethnic minorities co-exist on the territory of the state.660
Moreover, a reference to state integrity is made even within the provision against 
discrimination in stating that the country is a ‘common and indivisible land to all citizens.’661
The government attempted to enhance minority protection through Ordinance 137,
enacted in August 2000. The ordinance forbids discrimination by public authorities, legal 
entities, or private persons on the basis of race, nationality, ethnicity, and religion. Romania 
was the first European country to adopt anti-discrimination provisions with respect to 
Directives 43/2000/EC and 78/2000/ EC.662
However, Law 48/2002 does not comply with all the provisions of the Directives. The 
text does not explicitly prohibit indirect or structural discrimination, and reversal of the 
burden of proof has not been incorporated.  In fact, the law relies on another procedural rule, 
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the law on misdemeanours, which allows no room for incorporating the reversal of the 
burden of proof.663 The law is also more restrictive than the requirement of the 43/2000/ EC 
Directive to ensure that organisations ‘with legitimate interest in combating discrimination’ 
may initiate legal or administrative procedures on behalf of victims.664
The Romanian courts have used this wording to restrict the involvement of non-
governmental organisations in legal cases. One court has required that an NGO proves its 
statutory provisions contain clauses on the protection of human rights. ‘Representation’ by an 
organisation has been interpreted as the provision of power-of-attorney documents by the 
NGO, which incurs additional expenses to the claimants.665 In June 2006, Romania amended 
the law to meet the requirements of the directives, but the Parliament has yet to approve the 
bill on discrimination.666
It is commendable that the terms of the current law provide for the establishment of a 
specialised authority, the National Council for Combating Discrimination, which evaluates
complaints concerning the principles of non-discrimination and equal treatment. The 
National Council targets ‘discrimination on the grounds of race, nationality, ethnicity, 
language, religion, social origin, beliefs …or belonging to a disfavored category (refugees, 
asylum seekers, pensioners, etc.)’667 The Council also proposes measures and drafts laws for 
the protection of disadvantaged individuals, cooperates with relevant organisations in the 
field, sanctions discrimination by public authorities or natural persons, and implements 
informative national programs and campaigns.668 The Council’s powers were limited until 
2005 because the structure was a part of the local public administration and hence dependent 
on the government’s approval of the implementation of the proposed measures. The 
appointment and dismissal of its board members were in the hands of the Prime Minister, 
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665 Ibid, pp. 89-90.
666 “Amnesty International Report 2007. Romania” [http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Europe-and-
Central-Asia/Romania] (accessed: September 7, 2007).
667 Migration  Policy Group, “Profile of Partner Equality Body”, p. 2 
[http://www.migpolgroup.com/multiattachments/2913/DocumentName/Equinet_Romania_en.pdf] (accessed:   
September 7, 2007).
668 Council of Europe, “National Council for Combating Discrimination Romania” 
[http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/1-ecri/3-general_themes/2-examples_of_good_practices/1-
specialised_bodies/SB_Romania.asp] (accessed: September 7, 2007).
165
while the various ministries proposed candidates for board members.669 The limited authority 
vested in the Council points to the reluctance of the Romanian authorities to create a 
government structure tasked with decision-making and follow-up implementation.  
In 2005, the government transformed the Council into a presumably independent 
structure under the Parliament.670 Procedural rules designated the Council as a body that 
establishes the facts of alleged discrimination and issues administrative decisions. In case the
NCCD issues a positive decision which is not appealed or is upheld upon appeal, there is a 
formal recognition of the discriminatory deed, and the perpetrator pays a fine to the state. 
However, it is not within the Council’s capacity to issue binding recommendations (for 
example, order a school to enrol HIV positive children).  The victim remains in the position 
created by the act of discrimination because the Council is not entitled to accord the victim 
compensation. The plaintiff has to bring the findings of the Council before the civil courts in 
order to sue for damages.671
Furthermore, the Council does not have the capacity to serve as the main anti-
discrimination body. The potential victims of discrimination are the 22 million Romanian 
citizens, refugee and asylum seekers, and those who live in Romania regardless of their legal 
status. In 2003, the NCCD had a board of 7 members and less than 30 employees, with plans
to hire 50 more officers in the following years. The limited staff is unable to sufficiently 
answer complaints and complete other tasks.672 The funding of the Council is also 
insignificant. The Parliament approved LEI 2,560 or approximately EUR 770 in 2005.673 The 
financing in 2006 was equal to LEI 2,300 or EUR 690. In comparison, the 2006 budget of the 
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Presidency’s administration was almost LEI 29 million (around 8.7 million EUR).674 It is not 
surprising that the limited human and financial resources have turned the NCCD into the only 
national institution without local structures.
To sum up, the priority status of the state becomes evident upon examination of the 
Constitutional provisions and derivative statutory legislation. The state is conceived as 
belonging to the nation, which contradicts the fact that there are 14 recognised minorities on 
its territory. The notion of the nation-state is confirmed by the establishment of an anti-
discrimination structure that does not attend to minority remedial requests but collects fines 
in the name of the state. Notably, the anti-discrimination base of the Constitution and the new 
law are restrictive in comparison to the Bulgarian legislation. In addition, the Romanian 
Constitution limits socio-economic rights to the individual while the founding text contains a 
list of prohibitions. An example is the restriction on the right to speak one’s mother tongue at 
the administrative level, even if a minority forms a local numerical majority in its respective 
area. One Hungarian deputy has concluded that a democratic government could guarantee the
protection of the country’s minorities on the basis of the current Constitution. However,
under nationalistic leadership, ‘the text could even lead to genocide.’675 This statement might 
be a little far-fetched, but it is clear that Romania’s suspicion of ethnicity has downplayed the 
efforts toward minority protection. 
5.3.2.2. Government measures for Roma integration
The Government Strategy for Improving the Situation of Roma represents a national 
strategy, developed to deal with the situation of the minority in the country.676 The Strategy 
focuses on 10 priority areas. They are ‘community development and public administration, 
housing, social security, health care, economic justice and public order, child welfare, 
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education, culture and religious affairs, communication and civic involvement.’677 The 
Strategy was developed by the National Office for Roma, a structure of the Department for 
the Protection of National Minorities within the Ministry of Public Information at the time.678
The National Office for Roma (NOR) became the decision-making structure of a Joint 
Committee for the Implementation and Monitoring of the Strategy. The latter was tasked 
with ‘the organization, planning, coordination and control of the carrying through of the 
activities stipulated in the master plan of measures for the application of the strategy.’679
According to the plan, the Joint Committee consisted of Roma leaders, state secretaries, 
Executive Undersecretary for Roma, and a State Secretary for Inter-Ethnic Relations. They 
met once a month and discussed whether progress was made with respect to the scheduled 
activities. 680  
This minority-specific and minority-inclusive executive structure goes beyond the 
minimum standards of minority protection. However, the effectiveness of the committee was 
questionable because only lower rank delegates attended the discussions. They met on a 
random basis and did not focus exclusively on the Strategy. Roma integration was considered 
an ‘extra task’,681 and discussions ‘d[id] not follow any methodology. [Meetings] [we]re 
simply information sessions by state secretaries saying that everything [wa]s going well in 
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the country.’682 The executive core of the Committee, the National Office for Roma, had just 
two members: Julius Rosta and Dan Oprescu. The latter made a statement that,
we do not know what we deal with, even with respect of the number of the Roma. We do not know 
either how to establish the priorities for our actions, nation-wide, related to a program for the 
improvement and alleviation of the situation of most Roma communities in Romania … [T]here is still 
a mystery who is supported to start doing it and with what funding.683
In 2004, the poor performance of the Committee prompted the transfer of staff and 
responsibilities to a new National Agency for Roma. Its main task was the coordination of 
public policies for the Roma.684 Its efforts were directed toward an improved functioning on
national and local levels. By the end of 2005, the Agency hired 24 new staff members for its 
regional offices in addition to the 48 officials already working for the NAR. It is 
commendable that the Agency recruited young Roma activists with previous experience in 
public and non-governmental organisations. However, the Agency only received resources 
for its basic functions and no additional funds for the implementation of activities.685
Initially, the Agency was responsible for the administration of PHARE funds, which 
amounted to LEI 107 billion in 2005. With the government’s Emergency Ordinance of 2005,
the Government General Secretariat (GGS) became responsible for the funds’ administration. 
The PR of the GGS, Cristian Sinc, justified the transfer by stating that the Implementation 
Department of the Agency ‘did not auction the projects meant to improve ethnic Roma 
condition. Moreover, the Implementation Department has not drawn up a project to support 
these projects.’686 It seems that at present, the Agency deals mostly with strategic policy 
planning rather than implementation of activities.687
The overall implementation of the Strategy entails three additional components –
Ministerial Commissions subordinate to the Joint Committee of Implementation and 
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Monitoring, Local Experts on Roma Affairs, and County Offices on Roma. The Ministerial 
Commissions are in charge of planning, organising, and implementing the activities in the 
context of the Strategy.688 The Ministry of Health has established a functioning Commission, 
chaired by a state secretary and charged with reviewing and evaluating policies. The Ministry 
is the only authority that receives funding from the state’s annual budget and runs a 
successful health mediator’s program, turning Romania into a regional leader in healthcare
policies targeting the Roma population.689 This policy is also group-specific because the
health mediators aim to improve the health of the Roma population. Respectively, close to 
200 health mediators are working across the country, and their geographical distribution is 
based on the need and local willingness to participate. Each mediator is assigned to a local 
general practitioner and meets with him or her on a weekly basis to discuss the progress of 
activities. The local and national authorities, as well as the Romani organisation CRISS 
monitor the activities of the health workers.690 The Ministry of Health informs that mediators 
have assisted 40,015 Roma in obtaining health insurance, helped 3,521 women to register 
with a general practitioner, aided 1,180 people in acquiring identity documents, and 
identified 12,836 children in need of vaccinations.691
The other ministries have introduced policies that either do not take ethnicity into 
account or target members belonging to the Roma minority. The Ministry of Labour, for 
example, has inconsistent employment strategies, and job fairs appear to be the sole source of 
information on work positions. Due to the insufficient promotion of job fairs, only a small 
number of employers and job seekers attend them.692 A Ministerial Commission for Roma
functions within the Ministry of Labour, working to increase the Roma’s employment 
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opportunities. However, only 202 out of the 23,961 persons who received vocational training 
in 2003 were Roma.693
The Ministry of Education and Research has developed a strategy on Roma 
education.694 Furthermore, the government initiated affirmative action for high school 
education and vocational training. In line with the liberal approach, Romania is the only 
country of the three states that introduced the quota system for the purposes of education. 
Arguably, affirmative action focuses on the individual because it represents a preventative 
procedure, which aims to minimize the possibility of discrimination.695 In this sense, 
Romania again adopts measures that are focused on the integration of persons of Roma origin 
and not on the Roma’s social inclusion as a group.696 At the same time, affirmative action 
aims to deal with ‘inequitable outcomes of social arrangements without disturbing the 
underlying framework that generates them.’697 These policies attempt to correct final
outcomes rather than the processes that generate inequality.698
The Ministry opened 1,350 places for Roma students and increased their number to 
3,000 the following year. Approximately 2.500 students were admitted to secondary schools 
in 2004 and 2005.699 During the next year, the government adopted affirmative measures for 
tertiary education and opened 398 university places for young Roma candidates.700 The 
                                                
693 “CEACR: Individual Observation Concerning Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 
1958 (No. 111) Romania (ratification: 1973) Published: 2006” [http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/pdconv.pl?host=status01&textbase=iloeng&document=8664&chapter=6&query=Romania%40ref&highligh
t=&querytype=bool] (accessed: September 10, 2007).
694 The Strategy aims at: encouraging the Roma to enter universities through publicly funded places for Roma 
candidates; establishing classes for Roma speaking teachers who will be working with Roma students; 
providing classes in Romani as a native language in the schools; and others. See: “Advancing Education of 
Roma in Romania: Country Assessment and the Roma Education Fund’s Strategic Directions”, p. 47.
695 Tierney, William, “The Parameters of Affirmative Action: Equity and Excellence in the Academy”, Review 
of Educational Research, 67: 2 (1997), p. 167.
696 McHarg, Aileen and Donald Nicolson, “Justifying Affirmative Action: Perception and Reality”, p. 15
697 Fraser, Nancy, “A Rejoinder to Iris Young” in Willett, Cynthia, Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the 
Current Debate, pp. 31-2.
698 Ibid, pp. 31-2
699 “Advancing Education of Roma in Romania: Country Assessment and the Roma Education Fund’s Strategic 
Directions”, pp.147-8.
700 “Minority Protection in Romania, EU Accession Monitoring Program”, 2002, p. 502
[http://www.eumap.org/topics/minority/reports/minority02/international/sections/romania/2002_m_romania.pdf
] (accessed: March 6, 2006).
171
government also issued legal notification against segregation in schools, but segregation is 
likely to continue unless the warning transforms into a governmental decree or decision.701
In sum, the government did not adopt policies targeting the entire education system 
but measures directed toward members of the respective minority.
The last two structures in line with the Strategy, the Roma experts and County Offices
on Roma work on the local level. Such decentralisation of power advances the goals of 
liberal multiculturalism if the local and regional structures are committed to accommodating 
ethnic minorities. Adjustments are more readily identified, of smaller scale, and less 
expensive.  Local authorities may experiment with different practices, and it is less costly to 
correct inadequate policies on a limited scale. Regional authorities may exchange experience
and learn from the practices of other regions. A decentralised network is an important 
precondition for the growth of civic culture.702
The Romanian County Offices work under the supervision of the Joint Committee of 
Implementation and Monitoring, and the experts assist the offices on Roma and the mayor. 
The county offices are responsible for the planning and coordination of activities on the local 
level.703 As a part of a frequently recurring scenario, their employees had no access to the 
organisational resources of the local administration, and the prefects did not assist the 
Offices. It was difficult to estimate the necessary funds, and the Offices only carried out
activities that required no resources, such as informational campaigns, seminars, participation 
in the Census, conflict resolution, signing partnerships with NGOs and decentralised 
institutions for project implementation at the local level and implementation of projects that 
are funded as a part of the Strategy, to a more limited extent.704
The other local structure, the Roma expert represents the main mediator between the 
authorities and the public.705 The Roma experts function within the Counties’ Prefectures, 
which do not have funding available for the position. The Regional Councils are the 
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institutions responsible for the allocation of funds, but the Roma experts were not invited to 
the sessions, during which financial decisions were made.706
In general, the Strategy does not invoke funding sources, and this fact poses a serious 
concern for the government’s ability to implement the measures.707 The Strategy received a 
low level of direct funding considering the government’s own estimate that EUR 105 million 
was required over a period of 10 years. According to the estimate, 69 percent of the funding 
would come from international donors, and the government would contribute the rest of the 
money or approximately EUR 32.55 million. Three years after the Strategy was adopted, the 
government has allocated no more than EUR 3 million. A contribution of 1.6 million was 
secured for the improvement of Roma’s living conditions, and 1.33 million was provided for 
the education of disadvantaged groups, with a special focus on the Roma.708 The public 
authorities submitted 220 projects to an evaluation and selection committee, which identified 
83 of them as eligible and funded only 17.709 Information about these projects and their 
budgets remains confidential.710
The fact that the implementation of policies did not lead to a significant improvement 
of the situation of the minority can be attributed to the effects of the transitional period on the 
Romanian state. Romania went through a period of recession that affected its capacity to 
independently fund the Government Strategy for Improving the Situation of Roma. With 
respect to effectiveness, the Strategy has been more about ‘conceiving’, ‘planning’ or 
‘elaborating’ than about the actual implementation of measures.711 The idea that ‘the process
is more important that the product’ has become a guiding line of a program ‘obsessed with 
planning.’712 A statement of Prime Minister Natase illustrates the overall implementation of 
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activities: ‘The Strategy is excellent, we adopted it, everybody was satisfied and after that we 
put it in the drawer.’713
The general Romanian approach to minorities remains closer to the liberal model of 
human rights. The fact that the Council and the local structures have limited authority
suggests that the Romanian government has been reluctant to adopt special measures for 
accommodating the ethnic minorities in the country. This reluctance is explainable 
considering the geopolitical situation of Romania, whose Hungarian minority has an external 
homeland and is therefore seen as a security threat to the Romanian state.
On the other hand, chapter four on the historical treatment of minorities has illustrated 
the many ways, in which the Roma minority was marginalised, of which the long period of 
slavery is one example. The relatively ineffective attempt to improve the situation of the 
minority can be explained considering this legacy of marginalisation, combined with the 
negative attitude of the dominant group toward the country’s ethnic minorities and the lack of 
sufficient resources for the implementation of measures. In principle, the government 
program entails even more measures than its Bulgarian counterpart. The central and local 
levels participate in their implementation, and there is a structure to monitor and coordinate
the planned activities. However, the ambitious program lacks a clear vision of priority areas. 
The government has introduced a successful and commendable health mediators’ program, 
but the Strategy does not mention or justify the need to focus on this specific concern. The 
enduring marginalisation of the minority presupposes clear criteria for evaluating its living 
conditions. These would enable the government to articulate the most pressing concerns and
the most feasible and effective solutions. Finally, real devolution of authority to the local 
administrations would engage the skills of actors that have knowledge on the grassroots’
level.
5.3.3. Hungary
5.3.3.1. Legal framework within the human rights system
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The Hungarian Constitution guarantees the autonomy of the individual from state 
authority as per Article 70/ A of Act XX, which adopts the ECHR’s prohibition of
discrimination. The article postulates that Hungary ‘shall respect the human and civil rights 
of all persons in the country without discrimination,’ with national origin among the 
protected characteristics.714
The scope of Paragraph 1 is limited to civil and human rights, but the Constitutional 
Court has extended the non-discrimination principle to the entire legal system.715
Discrimination, in this sense, is defined as the limitation of some right or duty by the state or 
the imposition of obligations that are not prescribed to others.716 The constitutional text does 
not elaborate on the concept of discrimination.717 Similarly, article 70/A makes no reference 
to the responsibility of individuals and private entities to abide by the principle of non-
discrimination. 
The imprecise formulation of the principle does not arise from the unwillingness of 
the Hungarian state to provide guarantees against unequal treatment. The text of the current 
Constitution is the result of the 1989 Round Table negotiations between the hardliners and 
reformers of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party and the fairly undifferentiated 
oppositional structures.718 As a result, the amendment to the Constitution represented a 
political compromise that contained a number of contradictory and imprecise formulations. 
However, a premature promulgation of a new Constitution may have contributed to a 
‘conservation of transitory state of affairs full of compromises.’719
The statutory laws based on the amended Constitution contained general anti-
discrimination provisions only. The Parliament proceeded to refine the existing legislation in 
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2004 by adopting Act CXXV on Equal Treatment and Promoting Equal Opportunities 
(ETA). The Act transposes the Race Equality and Labor Equality Directives into national 
legislation.720 The law provides comprehensive safeguards against discrimination through a 
non-exhaustive list of protected characteristics. It also allows for non-governmental 
organisations and government structures to act on behalf of victims.721
 This approach is in line with the Hungarian rationale that domestic devolution of 
authority will serve as an example for the empowerment of Hungarian minorities abroad. In 
accordance with this view, the Equal Treatment Authority, which is the main anti-
discrimination structure, enjoys wide authority over case investigations and can impose fines 
on those who violate the equality provisions.722 This flexibility is possible because the body 
has its independent funding and cannot be instructed in its sphere of competence.723 As a 
result, the authority is able to resolve cases quicker than other existing mechanisms. It takes 
between 4 and 5 months to make a decision, while a court case continues for a year, and a 
case before the ECtHR can extend to 3-5 years.724 The fact that the ETA is empowered to 
review complaints across the country725 further illustrates the substantial authority vested 
within the anti-discrimination structure. 
A second investigative mechanism, the Minority Ombudsman, named Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, examines Constitutional 
rights’ violations and initiates measures to remedy them. Any person who suffers injustice by
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the public authorities can turn to the Parliamentary Commissioner in cases, where all other 
routes have been exhausted or do not exist. The Ombudsman investigates all public 
authorities and can request information, hearings, written explanations, opinions from a 
competent official, etc. Upon finding a violation, the Ombudsman issues recommendation, to 
which the perpetrator must respond within a period of one month.726 However, the body 
cannot issue a legally binding decision or correct the abuse. Its role is to merely investigate 
cases and propose measures to the organ concerned. A case of the 2006 Ombudsman Report 
illustrates the limited power of the body to influence perpetrators’ actions. The report states 
that the Ombudsman ‘received numerous complaints, including from the National Roma 
Self-Government that the Hungarian Roma community’s dignity had been violated by the 
false picture conveyed by the media of Roma and which was also capable of inciting 
hatred.’727
The Ombudsman requested that the Cooperation Board of the journalists’ 
organisations condemn the anti-Roma speech and called for journalistic self-restraint and 
responsibility. The Board replied in several months, merely stating that the press 
organisations had not agreed on a joint statement. Four organisations agreed with a draft 
response produced by the Cooperation Board, two gave evasive replies, and the other four 
did not react to the Ombudsman’s request.728 It is clear that if accusers exhaust all other 
channels for remedy, they have to rely on the good will of authorities and organisations to 
consider the request of the Ombudsman. As in the Bulgarian case, the Ombudsman 
represents an alternative form to the executive anti-discrimination body that serves to 
facilitate dialogue and increase the general knowledge of discriminatory practices.
In sum, the Hungarian approach to anti-discrimination has been the transposition of 
generic international norms, combined with a positive obligation to monitor and respond to 
discriminatory acts. Concurrently, Hungary has adopted the multicultural model of special 
protection in the form of non-territorial autonomy. The discussion in chapter four suggests
that the Hungarian assimilative approach has eliminated the perception that minorities could 
be a security threat to the state’s territorial integrity. Ethnicity could safely become a 
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synonym for cultural diversity, a fact which explains the government’s readiness to
accommodate multiple visions of identity. 
5.3.3.2. Government measures for Roma integration
The Hungarian approach toward minority protection includes constitutional 
guarantees, group-based rights, and non-territorial autonomy or self-government. However, 
the emphasis that Hungary places on minority protection may be attributed to the state’s
efforts to secure special protection for the Hungarian minorities in other countries. To this 
end, Hungary has adopted two policy lines: interference in the domestic affairs of countries 
with Hungarian minorities and adoption of robust domestic protection with the aim to raise 
Hungary’s diplomatic leverage and negotiate on the status of the Hungarian minorities 
abroad. 
The country has adopted all relevant human rights instruments.729 The present 
Constitution of Hungary contains provisions that protect the identity of domestic minorities 
as well as clauses that permit involvement in issues related to the treatment of ethnic 
Hungarians abroad. Article 6 (3), for example, stipulates that the state bears responsibility for 
‘Hungarians living outside of its borders and promotes the fostering of their relations with 
Hungary.’730
These Constitutional arrangements suggest that while Hungary develops legislation 
on ethnic Hungarians abroad, the authorities may disregard the FCNM’s principle of 
‘sovereign equality, and … political independence.’731 In fact, the country has already 
disregarded this principle by introducing legislation that aims to protect the Hungarians 
outside the borders of Hungary. Two main approaches toward the protection of the 
Hungarian Diaspora stand out: institutionalized trans-border protectionism and the adoption 
of special protection, serving as a model for countries with Hungarian minorities. 
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In 2001, the government of Prime Minister Orban attempted to institutionalize cross-
border protectionism through the Status Law on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States. 
According to its original provisions, all ethnic Hungarians and their families had access to 
educational facilities as Hungarian citizens (Article 4). They were entitled to social security 
benefits for contributions paid during work periods in the state (Article 7). Ethnic Hungarians 
had the right to temporary work permits under articles 15 and 16.
In response to the harsh criticism of the Romanian and Slovakian governments, the 
Venice Commission expressed the opinion that the role of Hungarian institutions abroad 
approached a de facto exercise of sovereign power over the affairs of neighbouring countries. 
In December 2001 and January 2002, Hungary revoked the Law in compliance with 
international human rights standards.732
With the introduction of group-based rights for minorities, the government adopted 
another approach – establishing a model of minority treatment for its neighbouring 
countries.733 The willingness to adopt exemplary minority legislation reflects both concern 
for ethnic Hungarians abroad and trust in the loyalty of domestic minorities. The reason 
behind the high level of trust is the fact that Hungary accommodates a multitude of small, 
dispersed, and relatively assimilated ethnic communities and the large but dispersed and 
culturally diverse Romani minority.734 The nature of the ethnic composition eliminates 
perceptions of threat to the state’s territorial integrity and accounts for the extensive 
Constitutional protections of individual and collective identities. Article 68 (2) confirms that 
the Republic of Hungary grants protection to its ethnic and national minorities, ensuring their 
inclusion in public life and fostering the cultures of ethnic minorities.735
The 1993 Act LXXVII on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities builds upon 
the far-reaching Constitutional protections of minorities. Several provisions stress the 
importance of cultural and linguistic ties with the country of origin, a clear indication of the 
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intent to provide an example of minority protection.736 The scope of the preferred collective 
guarantees extends to non-territorial autonomy rather than territorial autonomy. This choice 
is understandable in view of the contentious claims for succession among Hungarians
abroad.737 Therefore, the preference for non-territorial autonomy reflects the desire for the
empowerment of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. 
The chosen type of non-territorial autonomy entails cultural, personal, and functional 
decentralisation. Cultural autonomy involves the devolution of power over ‘identity issues’ 
such as education and language.738 Personal autonomy allows the establishment of 
administrative structures to address identity-related concerns, for example, decision-making
and representative bodies for minority groups. The last type of autonomy, functional 
decentralisation, entails the transfer of rights and state functions to minority decision-making 
structures.739
In line with this model of non-territorial autonomy, the Hungarian domestic 
minorities are entitled to cultural rights and their own institutions, referred to as national and 
local self-government in the Minority Act.740 These local authorities have the right to possess 
and display their own insignia, run their own educational and cultural institutions, print 
newspapers and broadcast media. They also have the right to veto the appointments of school 
principals and veto municipal or council resolutions affecting minorities. National self-
governments, on the other hand, have functional rights, i.e. they participate in legislative 
procedures where the respective laws affect minorities.741
The non-territorial character of the self-governments evokes the issue of group 
boundaries’ permeability. Strong ethnic boundaries would limit the liberal individual right to 
self-identification. However, weak boundaries might confirm the fear of multiculturalists that 
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dominant groups overrun their minorities.742 The second scenario is evidenced with the 
establishment of Roma self-government. Members of the dominant group can run for 
elections given that they are not required to declare their ethnic affiliation. Furthermore, there 
are no records of citizens’ ethnic background, and every Hungarian has the right to vote in 
the elections.743
As a result, more than half a million votes were cast for minority candidates in the 
1994 elections. The minorities’ representatives ignored the danger of being outvoted by the 
dominant group and at first interpreted electoral activity as a sign that the dominant group 
sympathised with them. According to the post-election estimates, numerous representatives 
of the minority self-governments ‘[did] not belong to the community and [were] only 
interested in a certain “ethno business”.’744 The Minority Ombudsman repeatedly argued that 
a voluntary registration of voters of minority origin would be compatible with the freedom to 
self-identify as a member of an ethnic community.745 The Hungarian parliament agreed with 
the Ombudsman and passed a law, which gave only registered citizens the right to vote.746 In 
this way, the state preserved the individual right to self-ascription but limited the possibility 
to repeatedly alter one’s ethnicity according to the perceived benefits.
A final but significant point of the discussion relates to the absence of economic 
protection within the system of self-governments. The Minority Act does not protect the right 
of minorities to a decent standard of living, and they cannot demand that the authorities 
improve their living standard when the issue is excluded from the minority political 
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agenda.747 The absence of legal guarantees reduces the work of many Roma self-
governments to lobbying on behalf of their destitute constituencies and negotiating future 
solutions. The Roma self-governments are unable to attend to the economic problems of the 
minority, and their legitimacy becomes questionable for the electorate.748
It can be argued that the work of the self-governments cannot replace the forces of the 
functioning market. However, this statement contradicts the fact that these institutions have
rights related to their economic interests and activities. Notably, they are granted the right to 
establish their own business enterprises and use the profits in support of their constituencies. 
One possible answer lies in the fact that the transitional period put enormous budgetary strain 
on the government at a time when the Roma needed substantial support from the state.749 The 
erosion of public institutions created a ‘recession transformation’ that affected the retired, 
large families, unskilled workers, and other disadvantaged groups.750 Hence, Hungary has 
been under pressure to integrate the Roma minority while reintegrating large social segments 
within the framework of the post-industrial capitalist model.751
While the absence of collective socio-economic guarantees brings disillusionment 
among the Roma, the establishment of self-government represents a considerable gain in the 
struggle for social equality. The Minority Act grants formal recognition of ethnic identities 
and ‘a framework to articulate [their] needs in an organized form.’ The right to self-
government has given the Roma the chance to gain experience in institution building. The 
lobbying and opinion-forming functions of Roma representatives have become the path to 
political education and a channel for upward social mobility. Representation has become a 
‘profession’ that brings material rewards and respect to Roma leaders. In addition, the 
election of several thousand representatives has resulted in the rise of Hungarian 
organisations that support local initiatives, training programs, and professional activities. 
This development has led to the growth of a capable and informed Roma elite. Finally, Julia 
Szalai notes that ‘participation in the political discourse assists the coupling of majority and 
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minority argumentations, and helps to put together the first building blocks of … a local 
policy on majority-minority coexistence.’752
Parallel to the development of the self-government system is the formulation of
measures and structures that introduce the social equality principle. Until 1998, the Office for 
National and Ethnic Minorities functioned as the main government agency in charge of 
minority issues. According to official information, the Office operated as an independent 
administrative body with national authority. In line with Article 15 of the ECHR, the Office 
evaluated the enforcement of minority rights, prepared policy concepts for government 
resolutions, and facilitated communication between the national government and
organisations run by ethnic minorities.753 The Council was also in charge of the preparation 
and subsequent monitoring of a National Action Plan on Social Inclusion of Roma. The first 
Medium-Term Action plan enforced under Government Resolution No. 1093/1997 aimed to 
preserve the Roma’s cultural identity and raise their socio-economic status. The Plan 
contained measures in terms of education, employment, anti-discrimination, and other 
aspects. 754 However, the resolution focused more on planning and researching than on actual 
implementation.755
The new government of Prime Minister Orban decided to revise the Mid-Term Action 
Plan in 1998. The content of the program confirmed the principles of the previous document 
but prioritised tasks in the fields of culture and education. The Action Plan focused on
regular attendance in primary school. Another goal was to reduce the dropout rate for high 
school and university students. The program also envisaged developing a system of cultural 
institutions, which offered further training to professionals. The government considered that 
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a different type of management body would implement the program more efficiently and 
proceeded to replace the Coordination Council with an Interdepartmental Committee on 
Roma Affairs.756 The new body was tasked with coordinating the work of various ministries 
in relation to the Action Plan. Each of the respective ministries was required to present an 
annual action plan for the implementation of the package measures and to allocate the
necessary resources.757
Despite the more autonomous nature of the coordination body, the implementation 
brought mixed results. In 2000, the Ministry of Economic Affairs spent the largest share of 
government funding for measures under the midterm package. The ministry allocated HUF 2 
billion (EUR 7.7 million) to retraining programs, public work labour projects, and subsidies 
for the long-term unemployed. However, these programs were open to all citizens, and the 
participants’ ethnic origin was not recorded. Roma-related spending was calculated on the 
assumption that 8 to 10 percent of the participants were Roma, and this ‘creative accounting’ 
was used to determine the actual spending allocated to the Action Plan.758
If economic measures were tailored inappropriately, the Roma housing program was 
close to non-existent. The government invested HUF 300 million in the construction of 
housing for Roma families who were employed and sent their children to school. However, a 
flat for 5 people costs between HUF 5 and 6 million, and the available funding covered the 
construction of 50 to 60 flats. This small-scale project could hardly represent a Governmental 
National Gypsy Housing Program.759 Measures related to the redevelopment of Roma 
neighbourhoods were not implemented. In 2001, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development produced a bill, which called for the expenditure of HUF 43 billion over a five-
year period to abolish ‘areas of colony-like slum housing.’760 The proposal featured two 
options: demolition or redevelopment by building infrastructure. The Interdepartmental 
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Committee on Roma Affairs rejected the bill on the grounds that the costs of the project were 
excessive. The Committee stated that the money would be drained into ‘pet redevelopment 
schemes’ instead of alleviating the housing situation of the Roma.761
Achievements in the education sector seem more promising. The government started 
a program that aimed to reduce segregation and decrease the number of Roma dropouts. The 
government invested EUR 12.5 million to strengthen the schools’ engagement in integration 
and to encourage talented Roma pupils, along with a PHARE contribution of EUR 6.9 
million.762 The program of integrated education included 8,800 students in 2003 and 16,000 
in 2004. The integration of disadvantaged students was required in all schools participating in 
the program, with the aim of eliminating segregation. Regional inspectors of the National 
Network of Educational Integration assisted the schools in the process of integration. The 
subsidy to schools from the state budget amounted to HUF 60,000 (226 EUR) in 2004. The 
government also expanded the scholarship system and distributed grants to 20,045 students 
and 7,739 mentoring teachers.  Finally, the government aimed at reducing the number of 
students, the majority being of Roma origin, who were misdiagnosed as intellectually 
disabled. Independent experts examined 2,100 children and returned 212 of them to 
mainstream schools.763
A brief glance at this overview reveals similarities between the multidimensional 
character of the Action Plans and the program of the Bulgarian government. The attempt to 
cover many fields has resulted in the inadequate distribution of resources. As in Bulgaria,
different structures participated simultaneously in implementation and came up with 
contradictory opinions. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Roma Affairs are two parties that could not reach an 
agreement on infrastructural development. The ambitious labour and retraining program 
secured substantial funding, but the project suffered from inadequate planning and lacked 
transparent implementation. It is commendable that the government pinpointed measures in 
one priority area, integrated education.
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Efforts in the education sector have produced visible results because of substantial 
foreign and domestic investments and cooperation on state and regional levels. Moreover, the 
government did not merely encourage but mandated integration in the participating 
institutions, while local experts assisted the process. Prioritising education and devolution of 
implementation to the local level has made room for sensitive and appropriately tailored 
measures for improving the situation of the Roma. 
5.4. Conclusion
This chapter explored the level of minority protection in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania and the underlying reasons for the adoption of agenda and legislation, based either 
on the liberal principles of equality or on the multicultural approach of accommodating the 
culture of ethnic minorities.
The first section of the chapter examined the low socio-economic status of the Roma
in the three states. The majority of present-day communities live in impoverished areas with 
substandard infrastructure and limited access to healthcare services. Many Roma attend 
segregated educational establishments with outdated and substandard facilities, where low 
quality of education is provided. With limited educational backgrounds, the majority of 
Roma people hold unskilled jobs or rely on the state for social assistance. Roma suffer from 
discrimination and remain on the fringes of socio-economic life. 
In the transitional period to democracy and market economy, the governments in the 
three states faced a difficult dilemma. They had to either adopt the liberal principles of 
equality and individual rights or the multicultural model of special protection for ethnic 
minorities.   
The second section explored the reasons behind the adoption of particular approaches 
toward minority protection in each state. In chapter four, it was suggested that Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Romania participated in imperial formations on different terms. The dominant 
group in Bulgaria was under Ottoman rule and at present claims to be a victim of historic
oppression. Bulgarians question the loyalty of the former dominant group – the present 
Turkish minority – and mistrust its commitment to social cohesion and the fulfilment of 
common citizenship duties. Due to fear that the Turkish minority may attempt to resume its 
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dominant status, the dominant group shows a preference for a strong state and disempowered 
minorities. Mistrust of the former oppressor also explains why the liberal approach based on 
human rights was adopted. 
The argument of historic injustice works differently in the Hungarian context. The 
Habsburg Empire, of which Hungary was a part, led a robust policy toward the assimilation 
of its ethnic minorities. After attaining independence Hungary pursued an effective policy of 
assimilation, which suppressed the minorities’ capacity for effective political mobilization. 
These factors explain Hungary’s readiness to adopt a multicultural approach of group-based 
rights and policies. Another factor that explains the strong emphasis on minority protection is 
the existence of large Hungarian minorities in neighbouring states. Due to the restructuring of 
borders after World War I, the incorporation of Hungarian-populated regions in other states 
is perceived as historic injustice. Hungary has adopted two approaches to deal with this
historic injustice – trans-border protectionism and domestic multicultural policies, intended
to serve as a model for the treatment of Hungarians abroad. 
In Romania, the annexation of Transylvania served to remedy a perceived historic 
injustice – Hungary’s control over Transylvania. However, the presence of the sizeable and 
politically active Hungarian minority and Hungary’s attempts to interfere in the domestic 
minority affairs of other states resulted in shifting the focus from minority protection to 
social cohesion and national security. Due to concerns over the sovereignty and indivisibility 
of the state, Romania took the liberal understanding that the members of ethnic minorities be 
treated in the same way as the members of the dominant group. 
An examination of the three states’ legislation and policies followed the discussion of 
why states opted for liberal or multicultural approaches to accommodating their ethnic 
minorities. Bulgaria has adopted all the international instruments for human rights protection,
which take priority over domestic legislation. However, the state’s preference for the liberal 
approach is evident in recognising only persons belonging to minorities. The new Law on the 
Protection from Discrimination is in line with the EU anti-discrimination standards. A special 
administrative structure has the authority to examine cases and impose sanctions if 
discrimination has occurred. The legislative framework complies with and even goes beyond 
the minimum reading of international norms, which require effective participation through 
non-discrimination. Despite its administrative limitation (e.g. overload of cases), the anti-
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discrimination structure has actual executive powers to implement decisions where
discrimination has occurred.
The Framework Program for the Equal Integration of Roma envisages specific 
measures in terms of housing, healthcare, professional development, and education. The 
National Council on Ethnic and Demographic Issues is tasked with the program’s 
implementation. Although the structure has coordinating and consultative functions, vesting 
of delaying and blocking powers would have been a sign of the state’s commitment to the 
multicultural model of minority protection. Its small budget and limited focus on cultural 
initiatives also indicates the government’s preference for the liberal approach. The program 
covers a comprehensive set of measures, but its scope is overambitious in view of the human 
and financial resources. In-depth analyses of each area and prioritisation of some fields over 
others might contribute more to the improvement of the socio-economic status of the Roma. 
Moreover, the implementation of this large-scale program requires more direct participation
of the authorities on all levels of government. Stronger stances on minority protection, 
however, risk intensifying the impression of undue minority empowerment at the expense of 
the dominant group’s chances to lead a better life. In view of the dominant group’s mistrust 
of ethnic minorities and their loyalty to the state, group-based measures may also intensify 
the securitisation of ethnicity. In this sense, the multicultural model may become the norm 
only after mutual trust and tolerance have become characteristic features of dominant group –
minority relations. Measures and policies that are conducive to building trust would facilitate 
the establishment of a country-specific approach toward minority protection.
Romania has adopted the body of human rights treaties that accords citizenship rights. 
At the same time, Romania places strong emphasis on national unity and territorial integrity,
and its approach to accommodating multiple identities is in line with the minimal reading of 
effective participation. Law 48/2002 on the protection against discrimination is more limited 
in scope compared to the provisions of the EU anti-discrimination directives. The structure 
that evaluates cases of discrimination – the National Council for Combating Discrimination –
has limited competencies and insufficient human and financial resources. 
The Government Strategy for Improving the Situation of Roma is extensive and 
encompasses measures in ten priority areas, such as housing, healthcare, education, and civic 
involvement. The National Agency for Roma is responsible for the coordination of policies 
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on the regional and national levels. In line with the liberal approach, the agency is tasked 
with strategic planning rather than implementation of the package measures for Roma 
integration. The Ministerial Commissions are in charge of the strategy, but their approach is 
limited to inconsistent and under-funded measures which, as the measures for employment 
suggest, target the general population rather than members of the Roma population.
 Similar to Bulgaria, the Romanian large-scale program requires substantial funding 
and direct involvement of the authorities on all levels of government. The implementation of 
policies in each area necessitates considerable planning, coordination, and financial and 
human resources. Careful reassessment of the planned measures, as with Hungary, and 
prioritisation of some policy areas could lead to policies that are better-suited to improve the 
socio-economic situation of the Roma. On the other hand, substantial investment of resources 
in the strategy, in its current form, runs the risk of provoking discontent among ethnic 
Romanians. The members of the dominant group may come to believe that these measures 
are being carried out to their disadvantage. Tolerance and trust building strategies may
contribute to the acceptance of multiculturalism. 
Hungary has adopted anti-discrimination legislation that transposes the EU Racial 
Equality and Labor Equality Directive and provides sound safeguards against discrimination. 
In line with the multicultural model, the Equal Treatment Authority has large competencies 
in evaluating cases of discrimination and imposing fines upon offenders. The fact that the 
structure has independent funding is sound proof of Hungary’s commitment to the 
multicultural model. 
The government’s approach to minority protection includes group-based measures 
and non-territorial autonomy with the aim of personal, cultural, and functional 
decentralisation. Group-based economic guarantees, such as the right to a decent standard of 
living, are excluded from the political agenda. This fact has been attributed partly to the 
budgetary strain on successive governments to accommodate multiple demands by social 
groups affected by the transitional period. Despite the absence of socio-economic guarantees, 
the right to establish self-governments is a step toward the empowerment of ethnic 
minorities. Lobbying, opinion forming, and representation have given Roma the chance to 
gather experience in and experiment with institution building. 
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As part of the government program for minority protection, the Hungarian authorities 
developed a large-scale program for the inclusion of Roma through measures in education, 
housing, healthcare, and more. The program was re-evaluated in 1998 and revised to 
prioritise measures in culture and education. Prioritisation has brought visible results in 
education. The government secured financing and mandated the integration of disadvantaged 
Roma students in the education system. At the same time, these efforts at integration were 
assisted by regional inspectors from the National Network of Educational Integration. The 
program’s success can be attributed to the allocation of considerable foreign and domestic 
funding and the close cooperation on and between state and regional levels. 
Arguably, the Hungarian approach represents a model for improving the socio-
economic situation of the Roma. The Hungarian state has gone beyond the minimum reading 
of effective participation, which only requires protection from discrimination, the right to 
vote in elections, run for office, and engage in advocacy. However, the ethnic minorities in 
Hungary are small, dispersed, and assimilated to a large extent. The Roma minority is 
sizeable but also dispersed and culturally diverse. The character of the ethnic composition in 
Hungary eliminates perceptions that ethnic minorities pose a security threat to the country. 
Multiple visions of identity are safeguarded and celebrated with the adoption of the
multicultural approach to minority protection. At the same time, the state seeks extensive 
guarantees for the rights of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries. The 
Hungarian approach to minority protection aims to establish a model for the protection of 
ethnic minorities and to strengthen the state’s case for negotiating the status of Hungarians 
abroad. 
In general, the response of the three governments entails a number of positive steps to 
empower the minority. The benefits of improving the socio-economic status of the Roma, 
even to the dominant group, are evident. For example, calculations show that the cost of 
integrating the Roma is BGN 1 billion while the returns, in terms of the Roma’s productivity, 
would be BGN 22 billion in the next 10 years.764 The most promising approach is applied in 
Hungary – choosing one or two priority areas and involving state as well as regional actors. 
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A general mismatch between the formulation and implementation of policies and the 
poor coordination between the local and state levels is evident in many of the states’ policies, 
suggesting that monitoring is weak or absent. In chapter three, it was suggested that the 
involvement of international monitoring structures has been mostly in the form of advisors, 
information gathering thinktanks, or lobbying mechanisms. The principle of state sovereignty 
tends to discourage large-scale monitoring when the stakes are not as high as in regions of 
acute human rights violations. The answer may lie, in part, in the implementation of local 
projects by NGOs, the government, local authorities, and international authorities on human 
rights. 
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Conclusion
After an overview of the contents and theoretical findings of this thesis, the 
conclusion turns to an outline of how the research done here can be taken forward. The thesis 
has exposed the reasons for the failure of the governments of Bulgaria and Romania, and for 
the relative success of the Hungarian government, to protect Roma minority rights. I will 
review a number of ways the identified problems could start to be addressed.
The thesis has examined the situation of the Roma in Bulgaria, Hungary, and 
Romania as well as the policies and rights, devised to improve the socio-economic status of 
this minority. I have looked into the nature of minority protection and the international and 
domestic institutions engaged in enforcing minority-related rights and measures. 
By exploring these issues, I have concluded that in Eastern Europe, as represented by 
Bulgaria and Romania, the authorities have failed to deal with the unequal position of the 
Roma. To help explain this fact, the thesis has examined different theories of 
multiculturalism and nationality and their relevance to the unique position of the minority. 
The thesis also looked at the functioning of the international regime of human rights and the 
geo-political situation of the states in Eastern Europe. 
My hypothesis was that a key factor in the failure of Eastern European states to 
improve the situation of their Roma minorities is that the ‘the dominant group – ethnic 
minority’ relations in these countries are based on a liberal model as opposed to a 
multicultural model. 
The academic literature on ethnic minority rights has provided two main models that 
deal with the rights of minority cultures. The liberal model focuses on universal human rights 
and advances the standpoint that the way to improve the socio-economic situation of ethnic 
minorities is to ensure that their members are treated in the same way as the members of the 
dominant groups. The multicultural model focuses on special protection of ethnic minorities 
as the way to improve their quality of life. 
The thesis has shown that the international system of human rights, which sets 
standards for minority rights’ legislation, is almost fully based on the liberal model. In line 
with this model, the governments of Eastern European states have chosen to adopt the liberal 
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model, thus according citizenship rights to their ethnic minorities. The multicultural model, 
which is based on the protection of minority cultures, has received little attention from the 
authorities in Bulgaria and Romania. Two explanations have emerged for the preference of 
states for the liberal model when setting the global human rights agenda as well as in their 
domestic affairs. Firstly, territorial integrity is still a major concern of these states, and they 
perceive stronger forms of multicultural rights such as secession and territorial autonomy as a 
threat. The focus of human rights standards and international monitoring organisations fits 
well with the security concerns of the states in Eastern Europe. 
Secondly, the fact that Bulgaria and Romania have been reluctant to adopt 
multicultural policies has been attributed to the negative attitude of the dominant groups 
towards their ethnic minorities. The hostile attitude of the dominant groups emerges from 
historic developments, which are unique to these countries. For example, the Bulgarian 
dominant group has been mistreated by its Turkish minority in the past. At present, the 
Turkish minority is sizeable and active, while Turkey is its external national homeland. This 
is why, demands for stronger forms of protection are perceived as a threat to the state’s 
territorial integrity. Unlike Bulgaria and Romania, Hungary does not have territorial and/or 
security concerns. Small, fairly integrated, and dispersed minorities with no external national 
homelands live on its territory. This explains why Hungary has been willing to adopt the 
multicultural model, which benefits the Roma minority. 
The first chapter has employed theories of multiculturalism and nationality to 
provide a theoretical underpinning for the analysis of policies and institutions that can 
improve the socio-economic status of the Roma. The investigation has focused on the main 
features of nationality in Eastern Europe. The analysis of these features has helped explain 
why the dominant groups believe that their ethnic minorities pose a security threat to the 
territorial integrity of the state. Due to this perceived security threat, the states in the region 
show preference for the liberal model over the multicultural model. The chapter has 
examined the two models within the liberal – multicultural debate in order to identify 
whether a focus on human rights or special protection of the cultures of minority groups 
would bring a significant improvement of the problematic situation of the Roma. 
The second chapter has looked at human rights legislation developed by the 
international community. The fact that the focus of most standards is on human rights as 
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opposed to cultural rights has helped explain why these standards have failed to contribute to 
improving the socio-economic situation of the Roma. 
The international community has been reluctant to endorse stronger forms of minority 
protection such as territorial and non-territorial autonomy or cultural rights. Human rights 
documents that deal with the socio-economic situation of the Roma are in the form of 
guiding principles and non-binding recommendations only. The reluctance of states to 
develop standards that deal with the situation of Roma has been attributed to the fact that 
Roma-related issues are unpopular with the domestic electorates of these states. When an 
issue is politically sensitive, states are likely to drop it from their domestic political agendas. 
They will not call for more attention at the international level because their own domestic 
policies may come into the spotlight.
Taking into consideration the reluctance of states to commit to a more vigorous 
approach to improving the situation of the Roma, the third chapter has examined the 
application of monitoring mechanisms and their effectiveness in enforcing human rights and 
minority-related standards with respect to the Roma. The organisations that received detailed 
attention were the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, the 
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. An analysis of their involvement in Bulgaria, Hungary, 
and Romania has revealed that they are only engaged in the implementation of small-scale 
projects and initiatives for the integration of Roma. Monitoring has been absent from the 
work of these bodies, hinting at the low motivation of states to grant the monitoring 
organisations a more formidable presence in the field of minority protection. 
In examining the particular developments and factors influencing the identity and 
situation of the Roma in Eastern Europe, the fourth chapter has looked at the historic 
treatment of Roma by the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian dominant groups. For 
historic reasons, the Roma minority is in a different and worse position than other ethnic 
minorities and therefore deserves a more focused enquiry. The focus of the chapter has been 
on historic marginalisation, proving that the process is not a recent development, but has 
transpired over many centuries. The long-lasting marginalisation of the Roma poses 
significant obstacles to the current government’s efforts to improve their socio-economic 
status. The historic treatment of Roma in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania followed a 
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different course, with the general approaches of the dominant groups being marginalisation, 
assimilation, enslavement, and indifference. However, all these approaches have led to the 
present marginalised and unequal position of the Roma in the three countries, which require 
special protection in order to improve their quality of life. 
The fifth chapter has examined the efforts of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian 
governments to integrate their Roma minorities after the fall of Communism. The 
governments of Bulgaria and Romania have developed policies based on the liberal model 
and have ultimately failed to deal with the poor socio-economic situation of the Roma. Their 
strategies for Roma integration are comprehensive, but the implementation of the planned 
measures has not been consistent. The Hungarian authorities achieved considerably better 
results due to the fact that they developed policies based on the multicultural model, such as 
non-territorial autonomy. In addition, the government’s efforts to improve the socio-
economic situation of the Roma were more successful due to better planning, coordination, 
monitoring, and availability of resources, compared to Bulgaria and Romania.  
The fifth chapter has also examined the historic geo-political situation of the 
Bulgarian, Hungarian, and Romanian states as to explain their preference for the liberal 
model, focused on citizenship, over the multicultural model, focused on the protection of 
minority cultures. The dominant groups in Bulgaria and Romania believe that their ethnic 
minorities are irredentist and pose a security threat. These territorial and/or security concerns 
are linked to historic developments unique to these countries. The dominant group in 
Bulgaria, for example, believes that the Turkish minority in the country cooperated with the 
Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria’s former subjugator. The Bulgarian state is therefore reluctant to 
adopt special measures for the protection of minority cultures based on the multicultural 
model. The abovementioned security concerns are not an issue in Hungary. Its ethnic 
minorities are largely assimilated and dispersed and do not pose a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the state. 
In view of the tense ethnic relations in Bulgaria and Romania, the first question to ask 
before even looking at minority protection for the Roma is how to approach the territorial 
and/or security concerns of these states. How to convince them that responding to minority 
claims, even claims to territorial autonomy (e.g. the ethnic Hungarians in Romania), will not 
result in secessionist violence?
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The dominant groups in Eastern Europe oppose even modest claims such as those to 
mother-tongue secondary education and formal language rights.765 Secessionist violence and 
mobilization for democratic secession are at the opposite end of the spectrum.766
One way to move from the ‘security-based debate’ to a ‘justice-based debate’ is to 
draw a line between secession and autonomy, persuading states that territorial autonomy is 
not the first step to secession.767 International organisations can take steps to guarantee the 
territorial integrity and borders of countries in Eastern and Central Europe. This can be done 
if the international community insists that national minorities agree to a ‘loyalty clause’ and 
accept the current state borders. Yet, such steps have been taken and despite that the states in 
the region do not trust the guarantees of international organisations.768
Alternatively, Eastern European states should make room for debates on secessionist 
mobilization.769 It is important that states take to heart human rights, justice, and the interests 
of their citizens rather than insist that state borders are inviolable. Non-territorial autonomy is 
a good solution in many cases, but debates about secession should be brought to the public 
space.770 When debates on stronger forms of minority protection become part of the 
democratic discourse, other forms, such as non-territorial autonomy and cultural rights, will 
enter the public space as well. 
If the Eastern European states move away from the security-based debate, they will 
make room for policies that can improve the situation of their Roma minorities. Kymlicka 
has suggested two approaches to the cultural accommodation of Roma. The minority has to 
either qualify for a national minority status or Roma-specific policies and institutions should 
be in place to improve its socio-economic situation. 
Possible approaches involve including Roma representatives in the electoral lists, 
encouraging Roma to run for visible public offices, and including them in institutions 
engaged in decision-making. First, it is important that governments encourage political 
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parties to include Roma in their electoral lists during national and EU elections.771 Thus, 
Roma representatives will gain greater exposure and lobbying power at the level of the 
European Parliament. Given the low priority of Roma issues on the agendas of international 
organisations, this development may become an additional incentive for joint state efforts at 
the European, regional, or international level. 
It is important that successful community members run for visible public offices, e.g. 
mayors of the larger cities. Regardless of the chances to win elections, running for office has 
the potential to enhance the image of Roma. Leaders can show that the improved socio-
economic position of Roma will benefit the whole nation. Roma candidates may come from 
the academia, the cultural and literary circles, the non-government sector, a political party, or 
any institution that is held in high esteem by Roma and the dominant group. At the same 
time, being aware of the Roma’s problems, more members of the dominant groups may begin 
to empathize with them. 
It would be of great help if the government institutions provided technical assistance 
and professional advice on campaigning methods to Roma leaders. Government officials may 
assist Roma candidates in developing platforms that promote a positive image of the Roma 
minority. The improved public and self-image of the Roma will ‘restore their sense of pride, 
dignity, and identity.’772 At the same time, platforms that intertwine Roma concerns with 
national interests may act to increase the trust of dominant groups in minorities as a whole. 
Finally, it is essential that Roma leaders are given the opportunity to participate in 
national and local decision-making structures. Justice requires a balanced political process 
through counter-majoritarian rules in the form of power-sharing.773 One possible form of 
political organisation is the establishment of non-territorial self-governments by the example 
of Hungary. Local governments can help promote a positive image of the minority, facilitate
the provision of rights to the Roma, contribute to political mobilization, and stem attempts at 
assimilation. However, these self-governments may suffer from insufficient competencies 
and power, inadequate funding, and overdependence on the support of the local 
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governments.774  Another option for the greater inclusion of Roma in the political process is 
to hold regular town meetings that aim to facilitate open and bilateral communication 
between the Roma community and the elected and non-elected leaders of the minority and 
the dominant group.775
As a third option, special institutions with veto powers can be established to protect 
the interests of the Roma. Drawing on the ideas of Allan Buchanan of vesting nullification 
and/or veto powers in minority institutions and representatives, Levy notes that institutions 
and posts with such powers can act in place of or complement self-government institutions. 
For example, it may not be Quebec’s provincial government that has veto powers over 
language policies in Canada; a special national institution can be established to defend 
francophone interests.776 In the same way, special national institutions with veto powers, in 
which the Roma will have a voice, can function to protect the interests of the minority. 
Special institutions have been established in Bulgaria and Romania, but it is important 
that they get more authority and resources. Structures at both local and national levels can 
contribute to improving the socio-economic position of the Roma. 
The greater inclusion of Roma politicians is an essential step toward enhancing the 
image of this minority. The agendas of Roma leaders may have an instrumental role in 
reducing the dominant groups’ mistrust of ethnic minorities. The growing involvement of 
Roma in the political process can contribute to the development of regionally functional 
policies. The establishment of special institutions with real authority, in which the Roma 
have a voice, can contribute to the socially just protection of this minority.
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